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The Strength of the Mind: Essays on Consciousness and Introspection 
 
Jorge Francisco Morales Ladrón de Guevara 
 
 
I defend the view that mental states have degrees of strength. Our pains are more or less 
intense, our mental imagery is more or less vivid, our visual perceptions are more or less 
striking, and our desires and thoughts are more or less gripping. Mental strength is a 
phenomenal magnitude shared by all conscious experiences that determines their degree of 
felt intensity. Mental strength, however, has been largely ignored over other aspects of 
mental states such as their representational contents, phenomenology, or type. Considering 
mental strength is crucial for illuminating philosophical discussions related to 
representationalism, the transparency of experiences, cognitive phenomenology, attention, 
and the structure and function of consciousness. I use mental strength to develop in detail a 
neuropsychologically plausible theory of introspection and its limits that is inspired by a 
signal detection theoretic model of perception. In the second half of the dissertation, I look 
into methodological issues concerning the neural correlates of consciousness such as 
controlling for performance capacity and stimulus strength, and what these methodological 
concerns reveal about our theories of consciousness and its function. 
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Preface 
 
Conscious mental states have varying degrees of strength; pains are more or less intense, 
mental imagery is more or less vivid, perceptions are more or less striking, and thoughts and 
desires are more or less gripping. What explains these degrees of strength? What is the 
function, if any, of mental strength? Despite its importance, these questions about mental 
strength have been historically overlooked over other aspects of mental states. Philosophers 
have emphasized propositional attitudes, representational contents, sensory phenomenology, 
and type. Psychologists have emphasized stimulus strength, attention, and cognitive control. 
In The Strength of the Mind: Essays on Consciousness and Introspection, I defend the view 
that mental states have degrees of strength. Mental strength is a phenomenal magnitude 
shared by all conscious experiences that determines their degree of felt intensity. Mental 
strength is useful for explaining a number of phenomena. For instance, I use it to develop a 
systematic and neuropsychologically plausible theory of introspection and its limits inspired 
by a signal detection theoretic model of perception. Mental strength illuminates philosophical 
discussions related to attention, cognitive phenomenology, representationalism, and the 
transparency of experiences. Mental strength also affects the structure of our conscious 
stream and it reveals important functions of consciousness. In the second half of the 
dissertation, I present work done in collaboration with Hakwan Lau were we look into 
methodological issues concerning the neural correlates of consciousness such as controlling 
for performance capacity and stimulus strength, and what these methodological concerns 
reveal about our theories of consciousness and its function. 
  xi 
 In Chapter 1, “Mental Strength,” I introduce the notion of ‘mental strength’, a 
phenomenal magnitude of conscious experiences that determines their felt intensity. We 
report this quantitative dimension of our phenomenology when we describe the intensity of 
pains, the intensity of visual experiences, the vivacity of mental images. Historical 
precedents of mental strength are found in Hume, Kant, and William James. Mental strength 
is distinct from attention, stimulus and psychological saliency, and representational 
contents. I show the main features of mental strength in the central cases of pains, and then 
expand the view to mental imagery, perception, thoughts, and desires. The view that emerges 
is that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal property. Incorporating mental 
strength to our explanations of the mental has important repercussions for how we 
understand cognitive phenomenology, as well as the structure and the functions of 
consciousness.  
 In Chapter 2, “A Detection Theory of Introspection,” I offer a novel theory of 
introspection. By ‘introspection’ I understand the process of attentively focusing on one’s 
current conscious mental states to form judgments about them. We can introspect sensory 
experiences, pains, emotions, desires, and thoughts, among other mental events. Current 
theories fail to explain why introspecting our experiences is sometimes easy and sometimes 
hard. For example, they fail to explain why it is typically easy to introspect the location of an 
intense pain and hard to introspect the location of a dull pain. This calls into question their 
adequacy. The theory I advance builds on a widespread scientific approach to how we perceive 
external stimuli: Signal Detection Theory. According to (SDT), the reliability of our 
perceptions is a function of the strength of the perceptual signal that external stimuli 
generate in us, so that our perceptions are more reliable when the signal is strong. For 
example, we perceive a person in an alley more reliably when the alley is well-lit because the 
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perceptual signal is stronger. Similarly, according to the theory I advance, the reliability of 
an introspective judgment is a function of the strength of the introspective signal that our 
experiences generate in ourselves, so that introspective judgments are more reliable when 
the signal is strong. Accordingly, I call this Introspective Signal Detection Theory (iSDT). It 
provides a general, systematic, and neuropsychologically plausible explanation of 
introspection and its limitations. It also provides insight into philosophical discussions 
related to the nature of perception and the transparency of experiences. I also discuss 
potential neural substrates of iSDT and I propose a way of testing it using psychophysical 
methods. 
 In Chapter 3, “Perception, Performance, and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness,” I 
discuss some methodological considerations regarding perceptual strength and the quest for 
the neural correlates of consciousness. Studying the neural correlates of conscious awareness 
depends on a reliable comparison between activations associated with awareness and 
unawareness. One particularly difficult confound to remove is task performance capacity, i.e., 
the difference in performance between the conditions of interest. While ideally task 
performance capacity should be matched across different conditions (including stimulus 
strength), this is difficult to achieve experimentally. However, differences in performance 
could theoretically be corrected for mathematically. One such proposal is found in a recent 
paper by Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim (2009), who put forward a corrective method for EEG 
neuroimaging. Their analysis, however, is essentially grounded in a version of High 
Threshold Theory of perception, which has been shown to be inferior in general to Signal 
Detection Theory. The results of computer simulations are presented to confirm this along a 
proposal for a mathematical correction method based on Signal Detection Theory that is 
theoretically capable of removing performance capacity confounds. The limitations of 
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mathematically correcting for performance capacity confounds in imaging studies and its 
impact for theories about consciousness are discussed. A version of this chapter, co-authored 
with Hakwan Lau and Jeffrey Chiang, appeared in Neuroscience of Consciousness in 2015. 
 Finally, in Chapter 4, “The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Theories & Functions,” 
I focus on the different predictions current views of the neural correlates of consciousness 
(NCC) make. The main emphasis is placed on Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis, Local 
Recurrency, Higher Order and Global Workspace theories. In particular, their predictions 
with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences are explored. 
Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual 
processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. 
This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious 
perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. The current experimental 
evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher 
order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on 
marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be 
insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. 
Finally, it follows from the discussed evidence that the functional advantages of conscious 
over unconscious visual perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. 
A version of this chapter, co-authored with Hakwan Lau, will appear in Oxford Handbook of 







Hume’s starting point in A Treatise of Human Nature is that mental states have degrees of 
strength: “All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, 
which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees 
of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our 
thought or consciousness.”1 (Hume 2000 1.1.1.1; my italics) Under IMPRESSIONS he includes 
sensations, perceptions, passions, and emotions, while IDEAS are “faint images of these” (ibid) 
that include memories, imaginations, reasonings, and thoughts. Hume used the degree of 
strength of mental states as a criterion for individuating mental states by type: “[Impressions 
and ideas] are in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them 
under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.”2 (ibid) He 
has been rightly criticized for using these degrees of “force and liveliness” to distinguish types 
of mental states.3 But his insight that conscious states have degrees of strength, and that 
these degrees are a fundamental property of conscious mental states, has been wrongly 
                                                 
1 Throughout the Treatise Hume refers to this distinctive property with many different terms in 
addition to ‘force’ and ‘liveliness’. Among others, he uses vivacity, influence, firmness, violence, vigor, 
steadiness, strength and intensity (Hume 2000, see Annotations and Glossary). 
2 The criterion was meant to have a wide scope. However, it is clear that Hume thought there could be 
exceptions: “The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in 
particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, 
or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions. As on the other 
hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish 
them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in 
general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign 
to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.” (Hume 2000, 1.1.1.1) 
3 For example, (Stroud 1977, 28-9; Bennett 1971, 255); but see (Everson 1988; Dauer 1999) who try to 
make the criterion respectable. 
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underestimated for too long. Pains can be more or less strong, perceptions more or less 
striking, mental images more or less vivid, emotions more or less intense, desires and 
thoughts more or less gripping. These variations in otherwise radically different states are 
explained, or so I will argue, by variations along a single phenomenal dimension shared by 
all conscious states: their mental strength.  
 According to the view I will develop in this chapter, mental strength is a distinct 
phenomenal magnitude of individual conscious mental states. As such, the degree of strength 
of a mental state can be understood as its degree of phenomenal intensity. My goal here is to 
develop a framework for understanding mental strength, distinguish it from related, but 
ultimately different, phenomena, and highlight some philosophical consequences that follow 
from recognizing it as a fundamental aspect of conscious mental states. To achieve this, in 
sections 1 and 2, I analyze the representative case of pain strength and its potential neural 
correlates. In section 3, the view is expanded to mental imagery, perception, thoughts, and 
desires. In section 4, an intrinsic and a relative understanding of mental strength is 
discussed. In section 5, I distinguish mental strength from attention, stimulus salience, 
psychological salience, and representational contents. In the last section, I discuss some of 
the philosophical consequences of admitting mental strength into our explanations of the 
mental. In particular, I discuss its repercussions in debates about cognitive phenomenology, 
the structure of the stream of consciousness, debates about degrees of consciousness, and the 






1.  Pain Strength 
 
Imagine you wake up late for work. You stub your big toe against the bed when rushing to 
the shower. A sudden painful sensation invades your conscious awareness: your toe hurts. 
First, the pain is sharp, strong, and unpleasant. You hold your toe and while doing so you 
are unable to focus on anything else except the painful sensation. After a few seconds, your 
experience starts changing: it slowly becomes weaker while still being a sharp, unpleasant 
pain in your toe. As the pain decreases, your mind gets back to thinking about being late for 
work and you resume your plan to take a shower.  
 An obvious phenomenal change takes place as the intensity of your pain first increases 
and then decreases. This phenomenal change is, I argue, a variation in the degree of mental 
strength of your painful experience.  
 Mental strength is a phenomenal magnitude present in all conscious experiences. It is, 
in this sense, domain-general. Other phenomenal properties are domain-specific. Only visual 
experiences have color or brightness phenomenology, only auditory experiences have 
loudness or pitch phenomenology, only haptic experiences have texture phenomenology, and 
so on. Mental strength, in contrast, is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude present, in 
the same way, across sensory modalities and cognitive domains. Mental strength increases 
from zero, as it were, when the conscious experience has not arisen, and grows in certain time 
to a given measure (e.g., an intense pain—stronger than yesterday’s headache but milder 
than tomorrow’s toothache). Different degrees of mental strength result in different degrees 
with which mental events “make their way to our consciousness,” to use Hume’s phrase. In 
other words, the degree of mental strength of a conscious state determines how intensely it 
is experienced, “how much it takes up” of someone’s stream of consciousness at a given time. 
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For instance, the pain becomes “blinding” when you stub your toe. Its intensity makes it “take 
over” your stream of consciousness by reducing or even inhibiting the mental strength of 
other experiences such as your intention of taking a shower or your worry of being late for 
work.4  
 Pains are complex. They have distinct sensory-discriminative, affective-motivational, 
and cognitive-evaluative components (Langland-Hassan 2017; Hardcastle 1999; Grahek 
2007). All of these components admit degrees and, together, they affect the overall 
phenomenology of pain. In the stubbed toe example, the affective-emotional and the 
cognitive-evaluative components—as well as some of the sensory-discriminative components 
such as felt location and sensory character (pain type)—remain constant throughout the 
described phenomenal changes. In contrast, its sensory intensity, which is part of the 
sensory-discriminative component, raises quickly and then slowly starts decreasing. In this 
case, mental strength changes are driven by variations along the sensory dimension.  
 The everyday example of hitting your toe reveals important phenomenal aspects of pains 
along the sensory dimension that go beyond sheer intensity. Pains have felt locations, that 
is, they are always felt somewhere in the body.5 Phantom limb pain patients, who still feel 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, Kant seemed to have held a similar view regarding conscious intensive magnitudes in 
both the Critique of Pure Reason (‘The anticipation of perception’) and in his Lectures on Metaphysics: 
“For example, when a representation has inhibited many others, we say that this has made a great 
impression.” (cited in Longuenesse 1998, 320) Longuenesse’s commentary of this passage is 
illuminating: “Even states of consciousness can thus be […] compared as to their magnitude. A 
representation is ‘more or less intense’ according to the multiplicity of representations it inhibits; a 
very great pain makes one deaf and blind toward any other representation.” (Longuenesse 1998, 320)  
5 Arguably, emotional and social pains lack bodily locations. Social rejection, breaking up with a 
romantic partner, a relative’s death, or public humiliation hurt to varying extents. However, they are 
not felt as such on the body. Certainly, it is common that bodily sensations accompany emotional pain. 
For example, when learning of someone’s unexpected death, you may experience an empty stomach, a 
running heart, or a dizzy head. However, I would say that pain in these cases is not bodily, in spite of 
the accompanying bodily sensations. In other words, the sensations in your stomach, heart, or head 
are not your emotional pain, although they might hurt due to the emotional distress you are 
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their recent lost limb, attribute the source of their pain to a bodily location on the nonexistent 
limb. Pains can be felt as affecting a volumetric area or just a surface, inside or outside the 
body, with a precise or an undefined shape. Pains also have pain-specific phenomenal 
characters that determine their type; a pain can be sharp, pricking, stabbing, gnawing, 
burning, dull, throbbing, etc.6  
 Although mental strength naturally latches onto sensory intensity, mental strength is 
not exhausted by it. Mental strength can be affected by changes in other aspects of the 
sensory-discriminatory dimension such as felt location and sensory character, and also along 
the affective and cognitive dimensions, independently from changes in sensory intensity. For 
example, even assuming equal sensory intensities, a sharp and pounding pain may raise the 
overall mental strength of the experience—“how much it takes up” of the stream of 
consciousness—more than a dull and flickering pain. Similarly, assuming equal sensory 
intensities, a pain in the face may have more mental strength than a pain in the leg. For 
instance, the pain in the face may be more “blinding” than the pain in the leg; it may occupy 
more of the conscious stream of the subject, making it more distracting or attention grabbing. 
In section 5, I discuss again cases like this one and argue that although salience, attention, 
and mental strength are related, they are ultimately distinct. 
 The mental strength of pains can be affected too by changes in their affective-
motivational dimension. The overall mental strength of an unpleasant pain may be higher 
                                                 
undergoing (pace Prinz 2005). A recent study using multivariate pattern analysis concluded, perhaps 
unsurprisingly but against previous findings (Kross et al. 2011), that despite their similar 
phenomenology, social and bodily pains are encoded differently in the brain (Woo et al. 2014). 
Importantly, it is clear that in both cases there are degrees of intensity. 
6 For a thorough list of sensory, affective, and cognitive aspects of pain and pain intensity used in 
clinical contexts, see the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack 1975).  
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than that of an equally intense (sensorially speaking) but less unpleasant pain. For example, 
you may find a paper cut more unpleasant than a prick, even if you rate them as being equally 
intense. The paper cut may grab more your attention, affect more your capacity to focus on 
other things, or, in extreme cases, even “blind” you from other experiences. This suggests 
mental strength increases can be modulated by variations in unpleasantness too.  
 It may be that the sensory-discriminative intensity dimension of pain—and therefore 
mental strength—is increased by the changes involved in variations of unpleasantness or 
whether subjects rate their unpleasant pains as being more intense because of non-sensory 
increases in mental strength. If the former, unpleasantness is a means by which sensory pain 
intensity is modulated; if the latter, mental strength is a phenomenal magnitude over and 
above intensity in the sensory-discriminatory dimension. Although I am inclined towards the 
second option, for our current purposes we do not need to solve this issue and it suffices to 
point out these possibilities. 
 Someone may object that disentangling the sensory intensity and the unpleasantness 
dimensions is hard. Stronger pains tend to be nastier and nasty pains tend to be stronger. 
But sensory intensity and unpleasantness can be dissociated (Rainville 2002), which 
indicates they are independent from one another. For example, patients with pain asymbolia 
report feeling the sensory intensity of being pricked in very similar ways to the normal 
population. They can detect when more pressure is being exerted on them, discriminating 
correctly the stimulus intensity, but they do not report feeling the pain’s unpleasantness 
(Grahek 2007).7 This does not mean they find pain pleasant, rather they are just indifferent 
                                                 
7 Some patients tended to underrate pain intensity, but they still made no adverse comments regarding 
the experience. In some cases, they willingly offer their hands, smiled or even laughed at the situation, 
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to it and they do not feel an urge to avoid it. Something similar happens after administrating 
morphine, thalamus lesions, or prefrontal lobotomies: patients detect the intensity of noxious 
stimuli in a consistent fashion, without reporting any of the suffering typically associated 
with them. Opiates act as if blunting the subjective appreciation of pain: “Patients who have 
been treated with morphine because of severe post-operative discomfort or extreme pain from 
cancer frequently tell their doctors, ‘It’s a funny thing. The pain is still there, but it doesn’t 
bother me’.” (S. H. Snyder 1996, 44) Similar, if more modest, effects are found in subjects 
under hypnosis (Rainville et al. 1999) and in mindful meditators (Gard et al. 2012). 
Importantly, the dissociation works in the other direction as well. Dental patients whose 
nerves are electrically stimulated while under the potent analgesic fentanyl report pain to be 
as unpleasant as without the drug but less intense (Gracely, Dubner, and McGrath 1979).  
   With respect to changes in cognitive appraisal, catastrophizers are an illustrative 
case. Catastrophizing, an exaggerated negative mental set brought to bear during painful 
experiences (Sullivan et al. 2001), affects mental strength by changing the cognitive-
evaluative dimension of pain. Catastrophizing is comprised of a threefold dimension that 
includes magnification (“I worry that something serious may happen”), rumination (“I can’t 
stop thinking about how much it hurts”), and helplessness (“It’s awful and I feel that it 
overwhelms me”). Catastrophizers rate pains—usually chronic pains—as having higher 
intensity than non-catastrophizers with similar ailments. In contrast, when pain is 
reappraised and subjects stop conceiving it as a signal of a potential life-threatening 
pathology, intensity ratings decrease (Leeuw et al. 2007). As with unpleasantness, this opens 
                                                 
and they did not show normal physical or emotional signs such as grimacing, anxiety, or anger (Grahek 
2007, 43-4).  
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two possibilities. One, that catastrophizing is a mechanism by which sensory intensity can 
be modulated; the other, that catastrophizing affects mental strength independently of the 
pure sensory-discriminative intensity dimension.  
 
Mental strength determines the overall intensity of our experiences. Pain strength has 
multiple sources: sensory, affective, and cognitive components. This entails that some mild 
but nasty pains may have a high degree of mental strength; a pain that is not very strong or 
unpleasant, but of which we ruminate and obsess about, may have a high degree of mental 
strength. The interaction between these components can be complex and the mental strength 
of a given state need not be a simple aggregate of the contribution of each component. This 
suggests mental strength is not simply reducible to the specific sensory, affective, and 
cognitive appraisal components that modulate it. This point is important for generalizing 
mental strength to conscious experiences other than pain, since other mental states do not 
have these dimensions and they have specific dimensions that pains lack. In the next section, 
I discuss whether mental strength can be reduced to other general mental phenomena.  
 
2.  The Neural Correlates of Mental Strength 
 
Pain intensity is an intuitive and phenomenally accessible way of grasping mental strength. 
Additionally, we can also speculate about its neural implementation. This can supplement 
the theory of mental strength with an extra layer of plausibility. As a property of conscious 
experiences, mental strength’s what-it-is-like aspect shares all the well-known problems of 
studying consciousness and its neural correlates (Chalmers 2000; Noë and Thompson 2004; 
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Hohwy 2009, see Chapter 4). However, even if we remain neutral about the neural correlates 
of consciousness in general, we are not in the dark regarding potential implementations of 
mental strength. 
 In perception, it is fairly common to interpret measures of neural activity (e.g., neural 
spike rates, blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity, etc.) as an indication of the 
strength of the perceptual response to external stimulation (Shadlen and Kiani 2013). In 
principle, we can subject mental strength to similar neuroscientific standards. The simplest 
option is that mental strength correlates linearly with neural activity related to the intensity 
of conscious experiences.8 Regardless of the processes involved in rendering a mental state 
conscious, neural activity that correlates linearly with stimulation intensity and reports of 
intensity can provide clues of where and how the brain implements mental strength.  
 Multiple studies in fact show that in normal conditions, subjects’ reports of pain intensity 
correlate linearly with stimulus intensity (e.g., hotter stimuli produce reports of higher pain 
intensity) (Coghill et al. 1999; Coghill, McHaffie, and Yen 2003; Wager et al. 2013; Atlas et 
al. 2014). These studies, where neural activity is measured indirectly by functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), also converge in that 
activity in areas like insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), thalamus, and 
somatosensory cortex shows a linear correlation with the temperature of the stimuli (and in 
consequence with reports of pain intensity).  
 These results already are indicative of a potential correlate of pain strength. But the 
evidence is more specific than this. Coghill and colleagues (Coghill, McHaffie, and Yen 2003) 
                                                 
8 There could be nonlinear relations too, as well as patterns of activity or distinct types of computation 
such as divisive normalization. It is also possible that mental strength in different sensory modalities 
may be implemented differently from each other. 
 10 
split subjects in low and high sensitivity groups by their pain intensity ratings of a 49°C 
stimulus. They found that BOLD-activity in somatosensory cortex and posterior ACC closely 
tracked the difference between low and high sensitivity groups. It is reasonable to assume 
from previous research that subjects are good at detecting differences in temperature, so we 
can confidently rule out that subjects were wrong about the temperature of the patch (i.e., 
we can trust that they would have reported less pain with a 48°C patch and more pain with 
a 50°C patch). The difference between the two groups, then, probably was how intense the 
pain felt to them. As I have been arguing, these differences in felt intensity are due to 
differences in mental strength. This entails that the difference in activity in ACC and 
somatosensory areas between low and high sensitivity groups is a good candidate for the 
neural correlates of the difference in mental strength that these subjects experienced. Note 
that no activity differences between these groups were found in the thalamus and insula. In 
other words, the thalamus and insula may encode degrees of painful stimulation, while ACC 
and somatosensory areas may encode the degrees of mental strength. 
 Whether activity in ACC and somatosensory areas are part of the neural correlates of 
mental strength remains highly speculative (see Legrain et al. 2011 for a thorough review). 
These results, however, are a proof of concept that mental strength can be subjected not only 
to phenomenal description but also to empirical scrutiny. Moreover, while the theory of 
mental strength is pitched at a phenomenological level, having a concrete proposal of its 
neural basis puts the theory in plausible neuroscientific terms. This will become more 
important in Chapter 2, where the signaling role of mental strength is argued to play a crucial 




3.  Beyond Pains  
 
So far, I have focused on pains. Mental strength, however, is a property of all conscious 
mental states. For brevity, here I only discuss mental imagery, perceptions, thoughts, and 
desires, but similar arguments can be made about other types of state such as memories, 
feelings, or emotions.  
 I argued above that pain strength has various sources: sensory intensity, 
unpleasantness, and a cognitive-emotional dimension. Variation in one or all of them affects 
the overall mental strength of a painful state, in its turn affecting how much a given painful 
experience “takes up” of someone’s stream of consciousness at any given moment. This 
explanation can be naturally extended to other states. The sources of mental strength of non-
painful experiences are diverse too and they interact with each other to modulate mental 
strength.  
 
a. Mental imagery 
 
The term ‘vividness’ is often used in the imagery domain to refer to what I mean by mental 
strength (Cornoldi et al. 1991; Galton 1880; Hume 2000; James 1950; Kosslyn 1996; Marks 
1973; McGinn 2004; Pearson et al. 2015). Independently of their visualizing capacity, people 
consistently use a small set of terms to describe the strength of their mental images.9 William 
                                                 
9 At least since Galton (Galton 1880) it has been observed that the individual differences in visual 
imagery capacity are notable. Some people with aphantasia do not seem to have the capacity to 
summon mental images voluntarily at all (Zeman, Dewar, and Sala 2015).  
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James (1950 XVIII, vol. II), for instance, offers a compilation of reports by other scientists 
and his own students who, besides using descriptors like ‘strength’ or ‘vigor’, appealed to the 
degree of vagueness, blurriness, sharpness, dimness, clarity, or number of details to capture 
imagery vividness. Furthermore, subjects have no trouble providing consistent vividness 
ratings across time (Cui et al. 2007). This convergence strongly suggests that, even though a 
precise definition of vividness offers some challenges (Kind 2017), people have an intuitive 
understanding of the notion of imagery strength.  
 The strength of mental imagery is affected by, and varies along, at least six dimensions: 
(1) sensory properties (e.g., brightness, loudness, etc.), (2) clarity, (3) number and (4) salience 
of details, (5) the feeling of presence of the imagined objects or events, and (6) the overall 
stability of the image (Cornoldi et al. 1991; Thomas 2009). When you imagine your childhood’s 
house, the saturation of the colors is likely to play a role in the strength of the image. The 
stability of the imagined house is important too. For instance, the shape of the windows may 
shift as you struggle to maintain the image in your mind. These shifts are clearly 
representational in nature. But there are non-representational components that affect the 
intensity of the imagined house too. The intensity of the feeling of presence that you are in 
front of your imagined childhood’s house is unlikely to be fully representational in nature. In 
this case, the emotional affect attached to the image or a feeling of familiarity may play an 
important role too.  
 Naturally, all these dimensions admit variations in degree. Ceteris paribus, a more 
stable image is stronger, a brighter and more saturated image is stronger, a more detailed 
image is stronger, and so on. Some dimensions covary with others. Increasing the number of 
details can make easier imagining the objects to be present, but it might also hinder the 
stability of the image. Importantly, the overall strength of the image is a function of the 
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degrees along each of these dimensions. Mental images with faint colors and few details may 
still be strong. Their strength may stem from a very salient feature or from being able to 
picture it in a very stable way. Even within a single dimension different objects can have 
different degrees of strength. For example, the image of your childhood’s house could be faint, 
but the grass and sky could be quite bright and saturated, making the image strong overall. 
Alternatively, even if an image is really clear or has lots of stability, few imagined details or 
no salient features could yield the image weak overall. 
 That mental imagery strength cannot be reduced to a single dimension, or to a single 
aspect within one dimension, can be shown as follows. If sensory properties were picked as 
the only dimension that mattered for imagery strength, one should not be able to strongly 
imagine a dim candle light. However, at least some people can do that, so imagined brightness 
cannot be identified with mental imagery strength. If clarity were selected as the single most 
important dimension, one should fail to strongly imagine a blurry image of one’s childhood’s 
house. But at least some people can strongly imagine their houses even if these have an ill-




Perceptual and imagery strength work in a very similar fashion. Hume described imagination 
as perception that is “faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv’d by the 
mind steady and uniform for any considerable time.” (Hume 2000, 1.1.3) In fact, 
neuropsychological and physiological research shows visual mental imagery shares many of 
the behavioral and neural profiles of visual perception (Pearson, Rademaker, and Tong 2011; 
Laeng and Sulutvedt 2014). It is not surprising, then, that this overlap has pushed 
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philosophers and psychologists, very much in Hume’s spirit, to characterize mental imagery 
as perception that is “weak” (Pearson et al. 2015), “degraded” (Byrne 2010), “essentially poor” 
(Sartre 2004), or “decayed” (Hobbes 1962).  
 An important difference is that perception is committal about a particular (the 
representation is caused by a singular object with the attributed properties), while 
imaginings are noncommittal (Burge 2010, 74-5).10 To have a perceptual experience of your 
childhood’s house there must be a commitment regarding its presence in the immediate 
environment of the perceiver (this is true too in cases of inaccurate representations, illusions, 
and hallucinations). Imagining does not come with such commitment. Even when the 
imagined-to-be-present dimension is heightened, in normal cases we are still not committed 
to the presence of the object. Naturally, as Hume noted, cross-overs in extreme cases are not 
impossible (e.g., fever, madness, low threshold stimuli) (Hume 2000, 1.1.1.1). 
Notwithstanding this obvious difference, the other five dimensions of imagery strength 
function similarly in perception. 
 The causal origin of perceptual experiences is not per se relevant for our current 
purposes, but unlike imagery and very much like pain, perceptual strength is modulated by 
external stimulation. Retinal size, speed, brightness and saturation are important bottom-
up modulators of perceptual strength. Ceteris paribus, strong stimuli give rise to strong 
experiences. But things are rarely ceteris paribus. Not just because we can misrepresent how 
things are, but because perceptual strength can be modulated by attention too.11 As has been 
                                                 
10 There are other differences too. Mental images, for instance, represent objects that need not be 
clearly located in space. Besides, the imagined objects exhibit an “essential poverty” to use Sartre’s 
phrase (2004, 9). They are deprived of relations that abound in perceived objects; imagined objects are, 
in this sense, isolated.  
11 It is an ongoing discussion whether attention influence on appearances implies lack of accuracy or 
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shown in multiple experiments, attention alters appearance (Carrasco, Ling, and Read 2004; 
Gobell and Carrasco 2005; Fuller and Carrasco 2006; Fuller, Park, and Carrasco 2009; 
Montagna and Carrasco 2006; Anton-Erxleben, Henrich, and Treue 2007; Liu, Fuller, and 
Carrasco 2006; Tse 2005).  
 More could be said about the relation of representational contents, salience, attention, 
and mental strength in perception. However, because of its similarity to mental imagery, for 
the present purposes this must suffice. (See section 5 for further discussion). 
 
c. Thoughts and desires 
 
The case for mental strength in conscious intentional states like thoughts and desires may 
first appear to be more controversial. However, thoughts and desires can also dominate one’s 
stream of consciousness over other experiences. Attention and the intentional contents of 
occurrent thoughts and desires may play some role in fixing the degree of strength, but they 
are unlikely to be the sole drivers of mental strength. A standing belief that something is 
highly probable, such as the believe that the sun will rise tomorrow with 0.99̅ probability, 
typically has little psychological impact in and of itself. Actively thinking about this does not 
make an impressive dent in our conscious stream either. In contrast, thinking that there is 
a negligible, but non-zero, probability that one left the stove on after leaving home, often has 
intense psychological effects. An increase in mental strength explains why an occurrent 
                                                 
not (Stazicker 2011; Block 2010). 
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thought like this feels much more intensely than thinking about something that is more 
probable but that is psychologically unimportant.  
 Occurrent desires can be gripping too, regardless of their contents. Like thoughts, it is 
not the strength assigned to the propositional attitude what determines their mental 
strength (e.g., «I desire that p to degree x»). The well-being of my relatives is something I 
strongly desire, but it is a desire that hardly ever dominates my stream of consciousness. At 
least not in the same way a strong pain or thinking that I left the stove on dominate it. In 
comparison, my current desire of standing up away from the computer for a few minutes is, 
all things considered, less strong than the well-being of my relatives. To paraphrase Hume, 
I would not prefer standing up over saving the whole world. The degree of desire assigned to 
the propositional attitude in an all-things-considered sense is much lower than my desire for 
the well-being of my relatives. However, my desire to stand up is currently much stronger in 
terms of its mental strength; it plays a much stronger role in my current psychology and it is 
more central to my conscious awareness. At least right now, my desire to stand up has more 
mental strength than my more noble desires.  
 
d. Domain generality 
 
Mental strength is a phenomenal magnitude present in all kinds of conscious states. This 
fact is evidenced when increasing mental strength in one experience reduces the mental 
strength in others. When you stub your toe, your worries about being late for work and your 
thoughts of taking a shower disappear as pain becomes more prominent. It is almost as if the 
total distributed mental strength one can have at a given moment was capped and therefore 
shared among simultaneous states in one’s stream of consciousness. This could explain why 
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mental states with high strength become “blinding”. It is because they dominate the stream 
of consciousness in detriment of other states. For instance, an effective remedy against pain 
consists in increasing the strength of other experiences. This could be achieved by focusing 
attention on something else, as well as by thinking about other things, imagining one is in a 
different situation and, in the most extreme cases, by inducing a new source of pain. 
Something similar happens while vividly daydreaming. A faint image that flickers in and out 
of consciousness is not very distracting. But when someone gets completely lost daydreaming 
or meditating, imagination can be so strong that one becomes perceptually “decoupled” or 
unaware of one’s surroundings (Hove et al. 2016; Schooler et al. 2011).  
 Research in psychophysics shows something like blinding takes place within the 
perceptual domain too. Lavie’s Load Theory holds that perception is automatic and it has a 
limited capacity. It predicts that perceptual load in a task modulates whether other stimuli 
enter conscious awareness or not independently of attention and the properties of non-target 
stimuli (Lavie, Beck, and Konstantinou 2014; Forster and Lavie 2016). Here, perceptual load 
is understood as the number of target items that need to be perceived in a task. For example, 
in a search task, when perceptual load is high, conscious awareness includes only the main 
task’s stimuli and it does not “spillover” to others. When perceptual load is low, other stimuli 
enter awareness too, distractors affect task performance, attentional capture is increased, 
etc. (see Lavie, Beck, and Konstantinou 2014 for a review). When the target is very different 
from the non-targets or when there are few non-targets, subjects become aware of task-
irrelevant stimuli. These effects are found across identical attentional conditions and 
independently of whether stimuli are in the periphery or at fixation, whether they are objects 
of socio-biological significance or not, or whether subjects are expecting the task-irrelevant 
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stimuli or not. In contrast, when perceptual load is high, task-irrelevant stimuli go unnoticed, 
as if the main task blinded subjects from seeing them.  
 While Lavie’s theory is cashed out in terms of perceptual processing and informational 
load, its results could be recast in terms of mental strength. As I argued above, mental 
strength is increased by quantitative stimulus properties, number of features, and so on. In 
my terms, then, Lavie’s results confirm that when perceptual experiences are strong, other 
experiences (or other objects in the visual experience) become weaker. 
 Like sensory experiences, intense desires and thoughts can also become “blinding.” 
Obsessive impulses and obsessive thinking can become distracting to the point of eliminating 
other states from someone’s stream of consciousness.  
 Incidentally, the phenomenon I have labelled as “blinding” goes against Hume’s goal of 
using mental strength to rank types of states. Hume’s idea of strength as a means of layering 
types of mental states by the range of mental strength they normally have does survive 
scrutiny. Imaginations and thoughts, which are conceived to be systematically weak in 
Hume’s ontology, can dominate over allegedly stronger states such as perceptions or pains.  
 
One of the lessons of this section is that “blinding” is possible because the degrees of strength 
of simultaneous states interact with each other. In the next section, I explain how mental 
strength, which is an intrinsic property of conscious experiences, can explain “blinding” in 
particular, and the structuring of the stream of consciousness in general, when it is 
considered in a relational way. 
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4.  Intrinsic and Relational Mental Strength 
 
Mental strength is an intrinsic magnitude of phenomenal states that determines how 
intensely they are experienced.12 Derivatively, mental strength is the measure of phenomenal 
prominence of a given conscious state at a given time in someone’s stream of consciousness. 
This means that mental strength effectively structures the stream of consciousness. This 
structuring role allows mental strength to be understood in a relational way.  
 The following analogy may help clarify the intrinsic and relational aspects of mental 
strength. Consider New York City’s skyline. The height of each building is completely 
independent of the heights of other buildings; it is one of its intrinsic features. The building’s 
height affects other things: how long it takes to climb its stairs, the length of its shadow at a 
particular time of the day, its weight, etc. However, height in itself is not sufficient for 
determining the prominence of the building within the skyline. Prominence is determined by 
the building’s relative height compared to other buildings in the city. At some point in the 
early twentieth century, the 22-stories of the Flat Iron Building made it stand out above the 
rest. It was the most prominent construction of the Manhattan skyline. However, even 
though the height of the Flat Iron Building has not changed since its completion 
                                                 
12 It is hard to speculate about the precise nature of mental strength as a magnitude. However, insofar 
as mental strength is a property of subjective experiences, it should be thought of as an intensive 
magnitude (e.g. like temperature), rather than an extensive magnitude (e.g. length). Intuitively, an 
intensive magnitude allows for rankings of magnitudes of the same type (e.g. greater than, lesser than, 
equal to). For example, we can say that one object is hotter or cooler than another one. We can certainly 
rank conscious experiences by their strength: this toothache is stronger than this headache. However, 
intensive magnitudes do not allow assignments of a ratio to two unequal magnitudes. It is not 
meaningful to say that a cup of tea is twice as hot as a glass of cold water. In contrast, it is meaningful 
to talk about ratios of extensive magnitudes, for which an intuitive notion of addition of the 
magnitudes has application (Peacocke 2015). An object can have twice or half the length of another 
object. But, can we say that this toothache is twice as strong as this headache? Probably not.  
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(intrinsically, its height has remained constant), its prominence within the skyline has 
completely eroded due to the tens or even hundreds of taller buildings that have appeared 
since it was constructed (relationally, its height has changed).  
 Similarly, the mental strength of a conscious state is intrinsic when considered on its 
own, and relational when considering the structuring role it exerts upon the stream of 
consciousness. A mild headache may not be equally prominent when the rest of your other 
conscious states are also weak than when you have some other strong experience. For 
example, a mild headache may be prominent in the totality of your conscious stream when 
you are quietly reading at home. In contrast, an identical headache might not be prominent 
at all if you are having a lively conversation with your friends. According to the view I have 
been putting forward, this scenario is explained by the higher mental strength of the 
conversation’s experience effectively reducing the prominence of your mild headache. Just as 
the Flat Iron Building lost prominence throughout the twentieth century, your headache 
loses prominence in your stream of consciousness throughout the conversation with your 
friends. Thus, it is the relative strengths of all your simultaneous states what determines 
their influence in the stream of consciousness.  
 This dual role of the intensity of experiences finds echo in what philosophers such as 
William James and David Hume himself have said about consciousness and mental strength. 
James thinks that the stream of consciousness, and thereby how we experience each 
individual state in it at any given moment, is largely dependent on other states. While 
discussing perceptual experiences, James writes: “What appeals to our attention far more 
than the absolute quality or quantity of a given sensation is its ratio to whatever other 
sensations we may have at the same time. […] We feel things differently according as we are 
sleepy or awake, hungry or full, fresh or tired […].” (James 1950 232-3, IX, vol. I) These 
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differences, however, never make us “doubt that our feelings reveal the same world, with the 
same sensible qualities and the same sensible things occupying it.” (James 1950, 233, IX, vol. 
I) Here, James’s suggestion is that we can distinguish the contents of our perceptions from 
both the absolute and relative strength with which they impact our minds at any given 
moment.  
 James thinks that the importance of strength proportions in shaping our experiences 
applies to thought too, not just perception. When entertaining the thought «The pack of cards 
is on the table», it is reasonable to say that we are entirely conscious of it throughout the 
duration of the thought. However, James points out, we are not equally conscious of each part 
as the thought progresses in our stream of consciousness. In the first, say, half second, the 
words ‘the pack’ are more prominent in consciousness; in the next half second, the words ‘of 
cards’ will gain prominence; and in the end, the words ‘is on the table’ dominate over the rest 
of the sentence. Moreover, according to James, mental strength and how it shapes our stream 
of consciousness is reflected in its neural correlates: 
 
[W]e may be sure that, could we see into the brain, we should find the same processes 
active through the entire sentence in different degrees, each one in turn becoming 
maximally excited and then yielding the momentary verbal ‘kernel’, to the thought’s 
content, at other times being only sub-excited, and then combining with the other sub-
excited processes to give the overtone or fringe. (James 1950, 282, XI, vol. I) 
 
David Hume’s own view is also consistent with the intrinsic and the relative aspects of mental 
strength I have highlighed. The terms ‘force’ and ‘liveliness’ used by Hume to describe mental 
strength, “refer to intrinsic properties of images and are non-relational. Whether, and to what 
degree, a ‘perception’ has force and vivacity can be determined by examining that perception 
by itself.” (Everson 1988, 404) On the other hand, “Hume is explaining force and vivacity in 
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functional terms. One ‘perception’ has greater force or vivacity than another if it is such as 
to produce a stronger effect on the mind.” (Everson 1988, 406) In Hume’s own words, mental 
strength causes experiences “to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior 
influence on the passions and imagination.” (Hume 2000, 1.3.7.7) Moreover, Hume also 
thinks that we can distinguish between the mental strength of a conscious mental state and 
its contents (see next section). Impressions and ideas in general, and ideas of memory and 
ideas of imagination in particular, differ “in having a greater degree of vivacity, or force and 
liveliness-conceived not as an additional perception or mental content but rather as a 
‘manner’ in which these ideas occur” (Garrett 2002, 26). Hume refers to this ‘manner’ also as 
a ‘feeling’ that varies in its degree of intensity (Hume 2000, 1.3.7.7). 
 
I will have more to say about the structuring functions of mental strength in the last section. 
Now, I move on to discuss potential alternative explanations for the phenomena whose 
underlying cause I have been attributing to mental strength. 
 
5.  What Mental Strength Is Not 
 
One may wonder, from the examples in the previous sections, if mental strength is truly a 
distinct trait of mental states. After all, the cases I discussed seemed to involve either bottom-
up stimulus driven intensity changes or top-down attention effects. Mental strength could 
just be garden-variety sensory intensity driven by the representational contents of the state 
involved (e.g., potential tissue damage, a bright light, etc.) that goes up when attention is 
involved and goes down when it is not. For states like desires or thoughts, mental strength 
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might really just be the degree of occupation of attention or cognitive access. If this were so, 
mental strength would not be a distinct, domain-general phenomenal magnitude of conscious 
experiences. It would be, at best, a domain-specific phenomenal magnitude. At worst, mental 
strength would be reducible to something else. I identify attention, stimulus salience, 
psychological salience, and representational contents as the most likely suspects. I will argue 
that mental strength is not reducible to either of them. For simplicity, I will limit my 
arguments to sensory states such as pains, mental imagery, and perception. However, I think 
the distinctions I lay out in this section could be extended to intentional states like desires 
and thoughts too. 
 
a. Mental strength is not attention 
 
A potential objection to the distinctness of mental strength is that it is just attention.13 Prima 
facie, mental strength and attention covary with each other. Moreover, it is well known that 
attention affects phenomenology (Carrasco, Ling, and Read 2004), and that it can be captured 
by sudden stimuli (so-called exogenous attention) (Wright and Ward 2008). One could argue 
that what I call mental strength really is the orientation of attention.  
 Despite the initial plausibility of this objection, attention and mental strength are 
distinct. First, they are not in the same metaphysical category: mental strength is a property 
of conscious experiences themselves, whereas attending is an activity of a cognitive capacity. 
                                                 
13 It is not a coincidence that similar notions to mental strength, but ultimately different from it, 
involve attention. Some of such notions include Beck and Schneider’s mental primer (2017) and Wu’s 
phenomenal saliency (2011).  
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Second, while mental strength can be modulated by attention, they are not identical. 
Presumably, your toe pain comes into existence before you attend to it. Or at least, 
counterfactually, we can say that attention would not have been directed to your toe had you 
not experienced pain. It would be odd to claim that the cause of your pain or the cause of the 
intensity of your pain is that you attended it. The order of explanation seems backwards.14  
 This observation does not annul the important role attention performs in modulating 
strength. In the case of pains, for example, subjects whose attention is distracted away from 
a noxious stimulus (e.g., by engaging cognitive resources in a demanding task), generally 
report less intense pains (Miron, Duncan, and Bushnell 1989; Legrain et al. 2009; Bantick et 
al. 2002). The opposite effect takes place too. When noxious stimulation becomes the main 
focus of attention, subjects rate pains as being stronger (Miron, Duncan, and Bushnell 1989), 
and physiological markers and neural activity of areas known to code for pain strength 
become more active (Hauck, Lorenz, and Engel 2007).15 It is remarkable that even in cases 
where external stimulation is lacking altogether (e.g., in phantom limb patients), pain 
strength is also modulated by attentional factors (Nikolajsen and Jensen 2001). However, 
and to the point of its distinctness, attention typically modulates pain strength only within a 
limited range. Normally, even if you give a weak pain your full attention, it does not become 
                                                 
14 Some philosophers and psychologists have argued attention is necessary for consciousness (M. A. 
Cohen et al. 2012; Prinz 2012). They would probably disagree that a conscious pain is felt before being 
attended. The debate is complex. Here I only would say that my view is compatible with unconscious 
attention, or subpersonal mechanisms necessary for attention, being engaged before pains become 
conscious. They may even cause it to become conscious. However, I would maintain that subject level, 
conscious attention is attracted to the pain only as a result of its being conscious in the first place. 
15 This kind of reverse inference, however, requires careful consideration (Poldrack 2006; Machery 
2014). 
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excruciating. Alternatively, you can try to distract your attention away from an excruciating 
pain and, normally, it will remain quite strong.16  
 The case for distinguishing mental imagery and attention is similar. Attention increases 
the strength of mental images. By focusing on the generated image and attending its 
features, more clear, stable, salient, and bright details may be experienced, plausibly making 
the image stronger. But this kind of attentive focusing need not translate into strength at all. 
First, increases in one isolated dimension do not necessarily imply increases in the strength 
of the image overall. Second, sometimes we just fail, in spite of our efforts, to picture a strong 
image. Thinking otherwise would amount to saying it is always in our hands to generate 
strong images given that it is always in our hands to attend to their features. Rather, like in 
the case of pains, attending can enhance the strength of an already existing image only within 
a limited range. And the same reasoning applies to perception. 
 
b. Mental strength is not salience 
 
Salience is another candidate one might feel tempted to invoke when discussing mental 
strength. In vision science, it is well established that salient stimuli grab attention (for a 
review see Itti and Koch 2001), they alter appearance by increasing apparent contrast and 
                                                 
16 Someone may argue that sometimes there are paradoxical effects of directing attention to pains. For 
example, during mindfulness therapy, subjects report experiencing reduced pain despite the fact that 
the mindfulness method involves attending to different aspects of the experienced pain (called ‘sensory 
splitting’). However, mindfulness also requires focusing on other mental states, activating mental 
imagery of pleasant scenery, and letting thoughts and sensations simply pass. Moreover, in 
experimental settings where pain reduction has been found using mindfulness, participants typically 
do not meditate while painful stimulation is being delivered but a few minutes beforehand (Zeidan et 
al. 2015; Zeidan et al. 2010). Overall, attention during mindfulness is more distracted away from the 
pain than it is focused on it.  
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apparent saturation (Kerzel et al. 2011), they increase performance and reaction time in a 
wide variety of tasks (Donk and van Zoest 2008) and, in general, salient stimuli effortlessly 
stand out from their neighbors in a visual scene. A salient stimulus, say, a red letter in a 
page full of black letters, immediately seems to attract attention, it facilitates detection 
during a visual search, and, one might argue, it increases the degree of mental strength of 
the stimulus. Pain strength may also be attributable to pain salience. After all, the sensation 
of pain in your toe stands out from the non-painful sensations in the neighboring parts of 
your body, and the effects of pain salience and pain habituation are very similar to those in 
visual perception (Legrain et al. 2011). 
 Like attention, salience can be a modulator of mental strength (J. Beck and Schneider 
2017). For example, Kerzel and colleagues (2011) showed that salient stimuli (e.g., a tilted 
bar in a set of upright bars) increased their apparent contrast and color saturation. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the mental strength of the experiences of a tilted bar was 
heightened along these appearance changes. However, mental strength cannot be identified 
with salience. The most obvious reason is that salience, as it is understood in psychology, is 
typically a property of stimuli, not of the mental states that represent them. But even if we 
focused on the experiences themselves, it is obvious that they still have a degree of strength 
when there is nothing salient in the environment they represent. If shown a display with a 
homogeneous set of stimuli (say, a matrix of white dots on a black background), your 
experience of the individual dots will have certain mental strength, even though none of the 
dots is (represented as) salient.  
 Another reason for not identifying salience with mental strength is that the mental 
strength of an experiences of a salient stimulus can change depending on the mental strength 
and attention demands of experiences of non-salient stimuli. For example, in an EEG study, 
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when subjects performed an easy visual task, salient nocive stimuli produced larger event-
related potentials (ERP) in the P400 component compared to homogeneous nocive 
stimulation. However, the difference in ERPs associated to the same set of salient and 
homogeneous nocive stimuli decreased when subjects simultaneously performed a visually 
demanding task (Legrain et al. 2005). I would not say that the P400 component is necessarily 
a physiological marker of pain strength. However, it is consistent with all I have said in this 
chapter (especially with what I said about “blinding” and the structure of consciousness) that 
the visual experiences become relatively stronger than salient pains when subjects performed 
the more demanding task. In that case, the P400 component could be a marker of relative 
pain strength.  
 Finally, mental strength and salience seem to provide different time courses and 
benefits. For instance, performance is increased with salient stimuli, but this benefit is only 
short lived (Donk and van Zoest 2008). Salient stimuli improve performance in visual tasks, 
but only if the response is produced very fast (in less than 200ms after stimulus onset).17 
Responses with longer latencies—which constitute the majority of responses we produce 
outside the lab—do not seem to benefit as much from salience. The effects of a mentally strong 
state, however, seem to last much longer than a few milliseconds. When a strong experience 
dominates the stream of consciousness, it attracts attention and rearrange the subject’s 
mental structure for several seconds or even minutes. 
 
                                                 
17 Responses in this study were made with saccades (rapid, ballistic eye movements). Perhaps other 
response modalities preserve performance benefits longer. 
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These results, along with the ones discussed in the previous subsection, suggest an intricate 
relation between mental strength on one hand, and attention and salience on the other. This 
relation, however, is not that of identity.18 
 
c. Mental strength is not psychological salience 
 
According to a recent proposal, attention is an “activity of creating, maintaining, and 
changing a certain structure of the mind” (Watzl 2017, 70). Watzl’s view, according to which 
attention regulates mental priority structures, provides a good contrast with the view about 
mental strength that I am presenting here. He suggests, correctly I think, that the elements 
of the mind, namely, its mental states, are organized in priority structures. Priority 
structures are regulated by attention, and attention is guided by psychological salience 
(passive attention) and executive control (active attention). Unlike stimulus salience, 
psychological salience is a property of mental states themselves.  
 According to Watzl, “an occurrent state is passively attention-guiding in virtue of being 
psychologically salient. And it is psychologically salient, because it presents an attention 
command. When priority structures evolve passively, they follow psychological imperatives 
issued from within those structures themselves.” (Watzl 2017, 115) In other words, when 
subjects are not actively guiding their attention, mental states themselves become like 
                                                 
18 Here I did not discuss the relation between salience and attention. While some have argued for a 
necessary connection between conscious attention and phenomenal salience (Wu 2011), there is some 
empirical evidence that suggests attention and salience are independent (Kerzel et al. 2011).  
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“basins of attraction” for attention. For him, “psychological salience consists in having an 
imperatival content of roughly the form <put x on top of a priority structure!>.” (ibid.) 
 Whether psychological states have, in addition to their regular representational 
contents, imperative contents to which subject-level attention is sensitive to is something I 
do not discuss here. I cannot help but express skepticism, although it is irrelevant for my 
current purposes. What matters here is that psychological salience is not what I mean by 
mental strength. I take mental strength to be conscious intensity, a phenomenal magnitude, 
which cannot be simply identified with any kind of content (see next subsection). Thus, 
mental strength cannot be some kind of imperative content. Moreover, Watzl thinks that 
priority structures also have unconscious states as parts (2017, 76, and chapter 12) and, 
therefore, psychological salience can be a property of unconscious states. I do not dispute that 
attention can be grabbed by unconscious stimuli (Jiang et al. 2006), and maybe unconscious 
mental states have some kind of psychological salience that attracts attention unconsciously, 
which, thereby, regulates an all-encompassing priority structure. Nevertheless, mental 
strength is exclusively a property of conscious experiences and because of that it cannot be 
equated to psychological salience. Finally, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Watzl thinks that 
psychological salience is primarily a property of perceptual states (and perhaps other sensory 
and emotional states). However, as I have been arguing, mental strength is a phenomenal 
property of all conscious mental states, including occurrent thoughts and desires. 
 Watzl’s theory is thorough and sophisticated, and further exploration of its 
commonalities and differences with mental strength is warranted. For instance, much of the 
work priority structures and psychological salience do in Watzl’s theory is explained by 
mental strength. Thus, ours could be rival or complementary explanations of related 
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phenomena. For now, however, it must suffice to say that mental strength is not identical to 
psychological salience. 
 
d. Mental strength is not representational contents 
 
Two questions may be asked about the relation between mental strength and 
representational contents. First, is the intensity of experiences modulated by their 
representational contents? Second, is the intensity of experiences reducible to their 
representational contents? An affirmative answer to the first question would indicate that 
the representational status of experiences and their mental strength are related, but mental 
strength might still be a distinct phenomenal magnitude. An affirmative answer to the 
second question would put pressure on the claim that mental strength is distinct. Here I will 
argue that mental strength may be modulated by the representational contents of 
experiences, but that strength is ultimately distinct from representational contents. For ease 
of exposition, I will focus on pain strength.  
 Claiming that pain strength is distinct from whatever representational contents pain 
experiences may have (contra Armstrong 1968, 314-5; Bain 2007; Cutter and Tye 2011; Tye 
1995), is not to deny the commonsense observation that external stimulation is an important 
modulator of pain strength.19 In fact, like with felt unpleasantness, pain intensity and tissue 
                                                 
19 This seemingly commonsense observation has a convoluted path throughout the history of 
philosophy. For Aristotle, pain is a nonspecific affect that accompanied every sensation (Aristotle 1994, 
II(3), 414b). It was Avicenna the first to seriously consider pain as a distinct sense (Dallenbach 1939). 
By Descartes’ time, pain was fully understood to be a distinct sensory modality. Descartes thinks that 
“if there is some bodily damage, there is a sensation of pain” (Descartes 1985b, I:282 , AT VIIIA 318) 
and that “the sensation we call ‘pain’ always results from an action so violent that it injures the nerves” 
(Descartes 1985c, I:362 , AT XI 399-400). But Descartes later developed a more nuanced view about 
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damage often co-vary. Thermal stimulation, for instance, is reported to be more painful in a 
linear fashion (Dubin and Patapoutian 2010; Coghill et al. 1999) and associated distributed 
brain activity increases linearly as well (Coghill et al. 1999).20 Presumably, this extends to 
simple cases of chemical, electrical, and mechanical pain too.  
 In a slogan, representationalist philosophers about the phenomenal character of 
conscious experiences hold that “if two experiences are alike representationally, then they 
are alike phenomenally (and vice versa).”21 Hence, contrary to my proposal, the 
representationalist would say that changes in mental strength are really just changes in 
represented strength (Dretske 1995; Byrne 2001; Harman 1990; Tye 2000).22 The pain 
representationalist’s argument could unfold as follows. Suppose that a painful state’s content 
is something like “«there is a disturbance of type d in location l»“ (Cutter and Tye 2011, 92). 
                                                 
the relation between stimulation and pain. In the Treatise on Man (1985d), he develops a mechanistic 
account of pain according to which the amount of damaging nerve stimulation, which in turn 
proportionally affects the nerve firing pattern, determines pain intensity. Based on cases of phantom 
limb pain, he argues that “the cause of pain lies in the other areas through which the nerves travel in 
their journey from the limbs to the brain” (Descartes 1985b, I:283, AT VIIIA 320). While rudimentary, 
Descartes’ understanding of pain is closer to contemporary theories of specificity, gate control, and 
coding patterns (Cervero 2012; Moayedi and Davis 2012; Prescott, Ma, and De Koninck 2014). 
20 This linear relationship has limits. External stimulation starts being painful only above a certain 
threshold (about 45°C for thermal pain) and it eventually stops hurting if tissue damage is such that 
nociceptors are completely destroyed (above 50°C nerve damage starts occurring). Furthermore, the 
most promising physiological theories of pain hold that the strength, sensory, and affective characters 
of pain are built from a series of opponent processes at the spinal and cortical levels rather than from 
simple one-to-one mappings between stimulation and experience (something akin to the opponent 
theory of color perception) (Prescott, Ma, and De Koninck 2014). 
21 This slogan marks the commitment of what has been called ‘weak representationalism’. ‘Strong 
representationalism’, in contrast, holds that the qualitative character of our experience consists in the 
representational content of such states (Tye 2000). The following discussion addresses weak 
representationalism. 
22 Representationalism is part of a wider view called intentionalism, according to which phenomenal 
characters can be reduced to contents, even if not representational ones. For pains, intentionalism can 
take the shape of imperativism, according to which the contents of painful experiences are commands 
(Martínez 2010; C. Klein 2015). Imperativists have recently addressed the issue of pain strength (C. 
Klein and Martínez 2016), but here I only address representationalist concerns. 
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Assume too that “the physiological type d includes information about the shape, volume, and 
intensity of the disturbance” (ibid.; my emphasis). Thus, under disturbance type, spatial 
extent (i.e., shape and volume) and the intensity of pain are included.23 The changes in felt 
strength would be effected by changes in how spatial extent and intensity are represented. 
As with any other representation, the representational accuracy of the actual spatial extent 
and intensity of the tissue damage can vary. Phantom limb pain, for instance, would be an 
extreme case of inaccurate representation. But even in that case, pain intensity could be 
explained as the (inaccurate) representation of (potential) tissue damage.  
 Let us focus on attention and representational accuracy. In the perceptual domain, 
attention systematically makes subjects faster and more accurate when discriminating 
stimuli (Posner, Snyder, and Davidson 1980; Posner 1980; Wright and Ward 2008; Carrasco 
2011). In the classic Posner attention paradigm, subjects discriminate (detect or identify) a 
stimulus briefly presented at one of two possible locations while directing their gaze to a 
central fixation point throughout each trial. A cue indicating with a certain probability the 
location of the next target is briefly presented before stimulus onset. Subjects are instructed 
to use this cue to direct their attention toward the expected target location. Their responses 
are systematically faster and more accurate in valid/attended trials (i.e., when the target 
appeared at the predicted location) than in invalid/unattended trials. There is a consensus 
that these behavioral improvements are achieved via perceptual signal processing 
                                                 
23 In earlier formulations (Tye 1995), the spatial extent of tissue damage seemed to be identified with 
the intensity of pain. In this more recent presentation, Cutter and Tye seem to assume these are 
orthogonal dimensions. For simplicity, I address them together. 
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enhancement and noise reduction that lead to increased representational accuracy (Carrasco 
2011).24 
 If mental strength is just represented tissue damage, it is not surprising, the 
representationalist would argue, that attention affects the precision of the relevant pain 
representations. As noted in the preceding subsection, attending increases pain and 
distracting attention decreases it. The representationalist would say this is not surprising 
because this modulation of representational precision is well established for the perceptual 
domain and pain—that is, the representation of potential tissue damage—is not different (cf. 
Aydede 2009). Consider this example. Let us stipulate that the actual extent and intensity of 
the bodily disturbance that produces your toe pain has 5 arbitrary units (a.u.). Then, you try 
to ignore your pain by occupying your attention with something else. The effect, we know, 
will be the reduction of pain. The alleged explanation is that your pain represents 
inaccurately the extent and intensity of bodily disturbance when you distract your attention 
and, thus, you now experience, say, 3 a.u. of pain.  
 This explanation is consistent with the experiments described in the previous subsection. 
Despite its prima facie plausibility, however, this explanation cannot fully account for the 
data. As we saw above, inattention systematically decreases pain strength. But there is 
nothing about inaccurate representation due to inattention that requires unidirectional 
inaccuracy. It is hard to see what a representationalist explanation would be. Appealing to 
inattention does not explain why, when distracted, subjects do not feel stronger pains 
sometimes. Inaccuracy implies variability in any direction. Why are inattentive subjects not 
                                                 
24 The precise neural mechanisms enabling this enhancement and noise reduction are the object of 
current research (Carrasco 2011; Carrasco et al. 2013; Desimone and Duncan 1995; M. R. Cohen and 
Maunsell 2009; Reynolds and Heeger 2009; Pestilli et al. 2011). 
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inaccurate by representing, say, 7 a.u. of pain instead of 3 a.u.? If attention increases 
representational accuracy, attending should decrease, not increase, pain intensity if 
inattentive subjects were being inaccurate by overestimating their pain. But decreasing pain 
intensity with attention goes against the evidence presented above.  
 The representationalist could try to insist that subjects are systematically biased to 
underestimate the extent and intensity of bodily damage when they are not attending. While 
not impossible, a systematic bias for being wrong in one particular direction in this case 
would be bizarre. It would be bizarre in the perceptual domain too. It would be surprising to 
discover that when not paying attention, humans always see things, say, 10° of visual angle 
to the left of where they really are. Note that I mean misrepresenting the location of objects, 
not just having a computational bias. Certainly, unidirectional computational biases in the 
perceptual domain are not unheard of. For example, our visual system solves convex-concave 
ambiguity by assuming light comes from above (and slightly to the left) (Sun and Perona 
1998). However, this is not a bias that makes us systematically wrong. Rather, it is a 
computational bias that makes us, in fact, accurate on a vast majority of times despite 
informational ambiguity. Furthermore, a systematic underestimation of the extent and 
intensity of bodily disturbances is not a prediction of representationalism and it would seem 
ad hoc to assume it unless independent reasons were offered. In contrast, the evidence can 
be simply explained by appealing to a direct modulation of pain strength by attention.25  
                                                 
25 An interesting case is precisely that of attention altering appearance. It has been repeatedly shown 
that attention alters appearances along several dimensions. Typically, these changes take place in one 
direction (i.e., stimuli become brighter, larger, etc.) (Carrasco, Ling, and Read 2004; Gobell and 
Carrasco 2005; Montagna and Carrasco 2006; Fuller and Carrasco 2006; Fuller, Park, and Carrasco 
2009; Anton-Erxleben, Henrich, and Treue 2007; Liu, Fuller, and Carrasco 2006; Tse 2005). I think 
that this is precisely because what is being altered in those cases is mental strength, rather than the 
perceptual representations. This would be consistent with those views that hold that changes in 
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 In summary, felt pain strength can vary independently of the representation of external 
stimulation. The evidence for this is largely due to experiments that manipulate pain 
strength via attention while keeping stimulation constant. I argued that these results cannot 
be easily explained by a representationalist account of pain strength. This does not mean I 
have refuted the representationalist position as such.26 For example, I have not shown that 
pains do not have contents (they probably have some), that they do not have representational 
contents of the extent and intensity of external stimulation (they probably have some), or 
that other phenomenal properties of experiences are not reducible to representational 
contents. However, the objections laid out here against the representationalist position make 
plausible that mental strength is a distinct phenomenal property of painful experiences. 
 
6.  Further Consequences  
 
Characterizing mental strength is a valuable project in its own right, independently of its 
philosophical consequences. Nevertheless, making explicit some of these is important. I will 
finish by pointing out how mental strength sheds light onto some relevant philosophical 
issues related to cognitive phenomenology, the structure of the stream of consciousness, the 
debate about degrees of consciousness and, finally, the functions of consciousness.  
 
                                                 
appearance through attention do not necessarily involve inaccurate representations (for discussion, 
see Stazicker 2011; Block 2010). 
26 For arguments against pain representationalism, see (Aydede 2009; Aydede 2017). 
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a. Cognitive phenomenology 
 
It is not a trivial finding that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude. 
Phenomenal character is often described only in terms of domain-specific sensory qualities: 
the redness of a tomato [vision], the sweet savor of pineapple [taste], or the odor of a skunk 
[smell]. Mental strength, in contrast, is present in all experiences in spite of originating from 
diverse phenomenal and representational components unique to each domain. An important 
consequence of the domain-generality of mental strength is that cognitive states such as 
thoughts and desires have a non-sensory phenomenal magnitude associated to it. This does 
not address whether cognitive states have distinct phenomenology from sensory states, which 
is the question that drives most of the debate about cognitive phenomenology (Chudnoff 2015; 
Bayne and Montague 2011). However, the domain-generality of mental strength indicates 
that cognitive states have phenomenology that is not sensory-specific. This much can be 
accepted even if it turns out that cognitive states lack any other type of phenomenal 
character. 
 
b. The structure of the stream of consciousness 
 
Philosophers and psychologists often describe the structuring relations between mental 
states using the familiar terminology of ‘center’ and ‘periphery’.27 Naturally, this structuring 
relation does not have to be binary, it could be graded. On my view, mental strength is the 
                                                 
27 There is a large tradition within Gestalt psychologists and phenomenologists like Husserl, Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty. For a recent approach see (Watzl 2017).  
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structuring property of the stream of consciousness. This should be clear from the relational 
reading of mental strength I discussed in section 4. In other words, when mental strength is 
considered in our explanations of the mental, structuring comes for free.  
 This is not true of all proposals that highlight the importance of central/peripheral 
relations. For example, Watzl’s priority structures theory requires both bottom-up and top-
down attention (see section 5.c above). On my view, in contrast, the explanation is 
straightforward and uncostly. Conscious mental states have an intrinsic property, mental 
strength, by means of which they fall into a natural ordering. Our conscious life is structured, 
rather than having to be constantly structured. The difference is subtle but important. In 
Watzl’s view mental states are, so to speak, inert. It is the powerful action of the constant 
deployment of attention that keeps them ordered. This should not rest importance to 
attention as a source of mental strength and, hence, as a powerful structuring tool. In the 
case of voluntary attention, it is a subject-guided structuring tool, which entails that the 
shape of our conscious life is to a large extent under our control. This, however, does not mean 
that attention is the ultimate explanation of the conscious mind’s structure. Rather, the 
structure of the conscious mind depends on mental strength. Thinking otherwise risks 
attributing attention powers it does not have, as it was sharply pointed out by William James: 
 
Thus the notion that our effort in attending is an original faculty, a force additional 
to the others of which brain and mind are the seat, may be an abject superstition. 
Attention may have to go, like many a faculty once deemed essential, like many verbal 
phantom, like many an idol of the tribe. It may be an excrescence on Psychology. No 
need of it to drag ideas before consciousness or fix them, when we see how perfectly they 
drag and fix each other there. (James 1950, 452, XI, vol. I; my emphasis) 
 
 We should agree with James that there is no need of an “additional force” to structure 
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consciousness other than mental states themselves. I would not go as far as to deny the 
existence of attention and its important role structuring the stream of consciousness. But the 
distinction between attention and its effects, as well as their limits, must be clear. The 
conscious mind is ultimately self-structuring. 
 
c. Degrees of consciousness  
 
There is a lively debate in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience about whether 
consciousness comes in degrees (Dehaene 2014; Bayne, Hohwy, and Owen 2016; Fazekas and 
Overgaard 2017; Rosenthal 2018). When talking about consciousness and its cognates, 
researchers may refer to the overall state of a person or animal (e.g., wakefulness, anesthesia, 
coma, sleep, etc.), for which they use phrases such as ‘state-consciousness’ or ‘global states of 
consciousness’. They may also refer to whether the person or animal is conscious of something 
or not (e.g., seeing or not seeing a face, seeing a face versus seeing a house, hearing or not 
hearing a sound, feeling or not feeling pain, etc.), also referred to as ‘content-consciousness’ 
or ‘local states of consciousness’.28 The question about degrees of local consciousness 
sometimes is framed in representational terms. Whether a subject is more or less conscious 
of something is taken to be a question about whether the representational contents of the 
subject’s state are more precise, more complete, or more intense.  
                                                 
28 This terminology is more common in neuroscience than in philosophy, but I find it clearer. 
Confusingly, in philosophy the terms ‘transitive-’ or ‘state-’ consciousness are often used to refer to 
what I labelled here ‘content-consciousness’, and the term ‘creature-consciousness’ is sometimes used 
to approximate what I called here ‘state-consciousness’ (Rosenthal 1993).  
 39 
 I think that the question about degrees of local consciousness should be, or at least it can 
also be, interpreted to be about phenomenal states themselves. Under this reading, we can 
take into account the representational contents of experiences insofar as they contribute to 
mental strength, but the question about the existence of degrees of consciousness is 
redirected towards the phenomenal intensity of states themselves. Naturally, when 
interpreted in this way, the question about whether there are degrees of consciousness is a 
resolute ‘yes’ because there certainly are degrees of mental strength. 
 It is unclear whether aggregating the mental strength of someone’s set of conscious 
states at a given moment is what determines their degree of global consciousness. We get 
counterintuitive results if we accept this idea. Consider patients with unresponsive 
wakefulness syndrome (Laureys et al. 2010). These patients sustained severe brain damage 
and as a result they are in a state of partial arousal (e.g., they have circadian rhythms), but 
they seem otherwise unresponsive to commands and, therefore, unconscious. However, a 
subset of these patients are suspected to enjoy some conscious states despite their inability 
to respond behaviorally (Owen 2006). Imagine that one of their isolated conscious states had 
a very elevated mental strength, more elevated than all the states of a drowsy person taken 
together. On one hand, it may seems counterintuitive to say that an unresponsive wakeful 
patient is more conscious than a drowsy person who just woke up from a dreamless sleep. On 
the other, it is hard to think what else would be needed other than the mental strength of the 
aggregate of someone’s individual states to determine their degree of global consciousness.  
 I suspect that part of the counterintuitiveness of this example stems from the fact that 
the drowsy person also has access-consciousness that the patient lacks. For instance, the 
drowsy person may be able to talk, attend, think, remember, respond, and perform all sorts 
of other tasks that require cognitive control. The patient cannot do most if not any of these 
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things. However, phenomenal- and access-consciousness tend to go hand-in-hand (Block 
1995; Block 2007), which may be eliciting the wrong intuitions in cases like this one. Namely, 
perhaps our intuitions about the degrees of consciousness for global states mix phenomenal 
and access-consciousness, making it hard to accept an aggregation account of mental 
strength. Theoretically speaking, however, an aggregation account of mental strength might 
yield the right result that there are degrees of global consciousness and that they can be 
systematically ranked. In any case, I would point out that the notion of mental strength 
provides us with an extra tool to move fowrward this debate by refocusing the emphasis in 
the case of local consciousness and perhaps by reshaping the logical space of possibilities in 
the case of global consciousness.  
 
d. The function of consciousness 
 
Consciousness is often thought to perform important functions: flexible control of behavior, 
rational thought, and cognitive control (e.g., action inhibition and preparation, task 
switching, control of attention, working memory). Recently, philosophers (Phillips 2016) and 
psychologists (Peters and Lau 2015) have questioned whether perception is even possible 
without conscious awareness. Some philosophers have sometimes gone as far as to argue that 
consciousness is the mark of the mental (for example, Locke; see Coventry and Kriegel 2008). 
 There is, however, abundant evidence that some mental states, which often take place 
consciously, can also occur unconsciously. Subjects who fail to report awareness of stimuli 
can perform above chance in a wide array of visual and cognitive tasks, such as stimulus 
discrimination, word meaning extraction, simple arithmetic operations, and cognitive control 
in general (Dehaene 2014; Dehaene et al. 2014). Performance can be matched between more 
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conscious and less conscious conditions in visual tasks (Lau and Passingham 2006). 
Blindsight patients who have sustained damage to visual cortex areas can detect and 
discriminate stimuli they are unaware of (Weiskrantz 1986). In the most striking cases, 
blindsight patients can even avoid obstacles while walking down a hallway (de Gelder et al. 
2008). Even when nuanced methods are used, researchers have often failed to demonstrate a 
clear advantage of consciousness (Koizumi, Maniscalco, and Lau 2015; Samaha et al. 2016). 
Moreover, many philosophers have forcefully argued that consciousness does not have a 
function, or at least that it was not evolutionarily selected for performing any function 
(Rosenthal 2008; Robinson, Maley, and Piccinini 2015). Together, this evidence suggests that 
many cognitive abilities exist (or could have existed) without consciousness, which puts 
pressure on the intuitive necessary link between consciousness and rational thought and 
action.  
 Despite these empirical findings and philosophical arguments to the contrary, it should 
be highlighted that mental strength performs at least two important functions: structuring 
the conscious mind and justifying self-guided action and reasoning. As argued above, mental 
strength structures the conscious mind. This structure has clear behavioral and cognitive 
effects. By prioritizing some states, mental strength guides action and cognition. Note that 
the fact that this could be done without consciousness and, therefore, without mental 
strength, does not mean that creatures like us can do it without consciousness or without 
mental strength. The same reasoning can be applied if consciousness and, thereby, mental 
strength, was not selected for (Robinson, Maley, and Piccinini 2015). That would not mean 
that in creatures like us mental strength does not perform an important function.  
 Conscious mental states do not have the same effects in our decision-making and in our 
mental lives independently of their strength. Certainly, there would be no reason to take an 
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aspirin if one were undergoing an unconscious pain (even if we were told by third-personal 
means that this was the case). There is less motivation for taking an aspirin when 
experiencing a mild headache than when experiencing a strong headache; a stronger emotion 
is easier to introspect than a mild one (see Chapter 2 for details on the relation of mental 
strength and introspection); a more vivid mental image is more useful for simulating a future 
scenario than a weak mental image; there is also less justification to take weak visual 
experiences at face value, and therefore act upon them, than when experiences are strong.  
 Philosophers and psychologists might have overemphasized the significance of the 
research discussed above, ignoring the role of mental strength in our lives: the initiation of 
action, the justification of perceptual beliefs, and the structuring of the stream of 
consciousness. Of course, an important motivational and justificatory role of mental strength 
is consistent with consciousness providing little to no advantage in visual processing (e.g., 
performance; see Chapter 4) as has been shown multiple times. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Mental strength is a distinct phenomenal magnitude of individual conscious mental states. 
It is what modulates the phenomenal intensity of conscious experiences, thereby modulating 
the degree to which mental states make their way to our consciousness. This important role 
of mental strength has been often underplayed by philosophers and psychologists in their 
theorizing and experimental designs. In this chapter, I offered an account of mental strength 
understood as a domain-general property of conscious experiences themselves, rather than 
as some aspect of their representational contents or attentional status. Instead of explaining 
 43 
the degrees of consciousness in each domain by appealing to domain-specific representational 
and phenomenal characteristics, the theory advanced in this chapter offers a parsimonious 
account of the intensity of experiences by postulating the existence of a single domain-general 
intensity phenomenal property. Mental strength explains the synchronic and diachronic 
dynamics of the structure of the stream of consciousness. It also provides consciousness with 
a clear function in action and cognition. Finally, I showed that mental strength can be 






A Detection Theory of Introspection 
 
In this chapter, I develop a theory of introspection in which mental strength plays a central 
role (see Chapter 1). By ‘introspection’ I understand the process of attentively focusing on 
one’s current conscious mental events in order to form judgments about them. We can 
introspect perceptual experiences, pains, emotions, desires, and thoughts, among other 
mental events. Although there are many disagreements about introspection, I expect this 
definition to be relatively uncontroversial.29 So defined, introspection should not be identified 
with consciousness, because not all conscious mental events are introspected. A theory of 
introspection also need not depend on any specific theory of consciousness, and this is true of 
the theory I will develop.30 For concreteness, I will limit my examples to pains. The 
                                                 
29 “[I]ntrospection is an attentive operation and one which is only occasionally performed, whereas 
consciousness is supposed to be a constant element of all mental processes […]” (Ryle 2009, 146); 
“When a thought occurs to you, or you make a conscious judgment, your attention is engaged.[…] A 
pain, for instance, can equally be an object of attention.” (Peacocke 1998, 64-5); “[W]e can also direct 
our attention at our phenomenally conscious experiences as such, in introspection. I can pay attention 
to the way things seem to me while watching a game; or I can concentrate on the felt qualities of my 
experiences, noticing what they are like.” (Carruthers 2000, 211; his emphasis); “[I]ntrospection is 
defined as deliberate and immediate attention to certain aspects of phenomenal experience.” (Hatfield 
2005, 279); “Introspection […] involves consciously and deliberately paying attention to our 
contemporaneous mental states.” (Rosenthal 2005, 28); “The “organ” of introspection is attention, the 
orientation of which puts a subject in an appropriate relation to a targeted state.” (Goldman 2006, 
244); “I attend to my visual experience and think I am having an experience of such-and-such quality 
[…].” (Chalmers 2010, 254) “Introspection is the dedication of central cognitive resources, or attention, 
to the task of arriving at a judgment about one’s current, or very recently past, conscious experience 
[…].” (Schwitzgebel 2012, 42); “Plausibly, introspection depends on a form of attention that enables 
selective thought about mental properties.” (Wu 2014b, 254); “[A]n introspective state [is] structurally 
identical to a regular, non-introspective conscious state, differing only in respect of the distribution of 
a certain resource, which we may call attention.” (Giustina and Kriegel 2017)  
30 My view is compatible with first-order (Block 2007; Lamme 2010), same-order (Kriegel 2009), higher-
order (Rosenthal 2005; Lau and Rosenthal 2011), global workspace (Baars 1988; Dehaene and 
Naccache 2001) or information integrated theories (Tononi et al. 2016; Tononi 2008). In Chapter 4, 
however, I argue that the higher-order view is well supported by neural and computational data. 
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introspective model that I develop here depends on states having mental strength. The model, 
then, can be easily generalized to introspection of states other than pain (see discussion about 
the domain-generality of mental strength in Chapter 1).  
 It might help to start with some examples of when introspection is easy and when it is 
hard: 
 
Accuracy. Unanesthetized dental patients can easily introspect their pains when their tooth 
is being drilled. However, patients undergoing dental treatment occasionally report feeling 
pain before the dentist’s instruments even touch them. This occurs even in patients whose 
nerves have been removed or who had been anesthetized.31 Surprisingly, patients do not 
report feeling pain once they are told that they had not been touched. Yet, they still insist it 
was painful the first time. 
  
Detection versus discrimination. Patients can easily detect and report feeling a sudden pain. 
However, it is typically harder for them to discriminate between kinds of pain, such as 
whether a pain is quivering or shooting, gnawing or stabbing, located exactly at the center of 
the back or slightly skewed to one side.  
 
Confidence. Patients admitted to the ER while experiencing a strong pain immediately and 
without hesitation inform the personnel how they feel. This same confidence, however, is not 
always displayed minutes after taking a potent painkiller. When asked if they are still in 
                                                 
31 This case of dental fear is discussed by Rosenthal (2005, 127). 
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pain, patients may hesitate and when they finally answer, it is typically with lower 
confidence. 
 
Criterion effects. When visiting the doctor, patients may detect mild pains that had been 
unnoticed when they were at home. Their criterion for classifying an experience as painful 
seems less strict in the presence of a doctor, and stricter when at home, perhaps because they 
want to make sure the doctor’s diagnosis takes all of their pains into account. 
 
In the next section, I will explain why existing theories of introspection cannot explain all 
these features of our introspective judgments. Then, I will introduce, motivate, and defend a 
new theory modeled after a widespread scientific theory of perception, Signal Detection 
Theory. Accordingly, I title my view Introspective Signal Detection Theory. I also discuss 
important differences between perception and introspection, as well as potential neural 
implementations of iSDT and ways of testing it. 
 The claim that introspection is similar to another cognitive capacity may be surprising. 
It used to be a common view “that the kind of knowledge a person has of their own mental 
(psychological) states, such as thoughts and feelings, is in principle not only fundamentally 
different from but also superior to the knowledge of their thoughts and feelings that is 
available to anyone else.” (Alston 1971, 223) Access to one’s own minds was thought to be 
peculiar (i.e., different) and privileged (i.e., superior or, according to some, infallible). I believe 
that this is a mistake and will argue that introspection is of the same general kind as the 
rest of our cognitive capacities.  
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1.  Existing Theories  
 
Most existing theories of introspection fall into two camps. Theories in the first camp try to 
explain why introspection can be infallible. Descartes vividly evokes introspective infallibility 
when he writes: “I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all 
this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false” 
(Descartes 1985a, AT VII 29).32 In this vein, some contemporary philosophers argue 
introspection of conscious experiences, such as perceptions, imaginations, pains, and 
thoughts, to be infallible—at least in some limited, paradigmatic cases (Chalmers 2003; 
Gertler 2001; Burge 1996). Some of these philosophers take introspection to be direct and 
self-verifying. According to Burge, if one judges ‘I am thinking that my head hurts’, “or indeed 
just engages in the thought, one makes it true. The thought is contextually self-verifying. One 
cannot err if one does not think it, and if one does think it one cannot err. In this sense, such 
thinkings are infallible.” (Burge 1996, 92) According to Gertler, introspection takes place via 
pure demonstrative reference achieved via directing attention to the phenomenal contents of 
our conscious experiences: it is thus [here, now]. “By appropriately attending to the dull 
throbbing sensation [of a headache], you demonstratively pick out the phenomenal content 
<dull throbbing>.” (Gertler 2001, 321) Thus, according to Gertler, phenomenal content is 
embedded in the introspective judgment ‘it is thus here and now’, preventing any sort of error. 
According to her, “pure demonstrative reference allows the subject to grasp the content 
directly […] in the sense that there is no causal gap between the referring state and its 
                                                 
32 Whether Descartes indeed held a theory of the infallibility of introspection is contentious (Newman 
2016).  
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referent, the phenomenal content. For the referring state instantiates the phenomenal 
content, by virtue of embedding its token.”33 (Gertler 2001, 323) 
 Theories in this camp might explain how introspection works in a small number of cases, 
specifically those in which the alleged target state is itself created or in which it is mentally 
pointed out. But they do not explain most cases. The embedding approach leaves unexplained 
a whole range of prototypical introspective judgments in which the contents are explicitly 
described, rather than just demonstrated. For example, it does not apply to judgments like 
“I’m hungry” and “The pain in my left leg is getting worse.” Our introspective capacities are 
wider than simple “it is thus here and now” judgments.  
 Theories in the second camp argue that introspection is mostly unreliable and try to 
explain why. Schwitzgebel, for instance, argues that “we’re prone to gross error, even in 
favorable circumstances of extended reflection” (2008, 259) about ongoing conscious 
experiences, including mental imagery, dreams, all kinds of perceptual experiences, pains, 
and cognitive phenomenology. For Schwitzgebel, a crucial indication of introspection’s 
unreliability is that there is large individual and group variation in our introspective 
judgments, as well as widespread uncertainty while we make them. According to him, this 
shows that “we are both ignorant and prone to error” and that “we make gross, enduring 
mistakes about even the most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience 
(or ‘phenomenology’).” (2008, 247) 
 Schwitzgebel argues introspective judgments are the product of regular cognitive 
capacities such as perception, memory, attention, and cognitive control, among others. Thus, 
                                                 
33 Note that Gertler (2012; 2018) defends a less ambitious view. 
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judgments of our experiences are “influenced by at least: expectations about my experience, 
my knowledge of the outward environment, my knowledge of what I can and cannot discern, 
culturally available metaphors and general theories about visual experience, and my 
knowledge of other aspects of my psychology.” (2012, 33) However, it is unclear why other 
cognitive capacities, such as memory and perception, are often reliable, while introspection 
is always unreliable, even though introspection is supposed to be a product of them. 
Schwitzgebel does not provide an introspective-specific explanation of why introspection fails. 
I agree with him that introspection is not special, in the sense that introspection is not of a 
different kind from other cognitive capacities. However, we need specific explanations for 
why each capacity fails. For example, memory is not peculiar in any strong sense, but the 
explanation of why we fail to remember is different from the explanation of why we fail to 
see or hear.  
 There are theories that fall between these two camps. They usually identify specific 
conditions in which introspection is unreliable (Rosenthal 2005; Armstrong 1968; Goldman 
2006; Reuter 2011; Giustina and Kriegel 2017). For example, Hohwy (2011) thinks we are 
unreliable when we introspect visual phenomenology. He argues that the neural mechanisms 
responsible for visual experiences become disengaged when the neural mechanisms for 
introspection are active, thereby weakening the experiences and making introspection less 
accurate. Bayne and Spener (2010) think that introspection is inaccurate when we include 
theoretical concepts in our introspective judgments.  
 However, these moderate theories do not provide a general account of introspection.34 
They limit themselves to providing psychological and neuroscientific details that explain 
                                                 
34 For a notable exception, see (Goldman 2006, Ch. 9). 
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inaccuracies in some domain (e.g., visual experiences) or in some narrow conditions (e.g., 
when introspective judgments include theoretical concepts). It is unclear whether Hohwy’s 
explanation for introspective inaccuracy of visual experiences can be extended to pains or 
emotions. Bayne and Spener’s approach leaves unexplained cases of inaccurate introspective 
judgments that contain no theoretical concepts.  
 A satisfactory theory of introspection must identify and explain more than the conditions 
in which it fails. It must also identify and explain the conditions in which it is reliable (Spener 
2015; Goldman 2004). For example, any theory of introspection must explain why we are 
reliable at detecting strong pains, not just why we are unreliable at detecting weak pains. It 
may be tempting to compromise and say introspection is fallible in hard cases and infallible 
in easy cases—such as introspecting ‘perceptual simples’ such as color and shapes or the 
presence of a strong pain (Allen-Hermanson 2015). However, a general theory of 
introspection ought to explain with the same resources why introspection is unlikely to fail in 
easy cases and likely to fail in hard cases. Rather than making easy cases exceptional, a 
satisfactory theory of introspection must offer a unifying explanation of its whole accuracy 
range. Current theories also do not explain the features of introspective judgments listed in 
the introduction. For example, they cannot explain why a dental patient may incorrectly 
report pain, or why it is harder for patients to discriminate the type of their pain than it is to 
detect the pain. They also do not explain in a systematic and general way why we are more 
confident when introspecting strong than mild pains, or why introspective judgments of 
identical pains may vary depending on criterion effects. 
 My goal in this chapter is to offer a new and more satisfying theory. According to Signal 
Detection Theory (SDT), the strength of a perceptual stimulus modulates perceptual 
accuracy. For instance, you are more likely to accurately perceive a person in an alley when 
 51 
the alley is well-lit than when it is not. Here I defend the view that all conscious experiences 
have degrees of strength. A central tenet of Introspective Signal Detection Theory (iSDT), the 
theory that I advance here, is that the strength of our conscious experiences modulates 
introspective accuracy. For example, you are more likely to accurately introspect a strong 
pain than a mild pain. iSDT also accounts for confidence and criterion effects as well as for 
the difference between detection and discrimination during introspection. Since all conscious 
experiences have a degree of strength, as I argued in Chapter 1, the iSDT model is apt for 
explaining introspection in several domains beyond pain, such as perception, mental 
imagery, emotions, thoughts, and desires. Modeling introspection after a well-established 
method for measuring sensory sensitivity such as SDT promotes its study in a systematic 
way. Finally, abandoning introspection’s alleged peculiarity and privileged status in favor of 
a naturalistic understanding has the potential of illuminating the underlying neural 
processes of introspection.  
 The comparison of introspection to perception may trigger some alarms, as philosophers 
often vilify this kind of comparison (Shoemaker 1996). Although iSDT may have some 
similarities to some so-called inner-sense theories of introspection, the details of my view 
are—as far as I can tell—novel and not reducible to a perceptual model (see Picciuto and 
Carruthers 2014 for discussion). Introspection shares with perception the fact that they 
create representations about their targets that are used to guide behavior. If I am right, 
introspection shares with perception the fact that the accuracy of our judgments depends on 
the strength of the relevant signal, whether it is an external signal (as in the case of 
perception) or an internal signal (as in the case of introspection). But these similarities do 
not imply that we perceive our conscious events during introspection and it should be noted 
that there are several important differences too. I discuss these at length in section 4. 
 52 
In the next two sections, first, I offer a short primer on signal detection theory and, then, 
introduce iSDT. 
 
2.  Signal Detection Theory Primer  
 
Here I introduce basic standard tenets of Signal Detection Theory. The reader well-versed in 
the topic may comfortably skip this section.  
 Imagine you walk by an alley late at night. If the alley’s lamp is on, it would be easy for 
you to notice a man lurking behind the dumpster. His face will look bright and the contours 
of his facial features well-defined. If the lamp is off, his face will look dark and the contours 
of his face ill-defined. It would be hard for you to see this man and easy to take him for being 
just a shadow. Now imagine that, earlier, you read that a robber was on the run in your 
neighborhood. In this case, a quick glimpse to the dark alley might help you see the man’s 
face even if it looks dark and grainy. With the robber on the run, a face-like shadow may be 
enough for detecting the lurking criminal.  
 The lesson from this simple example is that perception (detection and discrimination 
alike) depends on two factors, the signal-to-noise ratio of the perceptual signal created by the 
stimulus and on a detection criterion. When the alley’s lamp is on, the well-lit stimulus 
creates a strong signal in your perceptual system. The noise from the stimulus (e.g., shadows 
on the man’s face) is minimal. The signal-to-noise ratio is high and perceptual uncertainty is 
low. When the lamp is off, the dim face produces a weak perceptual signal and perceptual 
noise increases (e.g., there are more shadows in the man’s face). In this case, the signal-to-
noise ratio is low, and uncertainty increases. Importantly, perceptual detection involves 
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making a decision. This entails that, even with the same signal-to-noise ratio, you may still 
detect the dim face if your perceptual detection criterion shifts. When you learn that there is 
a criminal on the run, you need less evidence to detect the presence of a man in the alley. 
Your criterion or threshold for detecting a face is lowered when the probability of a man 
lurking in the shadows increases.  
 Let us now introduce some technical details. According to SDT, subjects detect (or 
discriminate) stimuli by comparing an internal response against a criterion placed along a 
decision axis (Macmillan and Creelman 2005; Green and Swets 1966) (Figure 1A). Stimulus 
presentation gives rise to an internal response in the subject’s mind (the signal).35 In easy 
cases, the stimulus may be large, bright, and on view long enough (Figure 1B, top panel). In 
hard cases, the stimulus may be small, dim, and viewable only for a very short moment 
(Figure 1B, lower panel). On average, easy cases give rise to a stronger internal response and 
hard cases give rise to a weaker response. In fact, this is what makes them easy and hard, 
respectively. 
                                                 
35 SDT was originally developed as a mathematical tool to assess the accuracy of radars. It was only 
later that it was adapted to be used in psychophysics (Luce 1963; Green and Swets 1966). When used 
to assess perceptual sensitivity, the internal response is understood as a hidden psychological variable. 





Figure 1. Signal detection theory 
(A) Basic model of a detection task in Signal Detection Theory. (B) Top panel. Model of a perceptual 
task with easy trials. Lower panel. Model of a perceptual task with hard trials. 
 
































































 However, internal responses vary across trials and subjects for reasons other than 
stimulus properties (e.g., different sizes, brightness, viewable time, and stimulus noise). 
Variation in stimulus processing (e.g., attention, experience, natural skill, flukes, state of the 
perceptual system) and internal noise (i.e., internal response unrelated to stimulus 
presentation) also affect the signal-to-noise ratio of the internal response. Even when there 
is no stimulus, internal noise alone produces an internal response. When aggregated, the 
internal responses when the stimulus is absent (noise) and the internal responses when the 
stimulus is present (signal-plus-noise) form two normal (Gaussian) distributions. By setting 
a criterion along a decision axis, subjects compare the criterion to the strength of the internal 
response on a given situation and classify it as belonging to one or the other distribution. 
When the strength of the internal response does not cross the criterion, subjects respond as 
if the stimulus were absent. If it crosses the criterion, they respond as if the stimulus were 
present (Figure 1A). 
 Because there is always certain degree of overlap of the two distributions, there is always 
a certain degree of uncertainty in perception.36 The smaller the overlap, the more different 
the noise-only and the signal-plus-noise internal distributions are and, hence, the more likely 
one is to respond correctly (i.e., making a hit or a correct rejection). When the distributions 
overlap more, detection becomes harder because a wider range of internal response strengths 
can equally belong to either distribution. So, in this case, even a criterion optimally placed to 
minimize errors generates a significant number of mistakes (i.e., false alarms or misses). The 
larger the overlap of the two distributions, the closer their means are and, conversely, the 
                                                 
36 This uncertainty need not be reflected in the subject’s subjective confidence. Subjects may feel 
completely confident about their perceptual decisions and yet the internal response evidence be 
ambiguous between pertaining to the signal or to the noise distributions. 
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smaller the overlap, the further apart they are. Thus, the distance between the means of the 
distributions can be used as a measure of detection sensitivity (called d’).37  
 To put these technical notions into simpler terms: perceiving is never pure signal 
processing. Noise always gets entangled with the perceptual signal and perceiving consists, 
to a large extent, in recovering signals from ever-present noise. Perceptual sensitivity is the 
capacity of a perceiver to distinguish signal from noise. This is what it means to say that 
perceptual accuracy depends on the signal-to-noise ratio. The larger this ratio is, the more 
sensitive, i.e., the more accurate, a perceiver will be. 
 SDT also emphasizes that perception is a decision-making process. Sensitivity and 
response bias (i.e., criterion placement) are independent. Keeping the subject’s internal 
response signal-to-noise ratio fixed, a detection criterion can be placed anywhere along the 
decision axis. Reward schedule, risk preferences, perceptual biases, or perceivers’ priors can 
affect criteria placement (Witt et al. 2015; Macmillan and Creelman 2005). A subject with a 
liberal criterion (placed leftwards on the decision axis) would require very little internal 
response strength to get the subject to respond as if the stimulus were present. In contrast, 
a subject with a conservative criterion (placed rightwards on the decision axis) would respond 
as if the stimulus were present only when the internal response is rather strong. This 
explains why knowing that there is a robber nearby makes you more likely to identify the 
shadow in the alley as a person. 
 
 
                                                 
37 The distance between the means of the distribution is sufficient for determining sensitivity assuming 




Figure 2. Confidence criteria in SDT 
 
 SDT also accounts for confidence in perceptual tasks (Figure 2). Confidence levels are 
determined by further criteria placed to the left and right of the detection criterion (Kepecs 
and Mainen 2012; Kepecs 2013; Shadlen and Kiani 2013; Macmillan and Creelman 2005). If 
the signal crosses the detection criterion (“stimulus present” in Figure 2) but not the 
confidence criterion, subjects report they detect the target with low confidence. If it also 
crosses the confidence criterion, they report detecting the target with high confidence. An 
analogous explanation applies when subjects do not report detecting a target (“stimulus 
absent” in Figure 2). 
 Finally, I note that SDT is primarily a theory of perception. SDT, however, can be 
adapted to explain the difference between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing 
(see Chapter 3). However, nothing in this section or about iSDT depends on this. 
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3.  Introspective Signal Detection Theory 
 
Introspective accuracy can be modeled after how SDT models perceptual accuracy. According 
to iSDT, introspective accuracy depends on an introspective signal-to-noise ratio. When one 
sets to judge the presence or the features of an ongoing conscious experience, the ensuing 
introspective judgment will be more or less accurate depending on the strength of the 
introspective internal response. This response depends on the degree of mental strength of 
the target conscious experience in the same way the perceptual internal response depends on 
the strength of the target external stimulus. There is also introspective noise, i.e., an internal 
response unrelated to the introspective response of the target conscious experience. 
Introspective noise can be introduced by fluctuations in attention and the mental strength of 
other experiences. A stronger experience generates a stronger introspective signal, which 
makes it easier to disentangle from noise and, consequently, more likely to be detected or 
discriminated accurately during introspection. In this section, I will develop the iSDT model 
focusing on pains. Because of the domain-generality of mental strength (Chapter 1), the 
model can be easily expanded to other experiences. 
 Let us recall the following pain example from Chapter 1. Imagine you wake up late for 
work. You stub your big toe against the bed when rushing to the shower. A sudden painful 
sensation invades your conscious awareness: your toe hurts. First, the pain is sharp, strong, 
and unpleasant. You hold your toe and while doing so you are unable to focus on anything 
else except the painful sensation. After a few seconds, your experience starts changing: it 
slowly becomes weaker while still being a sharp, unpleasant pain in your toe. As the pain 
decreases, your mind gets back to thinking about being late for work and you resume your 
plan to take a shower. As I argued before, an obvious phenomenal change takes place as the 
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intensity of your pain increases and decreases. This phenomenal change is due to a variation 
in the degree of mental strength of the experience.  
 Barring extraordinary cases, it would be surprising if one perceived inaccurately a large 
object that was looked at attentively for enough time under good viewing conditions. 
Similarly, strong pains are most likely introspected confidently and accurately (i.e., they are 
detected when present and not detected when absent, and their features are accurately 
discriminated). Failing to introspect a strong pain should be a very rare event. In contrast, it 
would not be surprising if one missed or misperceived a very dim, rapidly-presented stimulus 
while distracted or during other suboptimal viewing conditions. By the same logic, we should 
expect to introspect mild pains inaccurately, at least sometimes, and be less confident about 
our introspective judgments. The iSDT model provides a plausible and systematic account of 
why a strong pain is hardly ever missed, why it seems odd to think we could fail to introspect 
it, and why we are usually quite confident during introspection of strong pains. It also 
predicts that none of this holds for mild pains. iSDT is consistent with a natural 
understanding of pains and our knowledge of them, at the same time that it provides a 
psychologically plausible model of how introspection works. 
 Note that introspective inaccuracies are not accessible through introspection. At least 
not immediately and not always. Subjectively, if introspective judgments vary from one 
moment to another or if it is difficult to come to a verdict, one may conclude that introspection 
is amiss. Unlike perception, however, it is hard to get rid of an introspective mistake by non-
introspective means (for example, by someone pointing out the mistake).38 It might never 
                                                 
38 It is worth pointing out that this only applies to conscious experiences. Introspective errors of 
thoughts or desires might be easier to detect by others, since they tend to last longer and they can 
manifest in behavior more prominently. 
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seem to oneself that an introspective mistake is taking place. This, I suspect, explains some 
of the resistance to the idea that we can be introspectively wrong about pain. So, rather than 
relying on introspection or third-party corrections, introspective inaccuracies are a 
consequence of iSDT and, thus, we must accept their possibility based (mainly) on theoretical 
reasons.  
 Now, I will show how iSDT provides a satisfactory explanation of the four features of 
introspective judgments listed in the introduction: accuracy, detection versus discrimination, 




Nothing about iSDT prevents the possibility that we are terrible introspectors. But we do not 
need to accept this sort of global skepticism (Schwitzgebel 2011). We can start by assuming 
that introspection, as the rest of our cognitive capacities, is accurate to a certain degree. 
Following iSDT, this entails that the overlap of the introspective noise and introspective 
signal-plus-noise distributions is from low to moderate, especially for strong target conscious 
experiences. Getting one’s tooth drilled often produces an intense pain, that is, it often is a 
conscious experience with high mental strength. Thus, making an inaccurate introspective 
judgment about strong pains produced by getting one’s tooth drilled is expected to be rare. 
But not impossible, because there is always some overlap between the noise and signal 
distributions (Figure 3A). On rare occasions, someone might make a false alarm judging they 





Figure 3. Introspective signal detection theory 
(A) Introspective model of a stereotypical strong pain. (B) Introspective model of a stereotypical mild 
pain. 
 
 Recall the example of dental fear mentioned in the introduction. Vibrations produced by 
the dentist’s instruments in conjunction with the patient’s fear of the treatment produce a 
pain report even though anesthesia or the lack of nerves should make that impossible. In 
cases like these, there are at least two possible accounts of the patients’ initial report. 
Patients in fact experience pain (and accurately introspect and report it) even if there is no 
obvious cause for it. Alternatively, patients do not experience pain and their reports are based 
on an inaccurate introspective judgment. For those still convinced pain introspection is 
infallible or that feelings of pain and introspective judgments of pain collapse into each other, 
the first answer would seem correct. However, the second explanation is simpler: subjects 
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misjudged their experience. Patients are not in pain (yet), but fear and the expectation of it 
propitiates constant introspecting their ongoing experiences. This constant evaluation 
eventually produces a false alarm. Maybe their criterion was more liberal or maybe by 
constantly attending their stream of consciousness they amplified the mental strength of a 
non-painful state, like fear, and eventually misclassified it as a pain.  
 iSDT also accounts for possible misses. The mental strength of a strong pain yields an 
introspective signal that most of the time crosses the introspective detection criterion. 
However, in some rare cases, the mental strength of an actual dental pain might not be 
sufficiently strong. Or perhaps the criterion is shifted to become more conservative than 
usual. This situation is expected to be rare for strong pains, just as failing to see a big object 
under optimal viewing conditions is rare. However, unlike missed big objects, introspectively 
missing a strong pain often remains uncorrected. This in part explains why it seems so 
counterintuitive that one could be in a strong pain and yet fail to judge that this is the case. 
Moreover, due to the professed incorrigibility of introspection (Dennett 2002; Rorty 1970; 
Langland-Hassan 2017; Alston 1971), any change in our introspective judgments is typically 
attributed to a change in the target conscious state rather than to a previous introspective 
error.39 iSDT suggests this need not be the case. 
 Mild pains are different. They have less mental strength, which entails the introspective 
signal they produce is weaker. The noise and signal distributions of a mild headache overlap 
more, which entails we are introspectively less sensitive to the presence of mild pains and 
their features. In other words, on average, the mental strength of mild headaches is closer to 
                                                 
39 This does not entail that phenomenal variability cannot be an acceptable explanation in some cases 
(Hohwy 2011). 
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the mental strength of introspective noise, making harder for us to detect and discriminate 
them. This does not necessarily entail that false alarms and misses are frequent, just that 
they are less rare than during introspection of strong pains (Figure 3B). Thus, we should 
expect introspection to be more accurate when the target is strong than when it is not. As 
can be easily noticed in Figure 3, the area under the red curve that crosses the criterion is 
larger during mild pains than during strong pains, indicative of more false alarms. 
 
b. Detection versus discrimination 
 
From SDT we know detection is easier than discrimination, which is easier than 
classification. This can be shown formally (Macmillan and Creelman 2005), but an intuitive 
example should suffice. In the dark alley, even a quick glimpse may reveal the presence of 
someone. Yet, a quick glimpse would not reveal whether the person in the alley is the robber 
or your neighbor. This point applies to introspection as well. Unless mental strength is 
extremely low, detecting the presence of certain mental state need not be very hard. Thus, 
introspecting accurately that one is in pain may be common, even for mild pains. But, as in 
perception, when mental strength is low we should expect more errors discriminating fine-
grained properties of a pain (e.g., dull, throbbing, located exactly here or there, etc.). When 
experiencing a very mild pain, perhaps you are sure it hurts, but are you sure it hurts exactly 
here? Are you sure it is a throbbing pain and not a dull pain? If iSDT follows SDT in this 
respect too, we have the tools to explain why we can expect worse discrimination of mild 
pains’ features than those of strong pains.  
 Given this explanation, it is not surprising that philosophers find examples of 
introspecting being cold or seeing a red tomato as strong evidence in favor of infallibility, 
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while they use unconstrained cases of introspecting a mental image of one’s childhood house 
for arguing in favor of its unreliability. In the former cases, the experiences are typically 
strong and they ask to detect a state or discriminate a simple property; in the latter, the 
experiences are unstable, complex, often weak and the examples require us to identify 
complex features of the image.  
 
c. Confidence  
 
When you stub your toe against the bed, at the beginning at least, the pain dominates your 
stream of consciousness. If you were to entertain a thought about it, the presence and nature 
of such a conspicuous and dominating event should be readily known and you should be 
confident about your judgment. When the pain in your toe is about to vanish, introspection 
is not as easy, and you are not as confident when judging it. You may be unsure if what you 
are feeling is still pain or not. You might be aware of a sensation, but is it still a pain? Is it 
sharp, throbbing, or dull? Where exactly does it hurt? Is it the toe, just part of the toe, or part 
of the instep too? You may be able to tell it is not very painful anymore and, perhaps, you 
may identify it as dull and as located in the tip of the toe. Perhaps you are even right, but 
you are unlikely to be as confident as before. Note that this is how one can accurately 
determine that a state is weak. The fact that one is not able to introspect it easily and 
confidently reveals its weak nature. The situation is not different from perception. If a dim 
stimulus is flashed very quickly on a screen, you can very accurately determine that it was a 
weak stimulus, even if you fail to identify any of its traits (or precisely because of it). 
 The existence of this difference has been recently confirmed by a linguistic analysis of 
internet searches according to which, English and German speaking users use “I feel pain” 
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more often when describing minor or little pains, while they use “I have pain” significantly 
more often to describe severe or major pains (Reuter 2011). Presumably, subjects follow the 
usage of feel/have in a similar way as in other modalities to express degrees of confidence 
indicative of an understanding of an appearance/reality distinction. Compare: “the shirt looks 
blue” vs “the shirt is blue,” where the former is used to express low confidence about the real 
color of the shirt and the latter expresses confidence in the perceptual judgment. Similarly, 
subjects use “feel pain” for mild pains to express their weak confidence in their reported 
experience, while they use “have pain” to express certainty about the presence and 
characteristics of their experience. 
 iSDT provides a systematic explanation of this confidence variability: stereotypically 
strong pains, such as getting one’s tooth drilled, have fewer instances of introspective internal 
response falling between the detection and the confidence criteria than weak pains, such as 
mild headaches (Figure 3; shaded region).40, 41 
  
                                                 
40 Snodgrass and Shevrin (2006) describe a similar situation; their focus, however, is on perceptual 
internal response, not on what I call here introspective response. According to them, trials whose 
internal response fall between a detection criterion and a subjective criterion (akin to a confidence 
criterion [see Chapter 3; Figure 6]) can be labeled as “weak consciousness trials.” According to them, 
these are phenomenally conscious trials that are, however, not access-conscious trials (Block 2007; 
Block 1995). On their view, this would entail that they are not amenable to introspection, which 
requires the orientation of attention and forming a judgment (but see the end of section 4 below). My 
view is different from theirs because I think that trials that give rise to experiences with little mental 
strength, and therefore little introspective response, can still be introspected, albeit more inaccurately 
so. For a criticism of Snodgrass and Shevrin’s view, see (Irvine 2009). 
41 The extent to which mental strength and introspective confidence influence metacognition and 
confidence ratings in perceptual tasks is of great interest, but I do not discuss it further here. See 
(Morrison 2016; Morrison 2017; Denison 2016; Fleming and Lau 2014; Overgaard and Sandberg 2012). 
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d. Criterion effects 
 
Criterion effects can account for introspective variation too, even when holding introspective 
sensitivity fixed. The example of patients who detect a pain depending on whether they are 
in front of a doctor or not can be explained by shifts in their introspective criteria. By shifting 
what degree of mental strength counts as pain, these patients fail to detect it when they are 
at home. In contrast, the patient with dental fear illustrates a case of someone with a liberal 
introspective criterion. Being scared makes the patient count as pain even a weak 
introspective response pertaining to noise. Both cases propitiate introspective inaccuracies.  
 
Applying the assumptions of SDT to introspection is a reasonable and fruitful endeavor. iSDT 
provides a robustly grounded framework for thinking about our introspective capacities and 
mental strength is the kind of signal these can track. Important features of introspective 
judgments that make these hard are fully accounted by iSDT. 
 Despite the different types of phenomenal and representational components of 
experiences like pains, perception, or mental imagery, on one hand, and of thoughts and 
desires, on the other hand, it is not unreasonable to say that qua conscious states they all 
have a degree of mental strength (see Chapter 1). Due to the centrality of mental strength in 
iSDT, the domain-generality of mental strength allows us to apply the same lessons learned 
about introspection of pains to other mental states. Naturally, details about introspection of 




4.  Perception and Introspection 
 
SDT provides a helpful model for understanding introspection. Yet, the parallel between 
perception and introspection, and consequently between SDT and iSDT, is not perfect. For 
example, the assumptions behind SDT, such as the Gaussian shape of the internal response 
distributions or the independence of sensitivity and response bias, have been empirically 
validated by more than half a century of psychophysics (Luce 1963; Swets 1961; Green and 
Swets 1966; Macmillan and Creelman 2005). They have also been validated by a wide variety 
of experiments involving visual, auditory, and haptic perception and even memory (Wixted 
2004). This speaks to the generality of these assumptions. However, it remains to be 
determined whether they transfer to mental strength and introspective judgments as 
proposed by iSDT.  
 Setting these technical details aside, many philosophers resist comparisons between 
perception and introspection (Shoemaker 1996). I agree with these philosophers that we do 
not perceive our mental states when we introspect them. In this section, I will list some of the 
most important differences between perception and introspection. 
 The first difference is about the appearance/reality distinction. In perception, there is a 
clear distinction between reality and appearances. You can be wrong about seeing a light or 
hearing a sound. However, some deny that you can be wrong about whether there seems to 
be a light or whether there seems to be a sound. Recall Descartes’s claim: “I certainly seem to 
see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false.” Conscious experiences are the 
appearances, and, it is argued, there cannot be a further appearance/reality distinction 
involving these appearances. If there were one, there would be appearances of appearances. 
But an appearance of an appearance is indistinguishable from the first appearance.  
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 If this is true of visual and auditory experiences, it is certainly true about pains.42 Some 
may think that it follows that there is no difference between the appearance of being in pain 
and being in pain. According to this line of reasoning, appearing to be in pain should collapse 
into being in pain. But then we could not be introspectively wrong about being in pain. Even 
when you are not originally in pain, if it introspectively seemed to you that you are in pain, 
your seeming to be in pain should collapse into actually being in pain. Contrary to one of 
iSDT’s important tenets, this would make introspective failures impossible.  
 This might lead some to doubt that there is an appearance/reality distinction in 
introspection, and thus whether iSDT is tenable. But this rests on an ambiguity in the term 
‘seeming’. It is one thing to have an experience such that things “phenomenally seem” to you 
to be a certain way. It is another thing to make a judgment such that it “epistemically seems” 
to you that something is the case.43 In both cases, things seem to you to be certain way, but 
they are very different in nature. Nothing about these two types of seeming necessitates a 
collapse of one into the other. Judgments about pains (epistemic seemings) do not collapse 
into painful experiences (phenomenal seemings). Thus, an appearance/reality distinction in 
introspection can be preserved.  
 This appearance/reality structure allows for introspective inaccuracies. According to 
iSDT, epistemic seemings (appearances) need not match your phenomenal seemings (reality). 
Importantly, subjects appear to be sensitive to this appearance/reality distinction when they 
evaluate their pains. As noted in section 4.c, when people consider that their introspective 
judgments may be departing from their actual phenomenal experiences, they use expressions 
                                                 
42 It is a contentious issue whether pains can really be assimilated to perceptions. Hence, it is debatable 
what counts as the underlying reality of which pain experiences are appearances of (Aydede 2009). 
43 See (Schwitzgebel 2008) for discussion of this point. 
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like “feeling a pain.” This indicates they suspect a mismatch between their experience and 
their introspective judgment of the experience. In contrast, they use expressions like “having 
a pain” to indicate they are confident that there is no mismatch between their pain and their 
introspective judgment of the pain. In other words, they are confident that their epistemic-
seeming expressed by an introspective judgment matches their experiential reality. 
 Although there is an appearance/reality distinction in introspection, it is worth 
highlighting that its structure differs from that of perception. Conscious perception has a 
three-item structure: (1) the external object (i.e., the external reality), (2) the experience (i.e., 
the appearance or phenomenal-seeming) and (3) the perceptual judgment (i.e., the epistemic-
seeming). Introspection has a 2-item structure: (1) the experience (i.e., the internal reality or 
phenomenal-seeming) and (2) the introspective judgment (i.e., the appearance or epistemic-
seeming). These differences do not affect the main tenets of iSDT. 
 The second difference has to do with phenomenal character. In normal circumstances, 
conscious perception gives rise to a phenomenal character related to its object. For example, 
there is a special phenomenal character that accompanies perceiving an object as red. In 
contrast, introspecting a conscious experience does not have a phenomenal character related 
to the target conscious experience. An introspective judgment of pain does not have a 
phenomenal character related to the pain or to painfulness. If it did, inaccurate introspection 
would give rise to incompatible phenomenal characters (e.g., simultaneous phenomenal 
characters of having a sharp and a dull pain in the same bodily location). But, to my 
knowledge, this kind of conflicting phenomenology does not take place.44  
                                                 
44 Experiencing “impossible colors” is the closest case I can think of. Due to physiological constraints 
of our visual system, we do not perceive reddish-greens or yellowish-blues. In contrast, it is possible to 
see blueish greens or yellowish reds. However, under certain experimental conditions, some subjects 
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 It is possible that introspective judgments have a distinct phenomenal character, as 
defenders of cognitive phenomenology would argue (Montague 2015). In stark contrast to 
perception, however, the new phenomenal character would be related to the act of judging, 
not to its target. Thus, introspecting a pain may have a particular phenomenal character 
provided it is not the phenomenal character of being in pain (for the reasons offered in the 
previous paragraph). Note that this is true too of perceptual judgments. In the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, you experience—it phenomenally seems—that one line is longer than the other. But 
you do not perceptually judge—it does not epistemically seem—that this is the case. This 
perceptual judgment, however, does not alter your visual phenomenology. You still 
experience the lines as having different lengths.45 Likewise, when you judge that you are in 
pain, this does not alter the phenomenology of the pain itself, even if there is a 
phenomenology of judging. 
 Some may argue there is a third important difference: the outputs of perception and 
introspection are different. Perception produces representations below the level of judgment, 
and introspection produces judgments that require the possession of concepts. In that case, 
if we use SDT to model perception and iSDT to model introspection, the theories may not be 
sufficiently parallel because they have different kinds of output. I do not dispute that 
perception and introspection may have different outputs. However, this difference is not 
relevant for the points advanced by iSDT. In particular, the role played by signal strength in 
perception and introspection is informative regardless of their outputs. Moreover, it is 
                                                 
report seeing an area in their visual fields as simultaneously green and red (Crane and Piantanida 
1983). Even if taken at face value, this result does not show that one can experience being in pain and 
not being in pain at the same time.  
45 Defenders of cognitive penetration of perception might disagree that this holds across the board (Wu 
2017; but see Firestone and Scholl 2015). 
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possible to understand SDT as a theory of perceptual judgments. It is also possible to 
understand introspection as a capacity for entertaining epistemic seemings below the level 
of judgment and reformulate iSDT accordingly. Thus, the difference in outputs is not 
indicative of some irreconcilable difference between SDT and iSDT. I briefly discuss what 
these changes would look like. 
 On one hand, the machinery of SDT can be used to explain perceptual judgments, rather 
than perceptual representations. After all, SDT does not have the fineness of grain to 
distinguish between proper perceptual biases and response biases, and it is equally useful 
for both (for discussion, see Witt et al. 2015). That the formal apparatus of SDT can be 
adapted for iSDT, which is at the level of judgment, speaks to this flexibility. This does not 
mean that the outputs of perception are not perceptual representations.  
 On the other hand, it is possible that introspection takes place without the involvement 
of judgments. This would happen if there are introspective epistemic seemings below the 
level of judgment. Consequently, we could reformulate iSDT as a theory of introspective 
epistemic seemings rather than as a theory of introspective judgments, which is what I did 
here. An animal devoid of the concept of pain may still have an epistemic seeming of its pain 
phenomenology such that it is mistaken about it. Such animal might overestimate how much 
pain it is experiencing in ways that affect its decision-making without ever formulating an 
explicit introspective judgment or without the possession of concepts.46  
 
                                                 
46 For discussion of possession of concepts by nonlinguistic animals see (Allen 1999). 
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Let me finish this section by iterating that the differences between perception and 
introspection discussed in this section do not affect iSDT. The similarities between perception 
and introspection that I drew upon to develop iSDT are related to the detection and 
discrimination of signals, not to their outputs, their phenomenal characters, or their 
appearance/reality structures. 
 
5.  The Transparency of Experiences  
 
Philosophers often quarrel about whether the phenomenal character of experiences can be 
introspected (see Chapter 1 for discussion about the relation between mental strength and 
representational contents). According to some (Harman 1990; Tye 2000; Tye 1992; 
Shoemaker 2000; Dretske 1995), introspection does not reveal any intrinsic, non-
representational, immediately ‘felt’ quality of experiences because these are transparent. 
This means that when introspecting a conscious experience, you really focus your attention 
on the worldly properties and objects the experiences are about, rather than on properties of 
the experiences themselves, as if these were transparent. According to this view, “no new 
features of your experience are revealed” during introspection, just “qualities of things in the 
world (as in the case of perceptual experiences) or of regions of our bodies (as in the case of 
bodily sensations).” (Tye 2016) Accordingly, when you introspect your toe pain, you really just 
focus on your toe rather than on some intrinsic, qualitative property of the painful experience 
(Tye 1995). Similarly, when you introspect the experience of seeing the deep blue of the ocean 
while standing on the beach, the focus of your attention is on the ocean itself and its worldly 
blue, not on some intrinsic, blue quality of your experience (Tye 1992). 
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 There are voices of dissent among an apparent consensus around transparency (see Kind 
2003). Philosophers sometimes appeal to raw feelings that are not supposed to be 
representational, like orgasms or moods, to counter transparency (Block 1996). If these 
sensations are not about something in the world, they cannot be transparent and 
introspection must focus directly on them rather than on outer objects. Sometimes the appeal 
is to cases of experiences that are qualitatively different without any representational 
difference. For example, the experience of seeing a square as a square or as a diamond (i.e., 
a tilted-square) or the experience of seeing a 3×3 grid of dots as three rows or as three columns 
(Peacocke 1992). The idea is that we could only know about these qualitative differences if 
introspection picks out intrinsic properties of experiences since representational contents 
(i.e., worldly objects and properties) are identical. Another preferred example is blurriness. 
Experiencing blurred vision of an object and an experience of sharp vision of that same object 
blurred could have the same representational contents, at least in some carefully matched 
cases, and yet having these experiences feel different (Boghossian and Velleman 1989).  
 Despite these efforts, defenders of transparency adamantly reject them, often finding a 
way to argue that the purported difference in qualitative character can be reduced to a 
difference in the representational contents of the experiences (Tye 2002; Tye 1992). This view, 
known as representationalism, can be summarized in the slogan “If two experiences are alike 
representationally, then they are alike phenomenally (and vice versa).”47 So, the 
representationalist argues that the contents of the experiences of the two squares are 
different (and hence their phenomenal characters are different too). In one case, the content 
is something like <vertical square> and in the other is <tilted square>. By making the 
                                                 
47 See note 21. 
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orientation part of the content, the difference in phenomenology is reduced to a difference in 
representational contents. And thus, the difference revealed by introspection is explained by 
differences in the world, not by directly accessible and intrinsic properties of the experiences. 
The other cases are similarly addressed.  
 Considering mental strength offers a novel challenge against transparency and against 
strong versions of representationalism. Mental strength not only modulates introspective 
accuracy, it is also available to introspection. In perception there is no tension saying that 
brightness improves the discriminability of other stimulus properties and that we can 
estimate the brightness of a stimulus. In introspection, there should be no tension either. 
Mental strength promotes accurate introspection at the same time that it is an aspect of 
experiences available to introspection. We can estimate the strength of experiences (for 
example, by ranking them). But mental strength is a phenomenal magnitude and as such it 
cannot be a property of external objects. It is intrinsic to experiences.  
 When attending to the strength of an experience it is not the world or its properties that 
we focus on. When describing his being transfixed by the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean, 
Tye writes: “I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience. 
My experience itself certainly wasn’t blue.” (Tye 1992, 160) It is probably true that his 
experience was not blue. But it does not follow that his experience itself was not strong. This 
is probably what explains why he was transfixed by it. But the strength of his visual 
experiences is a property of Tye’s mind, not a property to be found in the ocean. Shifts in his 
stream of consciousness could alter the mental strength of the visual experience of the ocean 
without altering its representational contents. Hence, with respect to their strength, 
experiences are not transparent. And if they are not transparent in part because the 
phenomenology of mental strength is not reducible to representational contents, then 
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representationalism is not generally true because it does not hold for all kinds of phenomenal 
characters. 
 
6.  A Science of Introspection  
 
An important advantage of iSDT is that it puts introspection on the same standing as other 
cognitive mechanisms and, as such, it is amenable to scientific investigation. Here I outline 
how to move forward. 
 
a. iSDT psychophysics 
 
For some, studying introspection from the third-person point of view is a non-starter. While 
scientists precisely control stimulus properties in their study of perception, they cannot 
precisely control conscious experiences in their study of introspection. This seems to make 
subjective judgments the last word regarding someone’s conscious experiences. Even if true, 
this does not entail that each subjective report is accurate or consistent with others; like 
perceptions, they can be more or less accurate. A comparison may help. The best way of 
knowing the length of an object is by measuring it. This does not entail that we can ever know 
the true length of an object or that every time we make a measurement we will obtain its 
true length. The consistency among measurements will largely depend on the reliability of 
the measuring device. By making several measurements under different conditions, a better 
estimate of the length of the object and of the reliability of the ruler can be obtained. 
Similarly, by measuring multiple times subjects’ introspective judgments under different 
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conditions, we may estimate what their experiences are like and how reliable their 
introspection is, even if we do not have access to their true experiences. Thus, we can 
bootstrap our way above the authority of individual subjective reports. In this subsection, I 
argue that the assumptions from iSDT can be used to develop a measure of introspective 
reliability.  
 Some of the abilities that allow us to navigate the world (both spatially and 
epistemically) are more introspection-reliant than others and they can be exploited to study 
introspection (Spener 2015; Chirimuuta 2014). Presumably, introspection helps us succeed 
at many tasks. Examples of these include focusing binoculars, ordering a certain size of pizza 
depending on how hungry we feel or determining whether it is time to unbury our hand from 
the snow before it becomes too painful. Some of these capacities can be used in experimental 
conditions to test for variations in introspective sensitivity and validate some of iSDT’s 
assumptions.  
 Tasks where subjects are asked to compare painful stimuli can be more reliant on 
introspection than others.48 Imagine a task in which electric shocks are delivered via two 
electrodes attached to subjects’ left and right legs, respectively. On each trial, the 
experimenter delivers a painful electric current. One leg, counterbalanced across trials, has 
a fixed, intermediate shock intensity. The other one starts off at a random intensity within a 
predefined tolerable range. Subjects’ task consists in turning a knob that modulates the 
intensity of the variable current until they deem both of them equally painful. This 
SHOCK/SHOCK TASK is introspectively undemanding because subjects just need to judge 
whether the two pain intensities are the same or different overall without focusing their 
                                                 
48 I adapt these examples from the visual tasks discussed in Chirimuuta’s (2014).  
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attention on each pain independently. Now, imagine a similar task except that instead of the 
fixed-current electrode, one of the subjects’ legs is attached to a patch that delivers a fixed 
heat-based painful stimulation. Like before, subjects modulate the electric current of the 
patch attached to their other leg until they judge the pains in both legs to be of equal 
intensity. In this HEAT/SHOCK TASK, introspection is more demanding because subjects have 
to discount the phenomenal differences of the two sources of pain. In Chirimuuta’s words, it 
requires the “capacity to analyze and compare sensory experiences that bear nonobvious 
relationships of similarity and difference to each other” (2014, 917). Perhaps heat pain is 
more distributed and electric pain is more focalized. Maybe heat pain feels burning while 
electric pain feels stinging. Subjects, then, are required to focus on the independent 
dimensions of pain intensity and type, finding an identity along one dimension and 
disregarding the difference in the other.  
 We can take advantage of the introspectively demanding HEAT/SHOCK TASK to measure 
introspective variability. According to iSDT, if subjects’ painful experiences have higher 
mental strength, their introspective judgments should be more accurate. Assuming the target 
states are similar, the judgments should also be less variable. Imagine an experiment with 
two conditions. First, a strong mental strength-inducing condition that uses stimulation well-
above the detection threshold (say, the fixed heat patch is at 75% of the intensity range). 
Variations could include: sufficiently long lasting electric and heat stimulations, large enough 
contact areas, or fully attentive subjects. Subjects proceed to match the intensity of the 
electric and heat pains in tens, perhaps even hundreds, of trials. Since the heat patch delivers 
a fixed stimulation, if introspection is reliably accurate, one should expect subjects getting 
close to adjusting the knob to the same intensity on every trial (assuming habituation and 
tiredness effects are controlled for).  
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 By iSDT’s own assumptions, we can expect variations in internal introspective strength 
on every trial and, hence, variations in their knob settings. These variations may take place 
even if subjects are generally speaking introspectively reliable. That said, just like in 
perception, when the signal is strong enough, accurate subjects tend to be quite consistent.49 
Their small degree of variability, however, could be used as a baseline against which 
matching results from a weak condition are compared. A weak mental strength-inducing 
condition is achieved by lowering the heat-patch stimulation to the lower 25% of the 
stimulation range. Variations could include: introducing time pressure, reducing the contact 
surface areas, increasing subjects’ cognitive load, or distracting them in some other way. In 
this weak condition, painful experiences should be harder to introspect according to iSDT. In 
consequence, more variability is expected across trials in the estimation of the current’s 
intensity required for matching the heat and shock pain intensities. We then compare the 
mean and variance of subjects’ estimations to the baseline mean and variance obtained in 
the strong condition. The difference is used as a proxy of the extent of introspective accuracy 
modulation exerted by mental strength both within and across subjects. Additionally, subject 
responses can also be accompanied by confidence ratings, providing a chance to further assess 
their metacognitive access to their answers (Fleming and Lau 2014).  
 Weak and strong trials could be interspersed to avoid habituation. Limiting stimulation 
to the 25%/75% points of the stimulation range prevents flooring and ceiling effects. This also 
avoids well-known issues detecting differences at low and high ends of the stimulation 
                                                 
49 The technical reason for this is that when subjects are more sensitive, the noise and signal 
distributions are further apart. Even if the same stimulation gave rise to some variability in the 
internal response, in most trials this would not be enough to make it be on a different side of the 
criterion. In contrast, when subjects are not sensitive, the distributions overlap more and a small 
variation in the internal response may put it on a different side of the criterion changing the decision’s 
outcome. 
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spectrum (e.g., it is easier to detect a 1g difference in a 10g object than in a 10kg object).50 
Besides, the difference between the low and high points should be just a few degrees/amperes, 
namely, small enough to avoid creating a sensitivity to large differences but sufficient for 
producing a difference in mental strength and consequently in introspection. Or at least this 
is iSDT’s prediction. The proposed experiment is just a sketch and, even if all the necessarily 
details were fleshed out, it might not yield the results anticipated by iSDT, making it 
empirically inadequate. The important point, however, is precisely that iSDT makes 
empirically testable predictions. 
 
b. iSDT and the brain 
 
In this subsection, I explore a possible neural implementation of the introspective 
mechanisms proposed by iSDT. As above, this exercise is highly speculative and I do not 
strive for thoroughness or strict neurological accuracy. Rather, I will use a series of simple 
                                                 
50 Philosophers often invoke Weber-Fechner’s law, according to which increment thresholds (just 
noticeable differences or jnds) are proportional to stimulus magnitude approximated by a logarithmic 
transform. Philosophers seem to forget, however, that “Fechner’s derivation of his law has been 
subjected to examination and criticism that are perhaps without parallel in the history of psychology.” 
(Savage 1970, 290) Weber-Fechner’s law does not hold empirically across all stimulus types and across 
all conditions. For instance, the law seems to work relatively well for weight in most conditions, but 
not for sounds, and it tends to break at higher levels of stimulation. Different sources of stimulation 
of the same type have difference power functions that account for the observed perceptual scale. 
Thermal pain increases more or less linearly with stimulus increases, while pain induced by electric 
shocks has an expansive power function, namely, pain units increase proportionally much more than 
stimulation increases. To put it simply, while a little bit more heat produces a little bit more pain, a 
little bit stronger electric shock produces a lot of more pain. Finally, appealing to internal noise is in 
fact one of Signal Detection Theory’s fatal blow to the law. Perceptual scales derived from gathering 
just noticeable differences, which Weber-Fechner’s law expects to be proportional to stimulus 
magnitude, are imprecise due to the accumulation of noise as jnds are integrated along the perceptual 
scale (Macmillan and Creelman 2005, 22-24; Kingdom and Prins 2010, 202-205; Savage 1970, 283-363; 
Luce 1990, 73). 
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models (not without plausibility) to show that iSDT makes claims that are amenable for 
neuroscientific testing and that its assumptions are within reasonable parameters. I 
anticipate the general conclusions I will draw. First, when presented with a stimulus, the 
brain generates an internal sensory response that, along with the representation of signal 
and noise distributions and the setting of a criterion, produces a sensory decision (e.g., 
detection, discrimination, classification, etc.). Second, when these sensory decisions are 
conscious, they have degrees of mental strength. Third, analogous to the sensory process, the 
mental strength of conscious experiences gives rise to an internal introspective response that, 
along with the representation of introspective signal and noise distributions and the setting 
of an introspective criterion, produces an introspective judgment (e.g., detection, 
discrimination, classification, etc.). In what follows I will, first, address how pain intensity 
judgments, as proposed by SDT, may take place in the brain. Then, I address how 
introspective judgments about the intensity of painful experiences, as proposed by iSDT, may 
be implemented. 
 An external stimulus, such as an electric shock, creates an internal sensory response in 
the brain (Figure 4, red sphere). The brain maintains a representation of the relevant noise 
and signal distributions to which that particular token response belongs to. Then, the sensory 
system evaluates whether the internal response crossed the detection criterion or not and it 
is classified as belonging to one of two distributions, either noise or stimulus present (Figure 





Figure 4. SDT and iSDT neural models  
 
 A few clarifications are in place. First, the internal sensory response need not be localized 
in a single area. As much research has shown, neural responses to pain intensity are 
distributed in widespread networks (Coghill et al. 1999; Atlas et al. 2014; Wager et al. 2013). 
This may or may not generalize to other sensory experiences. Second, the internal sensory 
response need not be itself the (total) neural correlate of conscious pain. Consciousness likely 
requires the interaction of pain intensity encoding areas with other regions, possibly in a 
frontoparietal network (see Chapter 4; Odegaard, Knight, and Lau 2017; Atlas et al. 2014). 
In consequence, pain mental strength—which by definition is conscious—may also be 
distributed in several areas, some of which do not code for pain strength itself, but 














different options of how the brain may represent the noise and signal distributions. One 
option is the “same-locus” view. According to it, the distributions are represented in the same 
areas that process the stimulus itself, that is, where the internal sensory response is 
generated (Figure 4; red sphere). By encoding in the sensory representation of a stimulus the 
probability distributions to which it belongs, the brain would effectively encode the internal 
response and its likelihood ratio in a single representation (Kiani and Shadlen 2009). This is 
compatible with the view that sensory experiences themselves assign degrees of confidence 
by including probability distributions as part of the experience itself (Morrison 2016). 
Alternatively, according to “different-locus” views, the brain may encode the trial-wise 
strength of the internal response in one area (say, the red sphere located in the insula; Figure 
4) and the distributions for that particular kind of stimulus in some other area (say, the violet 
sphere located in prefrontal cortex; Figure 4) (Odegaard, Knight, and Lau 2017; Rahnev et 
al. 2011 are candidates for holding this view). The brain would make sensory detection and 
discrimination by situating the current experience’s internal response in its corresponding 
position of the x-axis of the signal and noise distributions.  
 Sensory decision criteria (as well as confidence criteria) may be implemented by means 
of changing the excitability, the baseline firing rate, or the evidence accumulation rate of the 
relevant neural populations (Mulder et al. 2012; van Ravenzwaaij et al. 2012). Either way, 
the subject’s sensory detection threshold would be affected, effectively changing the criterion. 
These neural changes could take place in the same areas encoding the internal sensory 
response and the signal and noise distributions. This would entail that most, or even all, of 
the relevant sensory processes take place in a single sensory area. Alternatively, in 
accordance with the different-locus view, the criterion may be implemented in the area where 
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the signal and noise distributions are encoded. Decision criteria may also be implemented in 
a third, independent decision area.  
 The neural implementation of introspection may follow an analogous structure. The 
regions responsible for encoding mental strength give rise to an internal introspective 
response (say, somewhere in prefrontal cortex; Figure 4, blue sphere). Like above, the 
introspective signal and noise distributions for that kind of experience may be encoded in the 
same or in a different region from where the introspective internal response tracking mental 
strength is kept. If a different region from where introspective internal response is encoded 
is involved, two possibilities emerge. One option is that this region coincides with the same 
region responsible for keeping track of the sensory internal response. This option is 
suggested, for illustration purposes, in Figure 4 (violet sphere). A second option would be that 
a new, independent region is involved. Introspective criteria are likely to be implemented in 
a similar fashion as sensory criteria. Subjects would make introspective judgments by placing 
the introspective internal response in its corresponding place within the introspective 
response axis. As they classify the experience as pertaining to the signal or noise distributions 
by comparing its strength to an introspective criterion, the conceptual machinery required 
for making judgments would be recruited. This whole process results in subjects making 
introspective judgments. 
 This simple sketch of a possible neural implementation of iSDT shows that introspection 
is subject to neuroscientific research. Together with the possibility of doing psychophysical 
testing for introspective variability, a clear picture emerges: the main tenets of iSDT are 




7.  Conclusions 
 
Mental strength, the phenomenal magnitude of conscious experiences, is a distinct aspect of 
their phenomenal character. Mental strength plays a crucial role in our mental lives: it 
modulates the accuracy of introspection. iSDT explains why sometimes we can expect to be 
introspectively very accurate, in line with infallibilists such as Burge or Gertler, and why 
sometimes we should expect to be inaccurate, in line with skeptic worries like the ones voiced 
by Schwitzgebel. In other words, it validates the intuitions of extreme, incompatible views. I 
take this to be a virtue of the theory. Unlike other theories of introspection, including 
moderate ones, iSDT offers a detailed, systematic, naturalistic, and psychologically plausible 
explanation of cases of various sorts. It also offers clear predictions of introspective 
performance under a wide range of conditions, and it postulates a general, testable 
psychological mechanism and plausible neural implementation of introspection. Instead of 
focusing on a few cases that may give rise to errors, as most moderate views do, iSDT fixes 
the whole range of success of introspection, including not just odd cases where it fails, but 
also common scenarios where it succeeds. Importantly, it achieves this in unified way, unlike 
other theories that appeal to different explanations to account for different cases. By 
comparing perceptual stimulus strength to mental strength, I showed that the tools 
developed by Signal Detection Theory provide a solid theoretical scaffolding for modeling 




Perception, Performance, and the Neural Correlates of 
Consciousness†  
 
In the search of neural correlates of consciousness, subjects’ response to the presentation of 
a visual stimulus can be assessed by subjective or objective measures (Snodgrass and Shevrin 
2006; Seth et al. 2008; Sandberg et al. 2010; Irvine 2013). Researchers who use subjective 
reports as measures of the state of awareness of subjects recognize the importance of 
controlling for confounding factors (Dehaene and Changeux 2011; Merikle, Smilek, and 
Eastwood 2001; Sergent et al. 2013; Li, Hill, and He 2014; Bachmann 2009; Bachmann 2015). 
Ideally, when comparing a condition where subjects report consciously seeing a target against 
a control condition where subjects report not consciously seeing it, the difference between 
these two conditions should be conscious awareness only.  
 When looking for objective measures of conscious awareness, it is common that some 
researchers treat performance at chance level as a reliable indicator of unconscious 
processing (Dehaene et al. 1998; Eriksen 1960; Kouider and Dehaene 2007). The inability to 
distinguish a stimulus from noise or from another stimulus, however, should not be 
immediately equated with lack of awareness. Performance, at any level, should rather be 
treated as a potential confound in consciousness research (Dehaene and Changeux 2011; Lau 
2008; Lau and Passingham 2006; Pitts et al. 2014; Li, Hill, and He 2014; Weiskrantz, Barbur, 
                                                 
† A version of this chapter was published as MORALES, J., Chiang, J., and Lau, H. (2015) “Controlling 
for Performance Capacity Confounds in Neuroimaging Studies of Conscious Awareness.” Neuroscience 
of Consciousness 1(1). doi:10.1093/nc/niv008. 
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and Sahraie 1995; Aru, Bachmann, et al. 2012; Aru, Axmacher, et al. 2012; Bachmann 2009; 
Bachmann 2015). In contrast, subjective reports are indeed a valid measure of conscious 
awareness. As such, we should isolate the influence of task performance capacity in any 
comparison between different levels of subjective reports of awareness. However, even 
amongst those persuaded by this logic, few actually conduct experiments to isolate 
performance capacity confounds. The main reason is, probably, that it is difficult to achieve 
it experimentally. Usually, when subjective reports of awareness differ, performance capacity 
also differs. This is true in most detection and discrimination tasks, as well as in paradigms 
like binocular rivalry, in which detecting changes in the suppressed image is harder (Wales 
and Fox 1970).  
 Nevertheless, some attempts to control for performance capacity have been recently 
made in conscious awareness imaging studies. For example, Lau & Passingham (2006) 
conducted a study using metacontrast masking. By varying the SOAs between stimulus 
presentation and mask presentation, they found two SOAs where performance capacity in a 
discrimination task was matched for each subject, and yet subjective reports of awareness 
differed. They reported specific hemodynamic activation in the prefrontal cortex in 
association with trials in the condition that generated the higher percentage of “aware” 
ratings. This study can be taken as a proof of concept that performance capacity confounds 
can be eliminated. However, the number of trials where subjects claimed consciously seeing 
the target differed only by about 10% between the two conditions. Admittedly, a problem with 
this approach is that it relies on a specific kind of stimulus: metacontrast masked shapes. 
For researchers interested in other perceptual paradigms, it is hard to see how this method 
of performance capacity matching could generalize.  
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 Another study (Persaud et al. 2011) matched performance between the normal sighted 
side of the visual field and the subjective blind side of the visual field in a hemianoptic 
patient, by presenting stimuli with low contrast to the patient’s normal visual field and high 
contrast to the damaged visual field to compensate for the defects in processing sensitivity. 
But this opportunity is specific to the availability of a single rare patient.  
 While these studies effectively eliminated the performance confound as such, other 
problems intimately interlinked when controlling for performance can still arise. For 
instance, when performance is matched by varying the stimulation conditions, as in (Persaud 
et al. 2011), pre- and post-perceptual processing can obscure the interpretation of awareness-
related activations (Bachmann 2009). Another potential issue is that subjective reports can 
differ due to variations in how subjects are probed and not due to differences in performance 
or conscious awareness itself. Different scales (Sandberg et al. 2011; Sandberg et al. 2010) or 
different criterion contents (i.e., different aspects of the experience subjects use for report) 
(Bachmann and Francis 2014; Bachmann 2015) can hinder contrastive analyses in imaging 
studies. Finally, another potential problem is that markers of specific conscious contents 
corresponding to the target stimulus have to be distinguished both conceptually and 
experimentally from the markers of conscious processes non-specific to the target. When 
attempting to eliminate performance confounds, this distinction is relevant because non-
specific conscious processes can be shared by both correct and incorrect trials (Bachmann 
2015). Unfortunately, it would be complicated to control experimentally for all these potential 
confounds at once (see Chapter 4 for more methodological issues). 
 In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim (2009) proposed a 
general method to control for the influence of performance capacity by comparing between 
subjectively conscious and unconscious conditions during an EEG experiment. Instead of 
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trying to match performance experimentally, they proposed to correct for its influence 
mathematically, keeping stimuli at threshold constant across aware and unaware trials. In 
this chapter, I focus on this potentially promising method. First, we should expand on the 
logic of their methodology, trying to provide an intuitive explanation for the motivation 
behind it. Then, we should show that the method and its assumptions are problematic from 
the perspective of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) and offer an alternative based on it.  
 Although the focus is on Lamy and colleagues’ proposal, it is important to note that it is 
useful to take it as a case study that has general conceptual and empirical ramifications 
concerning an appropriate analysis of perceptual signal, performance capacity confound, and 
the neural correlates of consciousness. Thus, the concerns raised regarding Lamy and 
colleagues’ correction method can be generalized to other neuroimaging studies and 
techniques, as well as to philosophical debates on consciousness and its relation to 
performance in general and to attention in particular (Block 2007; Lau and Rosenthal 2011; 
Block 2010; Prinz 2012; Montemayor and Haladjian 2015). Furthermore, other laboratories 
have already used their suggested method (Hesselmann, Hebart, and Malach 2011) and 
leading consciousness researchers like Stanislas Dehaene have recently praised them for 
having accomplished the “remarkable feat” of keeping both performance and stimuli the same 
and, thanks to “a perfect control,” having “confirmed [a neural] signature of conscious access” 
(Dehaene 2014, 129-30). However, despite all the merits behind it, their correction method 
makes unsound assumptions about perception and consciousness. Hence, its limitations have 




1.  Mathematical Correction for Perform ance Confound: 
Unconscious Lucky Answers  
 
Lamy, Salti & Bar-Haim (2009) (LSB, henceforth) conducted an event-related potentials 
(ERPs) study on the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious visual processing where 
stimuli were constant across aware and unaware conditions. Subjects were presented with a 
15x15 matrix of tilted lines (15˚), some of which were slightly more tilted (25˚) forming a 3x3 
target square in one of four possible quadrants. A 15x15 matrix with tilted lines (25˚) masked 
the targets after a short (~25 to 100 ms, individually adjusted to achieve 25% conscious 
detection) or a long (~37 to 112 ms, individually adjusted to achieve 50% conscious detection) 
exposure. Subjects made two judgments. First, a 4-alternative forced choice (4-AFC) 
regarding the quadrant where the target 3x3 square was presented. Then, a subjective 
judgment whether they were aware of the target or whether they were just guessing. 
Continuous EEG (electroencephalography) was recorded from 20 scalp regions during all 
trials and subjects’ responses were coded in the four following categories: subjects reported 
seeing the stimulus and correctly indicated its location (aware-correct), subjects reported 
seeing the stimulus and incorrectly indicated its location (aware-incorrect), subjects did not 
report seeing the stimulus and correctly indicated its location (unaware-correct) and subjects 
did not report seeing the stimulus and incorrectly indicated its location (unaware-incorrect). 
Note that in the last two categories subjects reported they were just guessing.  
 Confirming previous similar results (Batterink, Karns, and Neville 2012; Sergent, 
Baillet, and Dehaene 2005; Koivisto and Revonsuo 2010; Del Cul, Baillet, and Dehaene 2007), 
LSB reported a scalp-wide difference in the P3 waveform component (a positive voltage in 
the 300-650 latency range) in subjects’ ERPs between the aware-correct and unaware-correct 
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conditions. They took this difference to reflect conscious processing. Critically, the 
comparison was focused on correct trials only (aware-correct vs. unaware-correct), as a direct 
comparison between all the aware and all the unaware trials would have involved a 
performance capacity confound. That is, awareness would have been confounded with overall 
performance since awareness co-occurred with higher performance rates. By comparing 
correct trials only, LSB matched performance in the sense that both conditions involve 
perfect accuracy, enabling thus a legitimate comparison between awareness and 
unawareness. 
 However, to really match performance between the conditions, LSB correctly realized 
the need to distinguish between two possible scenarios for trials in which subjects answered 
correctly and did not report seeing the target (the unaware-correct condition). It is possible 
that the subjects unconsciously processed the visual stimulus, and therefore answered 
correctly. Alternatively, the subjects could also have failed to process the stimulus, i.e., 
neither consciously nor unconsciously, and yet arrived at the correct answer by chance—in a 
4-AFC task, random responding leads to an expected 25% chance of being correct. It is 
important to eliminate the influence of these correct-by-chance trials, because in comparing 
aware-correct and unaware-correct, the hope is not just to match performance as measured 
by sheer accuracy (in this case accuracy was 100% in both conditions). Rather, one would 
hope to match the underlying performance capacity. Only by removing the influence of the 
correct-by-chance trials in the unaware-correct condition one would be able to compare two 
conditions where the underlying performance capacities are matched (both at ceiling).  
 Thus, LSB developed a mathematical method to correct for the influence of those correct-
by-chance trials (see Appendix and LSB’s endnote 2). Their underlying idea is that by looking 
at the overall accuracy in unaware trials, one can estimate what percentage of trials in the 
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unaware-correct category is correct by chance. In a 4-AFC task we would expect 25% of 
unaware trials to be correct simply due to chance.  
 In order to correct for this percentage of unaware-correct-by-chance trials, LSB further 
assumed that the ERPs for these trials should just look like the ERPs for unaware-incorrect 
trials. The intuition behind their logic is that both types of trial have in common that subjects’ 
brains failed to process the target. The only difference is that subjects were lucky in the 
correct-by-chance trials. With this assumption in mind, they attempted to subtract away the 
influence of the correct-by-chance trials on the set of unaware-correct trials. In summary, 
they assumed that the observed ERPs for overall unaware-correct is a weighted sum of the 
ERPs of the truly correct trials (processed-unaware-correct trials) and the ERPs of the 
correct-by-chance trials (unprocessed-unaware-correct trials). Thusly, their correction 
method would get at the underlying ERPs for the processed-unaware-correct trials, which 
they call unaware-correct chance-free trials (see Appendix and LSB’s endnote 2 for details).  
 After this correction, LSB still found significant differences in the P3 components of 
ERPs between the aware-correct and the unaware-correct chance-free conditions. Because 
now both conditions were supposed to include only truly correct trials where the subjects 
processed the targets effectively, they argue that performance capacity was truly matched. 
Their logic is that their results now really reflect the signature of conscious processing, 
uncorrupted by confounds of performance capacity.   
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2.  Problematic Assumptions of Mathematical Correction 
for Correct Trials by Chance 
 
LSB analysis implicitly incorporates some of the major assumptions behind what is often 
called in psychophysics a High Threshold Model (HTM) (Swets 1961; Green and Swets 1966; 
Macmillan and Creelman 2005; Luce 1963). In this section, a general HTM is discussed in 
the context of detection and discrimination, and its discrepancies with the more popular 
methods of Signal Detection Theory (SDT).  
 
a. High threshold models 
 
A key conceptual component of HTM is that there is a discrete boundary that separates two 
distinct conditions: effective processing, in which a target is being processed correctly, and 
ineffective processing, in which a target is not being processed at all (Fig. 5). According to 
HTM, mere background noise can never lead to true detection, which means that correct 




Figure 5. Schematic representation of LSB conceptual framework 
Unprocessed targets lead to some correct responses due to luck. When the signal crosses the processing 
threshold (dotted line), the target is processed and it will always lead to a correct response (because 
the definition of ‘processed’ in this context means ‘successfully processed’). Awareness requires 
crossing a further threshold (long dashes). Catch or lure trials (i.e., trials were there was no target 
presented) are left out from this schematic representation.  
 
 LSB seem to have in mind precisely this kind of model when discussing their 
experimental paradigm: “Because localization performance was clearly above chance, 
stimulus conditions were such that observers unconsciously perceived [i.e., processed] the 
target on average. Yet, on those individual trials in which the observers produced an incorrect 
response, it is reasonable to claim that they did not perceive [i.e., processed] the target. Such 
trials were therefore defined as ‘no-perception’ trials” (2009, 1442; emphasis added). Incorrect 
responses are a direct consequence, according to LSB, of a lack of processing of the target 
(bottom stream in Fig. 5) and, hence, of true guessing. LSB accept that perceptual processing 
is not sufficient for conscious awareness and, hence, that there can be processed unconscious 
targets (bottom half of top stream in Fig. 5). These trials are the ones that give rise to a 
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subjective feeling of guessing. Note that in their framework the unaware processed trials are 
always correct (because incorrect trials are no-perception trials). Put simply, for LSB only 
targets (i.e., never pure noise) can cross the processing threshold. Conversely, if a target is 
not reported accurately it can be inferred that it was not perceptually processed. The 
distinction between processed and unprocessed stimuli is, then, sharp and clear.  
 Following this model, the only possible source of ambiguity is those unprocessed (and 
hence unaware) responses that are correct due to chance (upward arrow in bottom stream on 
Fig. 5). LSB suggest comparing unaware-correct chance-free and aware-correct trials to find 
the true neural correlates of consciousness. In conclusion, the sharp distinctions between 
unaware-correct by chance, unaware-correct chance-free, and aware-correct trials that their 
proposal requires make sense only if something like HTM is assumed. 
 
b. Signal detection theory 
 
Despite its prima facie intuitiveness, decades of psychophysics research have favored Signal 
Detection Theory over High Threshold Models (Macmillan and Creelman 2005; S. A. Klein 
2001; Luce 1963). Rather than having binary “processed” and “unprocessed” internal states, 
according to signal detection theory (SDT) the presentation of a target gives rise in the subject 
to an internal perceptual response that lies on a continuum (Fig. 6). The strength of the 
internal response is hardly ever exactly at zero due to the presence of noise. In other words, 
a stimulus is hardly ever in an unprocessed state. The signal of a target is always corrupted 
by noise, and therefore, performance capacity is determined by the signal-to-noise ratio of the 
internal response. There is no magical point below which subjects always completely fail to 




Figure 6. Signal detection theoretic model of perceptual awareness 
The presentation of one of two stimuli evokes an internal response, falling into one of two Gaussian 
distributions. In each trial of a discrimination experiment subjects set a discrimination criterion (solid 
vertical line) and awareness criteria (dashed lines) against which they compare the internal response. 
Because the distributions overlap (darker area), it is possible (and quite common) that stimulus A is 
mistaken for stimulus B, or vice versa. Wrongly classified trials are reported as conscious if the 
internal response crosses the awareness criterion on the wrong side of the discrimination criterion.  
 
 According to SDT (Macmillan and Creelman 2005), the presentation of a stimulus A or 
B in a discrimination task gives rise to an internal response in the subject (Fig. 6). The 
internal perceptual response varies from trial to trial, falling into one of two Gaussian 
distributions with equal variance and different means, depending on the stimulus presented 
and the subject’s internal state (i.e., noise). Subjects set a criterion against which they 
compare the internal response, which leads to the classification of the signal as being due to 
the presentation of stimulus A or B. The placement of the internal decision criterion is 
determined either by perceptual biases or by subjects’ response biases (Witt et al. 2015). 
These can be influenced by preference, a strategy for maximizing the proportion of correct 
answers or expected value, subjective appearance (veridical or not) of the target, or 
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attentional resources (Macmillan and Creelman 2005; Rahnev et al. 2011; Morales et al. 
2015). Because the distributions for the internal responses overlap, it is possible (and quite 
common) that stimulus A is mistaken for stimulus B, or vice versa. Additionally, trials are 
reported as aware when the internal perceptual response is strong enough to cross one of the 
outermost awareness criteria, and they are reported as unaware otherwise. Note that this 
allows for aware-incorrect trials when the internal response is drawn from the wrong 
distribution and yet it is strong enough to cross an awareness criterion (e.g., the right tail of 
the stimulus A distribution beyond the awareness criterion in Fig. 6).  
 Insofar as SDT rejects this strict dichotomy between perfectly processed and unprocessed 
stimuli, it is incompatible with HTM. But why prefer one model over the other?  
 
c. The argument from incorrect conscious trials 
 
A specific problem of HTM regarding consciousness studies is that it cannot explain the 
presence of incorrect trials when subjects report being aware of a target. According to the 
model as conceived by LSB, if subjects are aware of a target, it has to be because it was 
successfully processed. Thus, the presence of aware-incorrect trials is a problem. LSB report 
a small, but not negligible, percent of this kind of trials: 11% and 3.9% for short and long 
exposures, respectively. It is common practice in psychophysics to take into consideration 
lapse trials, i.e., trials where subjects did not witness the signal at all—sneezes or blinks are 
often blamed—or trials where non-perceptual problems, like motoric clumsiness, are 
accountable for the mistake. Lapse trials, however, are estimated at rates that go from 0% to 
1% in the most lenient cases (Klein, 2001), which leaves LSB’s empirical results unexplained.  
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 However, aware-incorrect trials are not uncommon and they can be seen in many other 
studies (Hesselmann, Hebart, and Malach 2011), and in some cases in high proportions (Lau 
and Passingham 2006). Hence, the presence of aware-incorrect trials in LSB’s experiment is 
in conflict with the core assumptions behind their version of a High Threshold Model. In 
contrast, as can be noted in Figure 6, aware-incorrect trials are an expected consequence of 
the SDT assumptions of the proposal advanced in this chapter. These trials are classified as 
aware and hence, despite being incorrect, should be accounted for when looking for the NCC.  
 
d. Empirical inadequacy of HTM receiving operating characteristic curves 
 
What really convinced generations of psychophysicists that SDT is a superior model to HTM 
is the comparison of theoretical and empirical ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curves. 
An ROC curve is a plot of hit rate against false alarm rate. In a discrimination task (but the 
principle generalizes to yes/no, detection, and forced-choice tasks as well), a subject’s hit and 
false alarm rates produce one point on an ROC plot. By changing the subject’s criterion in 
different conditions to be more liberal (more hits and more false alarms) and then more 
conservative (less hits and less false alarms), multiple points on the ROC space can be 
plotted. According to SDT, when sensitivity is different from zero, an ROC curve should be 
curvilinear (Fig. 7a), whereas according to HTM the ROC should be a straight line (Fig. 7b). 
Most empirical ROC curves from human subjects in visual experiments typically look like 
the one predicted by the SDT model, and hardly ever look like the one predicted by HTM (but 
see below). This is a strong reason to prefer SDT models over HTM with respect to human 
visual perception (Krantz 1969; Macmillan and Creelman 2005), auditory perception (Green 




Figure 7. ROC curves comparison  
(a) ROC curve as predicted by SDT. According to SDT, the tradeoff between having more hits 
and false alarms when there is non-zero sensitivity is a non-linear relationship determined 
by the signal-to-noise ratio. A zero-sensitivity scenario would yield a straight ROC line from 
zero to one (diagonal dashed line), where one can only increase hits by increasing the same 
amount of false alarms. A higher than zero signal-to-noise ratio means that the ROC curve 
will be curvilinear, where one can increase hits without increasing false alarms in the same 
proportion (solid curve) (i.e., performance above chance). ROC curve obtained from 10,000 
simulated criteria for the same sensitivity level (d’=1). See Appendix for details regarding the 
simulation. (b) ROC curve as predicted by HTM. According to HTM, the vertical intercept is 
determined by the proportion of trials where the subject successfully processes the stimulus. 
The tradeoff between hits and false alarms follows a linear relationship.  
 
 It should be noted that in the memory literature, HTMs have enjoyed more popularity 
than in different perceptual modalities. In particular, mixed models (Aly and Yonelinas 2012; 
Yonelinas and Jacoby 2012), where recognition responses follow HTM and familiarity 
responses conform to SDT, have been well received, but they have also been criticized from 
the perspective of SDT (Wixted and Mickes 2010). Here we can be agnostic to this specific 
issue. The argument is not that all HTMs are necessarily wrong. What can be maintained 
here is that in the case of vision psychophysics, it is uncontroversial that SDT is much better 
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supported by empirical data than HTM and that HTMs are inappropriate for conscious 
awareness studies. Their inadequacy lies on how they depict the internal representation of 
signal and noise, heavily underestimating the role of the latter. Analysis methods for vision 
that assume HTM rather than SDT are, thus, problematic. But how problematic is LSB’s 
High Threshold Model for conscious vision? How exactly might it have biased their results?  
 
3.  A Computer Simulation to Demonstrate the Inadequacy 
of the Correction Method 
 
A computational simulation analysis was carried out to evaluate the degree of inadequacy of 
the correction method proposed by LSB. The idea behind it was to determine, assuming SDT 
is the correct model of perceptual processing (as the empirical evidence robustly suggests), 
how results of an idealized ERP experiment would look like using LSB’s correction method. 
As any other theoretical model of perception, SDT has explanatory limits. It is only within 
these limits that the effectiveness of LSB’s correction method was assessed.  
 For simplicity, it was assumed that subjects performed a 2-choice discrimination task, 
which is analytically more tractable than a 4-AFC task and its results are trivially 
generalizable. The simulation consisted on distinguishing between two stimulus alternatives 
(A & B), and then reporting whether there was awareness of the target or not. It followed the 
SDT assumptions presented in section 3.2. The presentation of a stimulus along with noise 
is assumed to give rise to an internal perceptual response that varies from trial to trial and 
that falls into one of two Gaussian distributions depending on which stimulus was presented. 
Discrimination is made by comparing the internal response to a criterion. The trial is 
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reported as aware if the strength of the internal response crosses one of the awareness 
criteria. For every trial, the strength of the internal perceptual response was correlated with 
a hypothetical neural response and a corresponding ERP of an arbitrary electrode site. This 
ERP was modeled as a sinusoidal response over time, scaling the amplitude of the ERP 
response by the strength of the internal perceptual response sampled from either of the 
Gaussian distributions (Fig. 8; see Appendix for technical details).  
 For computational simplicity, perceptual processing was modeled as the ERP response 
from 0 to 333ms. When the internal response was strong enough to cross the awareness 
criteria, the model assumes a constant brain signal is added to it, which may reflect a 
putative processing signature of awareness. For aware trials, then, an extra half cycle was 
added to the sinusoidal response so that there is a third “bump” in the ERP waveform (333ms 
to 500ms) (Fig. 8a). This extra cycle represents the differentiating processing uniquely 
associated with conscious awareness that is absent in trials without awareness (Figs. 8b & 
8c). The idea is that by subtracting the unaware mean waveform from the aware mean 
waveform, if the unaware mean waveform is appropriately corrected for, we should be left 
just with activity properly related to awareness (i.e., the “third” bump). Despite its idealized 
nature, these simulations can help us determine the expected effectiveness of a performance 




Figure 8. Average simulated waveforms from different conditions 
based on an SDT model 
Representation of the mean ERP activation of three different conditions. There is an extra third 
“bump” in (a), the aware-correct trial, absent in (b) or (c), the unaware trials. This late activity is meant 
to reflect activity that is specific to awareness. Activity intensity in (c), the unaware-incorrect trial, is 
reduced compared to the higher activity in (b), the unaware-correct trial. (See Appendix for details.) 
 
 Neural responses associated with awareness need not arise late (>333ms) and they need 
not be temporally dissociated from the purely classification processes. Finding the precise 
timing and localization of these signatures is the goal of imagining studies looking for the 
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NCC. Hence, the simulations assumed the dissociated late timing for mere illustration 
purposes. The extra cycle associated with consciousness, then, could have been added earlier 
too (e.g., at ~100ms), as has been reported by different laboratories (Railo, Koivisto, and 
Revonsuo 2011; Rutiku et al. 2015; L. M. Andersen et al. 2015; Koivisto and Revonsuo 2003; 
Pins and ffytche 2003; Aru and Bachmann 2009). Along with other simplifications (e.g., the 
use of a sinusoidal waveform or the fact that wavelength, symmetry and latency are constant 
with changes in internal response), these assumptions should not affect the main lesson to 
be drawn from this exercise. Its main purpose is to illustrate how a correction method that 
assumes HTM performs under reasonable SDT assumptions. To emphasize, this simple 
model is suggested for ease of visualization and implementation only. 
 The results presented in Figures 8 and 9 were obtained after a 10,000-trial computer 
simulation (see Appendix for technical details). Figure 8 shows the ERP average responses 
under the different relevant conditions. In Figure 9, the correction was implemented as 
described by Lamy et al. (2009; specifically, endnote 2). The unaware-correct response (Fig. 
8b, and repeated for ease of comparison in Fig. 9a as the solid curve) is only marginally 
different from the unaware-correct chance-free response (Fig. 9a, dashed curve). This is the 
waveform obtained after applying the correction suggested by LSB’s method to eliminate 
performance confounds by lucky guesses. Hence, the influence of subtracting unaware 
correct-by-chance trials from aware-correct activations is only marginal. Both subtractive 
comparisons, namely, aware-correct minus unaware-correct (Fig. 9b, solid curve) and aware-
correct minus unaware-correct chance-free (Fig. 9b, dashed curve), turn out to be almost the 
same, suggesting that the corrected unaware trials made a small contribution, if any, for 
singling out the signal specific to awareness. Concretely, in the latter comparison (Fig. 9b, 
dashed curve) there is still a clear residual activation during the first sinusoidal period of the 
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ERP (0–333ms), associated to the internal perceptual response strength in general, and not 
specifically to awareness, which occurs late in the simulations, i.e., from 333-500ms (Fig. 8a). 
An optimal analysis where only the awareness signature response remains after a 
subtractive comparison should cancel out the early response, leaving just the late response 
that is specific to awareness. As it is clear from Figure 9b, LSB’s method fails to single out 
the specific response associated to awareness when plausible SDT assumptions are in place, 




Figure 9. Simulated neural responses after LSB’s correction method  
(a) Simulated unaware-correct (solid curve) and unaware-correct chance-free (dashed curve) activation 
using LSB’s (2009) suggested correction method. (b) The wave function result of subtracting the 
unaware-correct wave function (solid curve) and unaware-correct chance-free curves (dashed curve), 
respectively, from the awareness-correct wave function (Fig. 8a). It is evident from visual inspection 
that the influence of lucky responses was not sufficiently removed. Also, the activity during the early 
period was only marginally subtracted away with or without the correction method. 
 
 It is here that we can see the crucial, but flawed, role that LSB’s High Threshold 
assumption plays. They assume that the ERP response of unaware-correct-by-chance trials 
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looks the same as the ERP response of unaware-incorrect trials (Fig. 8c): both are taken to be 
trials with unprocessed targets. Problematically, unaware-incorrect and unaware-correct do 
not look that different in the first place—the former’s amplitude is only about half smaller 
than the latter’s—so the unaware-incorrect waveform cannot have a very big influence on 
unaware-correct anyway. This is also observed in the actual ERP reported in LSB’s 2009 
paper (their Figure 3). It is of crucial importance to note that their results stayed basically 
the same regardless of whether they used unaware-correct or unaware-correct chance-free 
trials. In other words, their correction method affected in a negligible way their analyses, 
even though it was designed precisely to compensate for a significant underperformance 
during unawareness. This should be surprising for LSB since their assumed HTM implies 
that processed and unprocessed trials are radically different. Furthermore, in the P3 
component during long-exposure trials (their Figure 2) there is no difference between the 
amplitude of unaware-correct and unaware-incorrect trials. This is an important unpredicted 
fact in their theory that receives no comment. (Note that the difference between unaware-
correct and unaware-incorrect was found to be significant in the P3 component in the parietal 
region in a follow up study (Salti, Bar-Haim, and Lamy 2012)).  
 On SDT, however, this type of outcome is to be expected because both unaware-correct 
and unaware-incorrect are trials that come from the inner partitions between the awareness 
criteria, where signal strength is weak (Fig. 6), and they are not necessarily very different in 
each of the two partitions. As a matter of fact, unaware-incorrect trials may even have higher 
internal response strength than unaware-correct trials (due to the overlap of the Gaussian 
distributions), making them in the end qualitatively similar. In conclusion, LSB’s correction 
method only partially, and inadequately, removes the performance capacity confound.  
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4.  An SDT-based Correction Method 
 
Having demonstrated the inadequacy of LSB’s correction method, we can now show a way to 
perform a theoretically more adequate analysis based on SDT assumptions. The simulation 
presented in the previous section clearly established what the goal of such a correction should 
be, namely, to remove the ERP responses associated to mere processing in order to reveal the 
response that is specific to awareness and independent from performance. Like Lamy and 
colleagues, we are concerned with awareness as measured by subjective ratings (akin to 
confidence ratings as characterized within SDT). The distribution properties of the internal 
signal strength during a discrimination task are known when SDT is assumed, i.e., the 
internal perceptual response is drawn from one of two overlapping Gaussian distributions 
with equal variance and different means. Then, an appropriate correction for controlling for 
performance and factoring in any correct-by-chance trials is actually not difficult to achieve 
using standard SDT methods.  
 The primary assumption behind this correction is that activation intensity is linearly 
determined by the internal response. As it is clear from Figure 6, an SDT model assumes that 
unaware trials have a lower mean internal response than aware trials. This fact can be used 
to correct for performance confounds between aware and unaware trials. The ratio of the 
mean internal response for aware and unaware trials is used as a scaling factor of the 
unaware mean waveform. By scaling up the weaker response in the unaware condition to 
approximately match the intensity of the stronger response in the aware condition, we can 
subtract away any activation due to magnitude difference in internal response (see Appendix 
for technical details). Put simply, waveforms (but this is potentially generalizable to other 
types of imaging techniques like BOLD activity) of unaware trials during perceptual 
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processing must be scaled up to match waveform amplitudes (or activation) of aware trials 




Figure 10. SDT-based correction method 
(a) Simulated unaware-correct (solid curve) and unaware-correct SDT-adjusted (dashed 
curve) activation using the proposed SDT-based correction method (see Appendix for details). 
(b) Aware-correct activation curve corrected by subtracting unaware-correct wave function 
(solid curve; identical to solid curve in Fig. 9b, repeated here for ease of comparison) and 
unaware-correct SDT-adjusted curve (dashed curve), respectively. When comparing the 
corrected aware-correct curve in this figure to the one in Fig. 9b (dashed curve), it can be 
easily noticed by visual inspection that the proposed SDT-based adjustment method robustly 
removes the task performance capacity confound during the early processing stages, leaving 
just the awareness activation signature. 
 
 The correction from unaware-correct to unaware-correct SDT-adjusted, thus labeled to 
distinguish it from LSB’s chance-free terminology, is presented in Figure 10a (dashed curve). 
The subtraction of the scaled up unaware waveform should leave us mainly with the 
activations relevant to awareness (i.e., the third “bump”) in the simulated ERPs. Figure 10b 
shows the result of this process. For comparison, the subtraction aware-correct minus 
unaware-correct presented in Fig. 9b (solid curves) is repeated in 10b as well. Unlike LSB’s 
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method, this adjustment method allows a significant difference between subtracting 




Figure 11. LSB’s and SDT-based correction methods stimulation 
results under different parametric assumptions 
10,000-trial simulations were performed, changing the parameters for awareness criteria and 
sensitivity (d’). The solid curve represents the subtraction of unaware-correct chance-free from aware-
correct activation (i.e., LSB’s method), and the dashed curve represents the subtraction of unaware-
correct SDT-adjusted from aware-correct activation (i.e., the SDT-based correction method). (a) 
Sensitivity was kept constant and identical to previous simulations (d’=1). Very conservative 
awareness criteria were assigned, i.e., the internal response strength had to cross ±3 on the x-axis of 
Fig. 8a for a trial to be classified as aware. (b) Sensitivity was as in (a), but it was assigned a very 
liberal awareness criteria (±0.5). (c) Awareness criteria were held constant and identical to previous 
simulations (±2) and a higher sensitivity of d’=2 was assigned. (d) Awareness criteria were as in (c), 
but sensitivity was set to a low level of d’=0.5. The results for all four variations look qualitatively the 
same to the simulation results presented in Figures 9-10. See Appendix for details. 
 
 For the sake of completeness, Figure 11 includes the results of performing the same 
analysis with a different selection of parameters: better and worse performance (sensitivity 
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d’) as well as more conservative and more liberal awareness criteria (see Fig. 11 caption and 
Appendix for details on the parameters used). Even though there is a slight numerical 
variation, changing simulated sensitivity or awareness criteria left intact the results thus far 
presented. The chance-free correction suggested by LSB is insufficient to isolate an 
awareness signature in the simulated ERP activation waveforms, while the SDT-based 
method is more robust to that end at the same time that it significantly reduces the worries 
regarding performance confound.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In order to discover the neural correlates of the exclusively subjective aspects of conscious 
awareness, eliminating performance capacity confound is a critical step. Lamy and 
colleagues’ effort should be commended for recognizing the importance of this issue, and for 
providing a novel and general method for dealing with this problem in a formal way. The 
intuitive appeal of its core logic can be recognized as well as the importance and the potential 
impact that methods of its kind may have on the field. Unfortunately, whereas the overall 
concept behind the analysis is, prima facie, intuitive and appealing, it fails on a technical 
level due to its problematic assumptions.  
 The fact that the correction method proposed by LSB only minimally removes the 
performance capacity confound once plausible signal detection theoretic assumptions are 
made means that results based on it or on similar approaches have to be reassessed less 
optimistically. For instance, in their own study, LSB associated awareness with widespread 
activations. It would not be surprising that some of those activations are due to the failure to 
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thoroughly remove the performance capacity confound. Other laboratories (e.g., Hesselmann, 
Hebart, and Malach 2011) have used LSB’s method trying to control for performance capacity 
and they found in an fMRI study that BOLD activity in the occipital and temporal areas was 
associated with awareness. But we know activity in some of these areas reflect internal 
response strength anyway (as they also predict task performance capacity), so their results 
may be merely due to the lack of complete removal of the influence of performance capacity. 
If this were the case, the view that these authors put forward, namely, that awareness may 
be associated with widely distributed activity in the whole brain, including visual areas, 
would be undermined. If an awareness signature response were correctly isolated, however, 
their findings may even turn out to be compatible with the view that awareness is associated 
with specific activity in a set of brain regions outside of the visual cortex, not directly involved 
in the generation of the internal perceptual response itself (Lau and Passingham 2006; Lau 
and Rosenthal 2011). 
 The simulation results are not presented without misgivings. They are highly idealized 
and they make strong parametric assumptions regarding neural data. For instance, they 
assume that the internal perceptual response follows strictly Gaussian distributions and that 
the strength of the ERP (or whatever other neural response is analyzed, like BOLD activity) 
follows the exact same distributions. We know that SDT models are appropriate for human 
perceptual behavior because the underlying parametric assumptions have been validated by 
psychophysical measurements of ROC curves, which show that the Gaussian distribution 
assumption is empirically justified in most cases of visual perception. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to ERP data, relatively little is known about their statistical nature. If awareness 
modulates neural activity nonlinearly (Friston et al. 1996), both the HTM and SDT 
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corrections presented in this chapter would fail to reveal the corresponding neural correlates 
properly. 
 Another limitation of the present work, shared by LSB’s analyses, is that when 
contrasting unconscious and conscious activations, the latter could be revealing more than 
just the neural correlates of consciousness. These could also indicate brain activity present 
during conscious trials but unrelated to consciousness per se, like post-perceptual processing, 
working memory, or response preparation (Pitts et al. 2014; Aru, Bachmann, et al. 2012; Li, 
Hill, and He 2014; Bachmann 2009).  
 Finally, another limitation is that only one awareness criterion was assumed. This was 
done mainly for the sake of simplicity and computational tractability and it should not 
suggest that awareness is an on-off step function. Future work could pursue the effectiveness 
of this method with multiple criteria, which may more realistically capture the nature of 
subjective ratings. (Note that with enough criteria, the suggested type of modeling would, in 
practice, approximate a truly continuous scale.) Relatedly, it may be argued that there are 
subtle differences between confidence ratings (commonly used in SDT contexts) and 
awareness judgments (Overgaard and Sandberg 2012). We can acknowledge there are 
potential differences, but within the framework of SDT these two have been given similar 
treatments, in that they are both subjective ratings that can be modeled as responses 
separated by criteria. 
 With these caveats in mind, the conceptual ideas behind the SDT model are useful for 
the study of consciousness in both behavioral and imaging studies. Because this model is 
based on the localization of criteria along a decision axis, ratings of awareness can be 
dissociated from performance capacity, just as response bias can be dissociated from 
discrimination sensitivity (Maniscalco and Lau 2012). Furthermore, for a single trial, given 
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the internal response strength, the same stimulus could end up being classified as aware or 
unaware depending on where the criteria for awareness are placed. This is where HTM and 
SDT depart from each other more dramatically. Within SDT, for the same stimulus and the 
same internal response strength, the same subject could classify a trial as aware on one 
occasion and as unaware in a different occasion, depending on the localization of the subject’s 
awareness criterion. This boundary is determined by fixating a criterion that changes from 
subject to subject, from experiment to experiment, and most likely it even jitters from trial 
to trial.  
 Perhaps, the most important take-home message of the exercise of focusing on LSB is 
not methodological in nature. Rather, there is a broader conceptual point that I am hoping to 
advocate here. When controlling for performance capacity in imaging studies, researchers 
should focus on controlling for the internal response strength, and not just for adjusting the 
influence of mere flukes. In imaging studies of consciousness, this means isolating some kind 
of further processing which only happens during trials crossing the awareness criteria. Such 
is the logic behind the proposed correction method. Given the complexity of this problem as 
revealed by the limitations of the correction method described here, in order to address the 
issue of performance capacity as a confound, the best method so far is to create task 
conditions in which task performance is empirically matched, and yet reported subjective 
levels of awareness differ (Lau and Passingham 2006; Rounis et al. 2010). Though this may 





The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Theories and 
Functions †  
 
Our understanding of the neural basis of consciousness has substantially improved in the 
last few decades. New imaging and statistical techniques have been introduced, experiments 
have become more sophisticated, and several unsuccessful hypotheses have been quite 
conclusively ruled out. However, neuroscientists still do not entirely agree on the critical 
neural features required for sustaining perceptual conscious experiences in humans and 
other primates. In this chapter, a selection of influential views of the neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCC) and the predictions they make are discussed. For example, neural 
activity synchronized at 40Hz used to be considered a serious candidate for the NCC. Among 
current views, some expect activity in the ventral stream of the visual processing pathway to 
be crucial for consciousness, others expect recurrent activity in visual areas, distributed 
activity across frontoparietal areas, or specific activity in prefrontal cortex (PFC). In 
particular, the focus is placed on the predictions these views make with respect to the role of 
PFC during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of 
contention. The discussion of these views will focus mainly on the level of functional anatomy, 
i.e., the level at which we consider different brain regions, rather than at the neuronal 
circuitry level. This approach makes sense because currently relatively more is understood 
about experimental evidence at this coarse level, and because these results are appropriate 
                                                 
† A version of this chapter is forthcoming as MORALES, J., and Lau, H. “The Neural Correlates of 
Consciousness.” In U. Kriegel (Ed.) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. For instance, while the Neural 
Synchrony Theory (Crick and Koch 1990), the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner and 
Goodale 2006), and the Local Recurrency Theory (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006) predict that 
PFC activity is not critical for perceptual consciousness, the Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau 
and Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014; 
Baars 1988) Theories confer activity in PFC a crucial role in enabling conscious perception. 
Moreover, while Global Workspace Theory requires global and elevated activity distributed 
in a frontoparietal network, Higher Order Theory expects specific computations in PFC to be 
responsible for visual conscious experiences.  
 While it is sometimes described as a “brain mapping” issue (for example, in the form of 
questions like “Where is the neural basis of consciousness?”), finding the NCC is hardly a 
simple “localization” job. This is not to say that identifying certain areas differentially 
involved during conscious experiences is not part of what is required for finding the NCC. 
But the theoretically interesting quest for the NCC goes beyond straightforward “brain 
mapping.” Success in finding the NCC is likely to involve describing how multiple brain areas 
work in conjunction to sustain conscious experiences, as well as the neural computations and 
the computational architecture behind them. Importantly, there are also important 
conceptual and experimental design issues that are relevant, where philosophy can play a 
key role. By highlighting some neurobiological and computational modelling results, it can 
be shown that the available evidence favors a hierarchical processing architecture that 
confers a crucial, if subtle and specific, role to PFC. After presenting the relevant results, 
methodological and functional implications of this neural architecture supporting conscious 
experiences are discussed. To anticipate, despite the apparent stark differences between 
conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their 
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neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity 
between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly 
specialized. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences 
between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant 
neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the 
evidence discussed here that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious 
perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought.  
 
1.  Finding the Neural Correlates of Consciousness  
 
Scientists study the neural difference between being conscious versus unconscious in at least 
two different ways. First, researchers may refer to the overall state of a person or animal 
(e.g., wakefulness, anesthesia, coma, sleep, etc.), for which they use phrases such as ‘state-
consciousness’ or ‘global states of consciousness’. Second, they may also refer to whether the 
person or animal is conscious of something or not (e.g., seeing or not seeing a face, seeing a 
face versus seeing a house, hearing or not hearing a sound, feeling or not feeling pain, etc.), 
also referred to as ‘content-consciousness’ or ‘local states of consciousness’.51  
 When studying the NCC, scientists seek necessary and sufficient neural events that 
cause conscious experiences.52 However, it has been acutely pointed out that finding 
necessary conditions for consciousness can be challenging (Chalmers 2000). First, after 
                                                 
51 See note 28.  
52 The term ‘correlate’ falls short from capturing necessary and sufficient conditions. We just follow 
the terminology used in the field at least since (Crick and Koch 1990). 
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damage to a specific part of the brain (e.g., stroke, surgery, etc.), mental functions—including 
consciousness—may be lost. But they may also be recovered thanks to neuroplasticity: the 
brain’s capacity to “rewire” itself. In some rare cases, cognitive functions and consciousness 
are never lost at all, even after massive, albeit slow, destruction of neural tissue (Feuillet, 
Dufour, and Pelletier 2007).  
 Second, redundancy makes finding necessary conditions for consciousness unlikely. It is 
not uncommon that the brain has redundant or backup mechanisms for performing the same 
function. This means that consciousness could be sustained by more than one neural 
mechanism. If mechanism x causally sustains consciousness, x is undoubtedly an NCC. But 
consciousness may be overdetermined if mechanisms x and y can cause the same type of 
conscious event independently. In this case, if x is damaged but y is spared, consciousness 
would still take place. This would demonstrate that x is not a necessary condition for that 
type of conscious event, even though it is ex hypothesi its neural correlate (or one of them). 
Thus, preservation of consciousness when a brain region is destroyed, impaired or when it 
does not display any measurable activity does not in and of itself show that normal activity 
in that region is not an NCC.  
 Third, convergent evolution could have produced independent mechanisms for 
consciousness in two species whose common ancestor lacked either mechanism. It may be the 
case that something as complex as consciousness emerged during evolution just once, but it 
is not necessary. If different species (say, humans and octopuses) sustain conscious 
experiences via different types of neural mechanisms, neither would be necessary for 
consciousness in a strong metaphysical sense. For all these reasons, establishing strict 
necessary conditions for consciousness is unlikely to be successful. If anything, we can aspire 
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to restricted necessity claims that include clauses like “in humans” or “in normal 
conditions”.53 
 Finding sufficient neural conditions for consciousness is not without challenges either. 
For instance, everything else being the same, the whole brain is likely to be sufficient for 
sustaining conscious experiences. Yet, postulating the whole brain as the NCC would not be 
informative. Instead, neuroscientists are interested in the “minimal set of neural events 
jointly sufficient for a specific conscious experience (given the appropriate enabling 
conditions)” (Koch 2004, 97); or “core realizers” of consciousness for short (see Shoemaker 
1981). Delimiting what counts as a core realizer is far from straightforward (Aru, Bachmann, 
et al. 2012; Chalmers 2000). For instance, when comparing a condition in which subjects 
report being conscious of a stimulus against a condition in which subjects report no 
consciousness of it, the difference between these two conditions should be conscious 
awareness only. Yet, distilling stimulation and cognition from consciousness is not easy. 
Controlling for stimulation, attention, and performance capacity (e.g., accuracy, reaction 
time, etc.), such that these are matched across conscious and unconscious conditions is hard 
to achieve experimentally (Lau 2008). During imaging experiments, prerequisites (e.g., 
stimulus processing, attention) and consequences (e.g., performance, attention, working 
memory, motor preparation, verbal report, etc.) of consciousness can be easily confounded 
with the actual NCC (Lumer and Rees 1999; Aru, Bachmann, et al. 2012; Bachmann 2015; 
Tse et al. 2005). Using lesion patients for whom performance is constant across subjective 
judgments of awareness and unawareness without experimental manipulation does not 
eliminate all the problems. Not only these patients are rare and their deficits are often 
                                                 
53 Establishing what counts as a normal condition is complicated too, but we sidestep this issue here. 
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constrained in specific ways, their lesions are hardly ever limited to clear-cut anatomical or 
functional regions. Moreover, these patients’ brains often rewire and recover functions in 
peculiar ways, which hinders making general inferences. 
 A practical limitation when studying the NCC is the methods currently available for 
detecting neural activity in the relevant functional networks. In the last few decades, 
sophisticated non-invasive imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) have been added to decades-old technology like electroencephalography 
(EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), and positron emission tomography (PET). These 
technologies, however, have strong limitations with respect to either their spatial or temporal 
resolutions, or both. They are also indirect measurements of neural activity: oxygenated 
blood, electrical and magnetic signals measured outside the skull or glucose consumption 
detected via positron-emitting radioactive tracers. Electricocorticography (ECoG) allows 
making measurements with better signal-to-noise ratio and good temporal resolution by 
placing electrodes directly over the cortex, but it requires risky surgical intervention. For 
obvious medical and ethical reasons, the use of this technology in humans is very limited. In 
contrast, direct single- and multi-unit recording of neural activity offers unsurpassable 
spatiotemporal resolution. Unfortunately, it requires inserting electrodes directly into or 
right next to neurons, making it an extremely invasive method. In consequence, it is available 
almost exclusively in other animals like monkeys or rats. Working with animal models offers 
multiple advantages (Passingham 2009), but the study of consciousness may be challenging 
even when ingenious solutions have been devised (Leopold and Logothetis 1996; Rigotti et al. 
2013). I will come back to some of the limitations of these methods when assessing the 
available empirical evidence for the NCC. 
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 Finally, restricted necessary and sufficient conditions should ideally be established via 
causal interventions. By directly manipulating neural activity, we may reveal the causal 
mechanisms underlying conscious states (Craver 2007; Neisser 2012). Manipulating the 
brain safely and effectively, however, is a major challenge—especially in humans. Genetic, 
chemical, and surgical interventions are risky, almost exclusively available in other animals 
and likely to affect more than just conscious awareness. More promising may be the use of 
non-invasive technology such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). TMS pulses 
project a small magnetic field onto the surface of the brain through a coil placed outside the 
skull. Depending on the number and frequency of pulses, the magnetic field can enhance or 
inhibit neural activity in the target region. This allows researchers to create reversible 
“virtual lesions” for short intervals and test whether the target region was subserving the 
function of interest, including conscious awareness. While promising, the precise 
mechanisms of action of TMS are still poorly understood and its effects can only be coarsely 
controlled (Sandrini, Umiltá, and Rusconi 2011). 
 
2.  Theoretical Predictions Regarding the NCC 
 
Different theories about the nature and localization of the NCC place their explanatory power 
at different levels (Hardcastle 2000). The emphasis has been sometimes laid on 
neurochemistry [e.g., activation of the NDMA neuroreceptor that forms large neural 
assemblies (Flohr 1995)], neuronal types [e.g., spindle neurons (Butti et al. 2013; Allman et 
al. 2005)], systemic properties [e.g., integrated information (Tononi 2008)], and functional 
neuroanatomy [e.g., specific neurophysiological markers and neural activity in specific 
regions or networks; for recent reviews see (Koch et al. 2016; Lau and Rosenthal 2011; 
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Dehaene and Changeux 2011)]. In this section, first, some important recent functional 
neuroanatomical theories are introduced. In no way this is an attempt at a thorough review. 
Not only other viable empirical theories of the NCC are not discussed, only succinct 
presentations of the ones discussed are offered. Rather, the goal is to show that the theories 
discussed here predict different neural implementations of consciousness, especially 
regarding the role of PFC, providing an opportunity to arbitrate empirically between several 
theoretical frameworks. 
 
a. Neural synchrony theory 
 
Much of the recent interest in finding the NCC was set off by the introduction of Neural 
Synchrony Theory (Crick and Koch 1990). According to it, at the psychological level 
consciousness depends on short-term memory and attention. At the neural level, attention 
makes groups of relevant neurons to fire in a coherent way giving rise to conscious percepts. 
Neurons in different areas often fire independently from each other. However, attention can 
make their firing rates to become synchronized in fast waves (between 40 and 70 times per 
second). This temporal coherence achieves a global unity imposed on different areas of the 
brain that activates short-term (working) memory. Crick and Koch hypothesize that this 
basic oscillatory mechanism underlies all kinds of consciousness (e.g., visual, auditory, 
tactile, or painful experiences). Thus, the NCC is identified in their theory with a special type 
of activity (i.e., neural firings oscillating at 40-70Hz). The specific contents of conscious 
experiences depend on the specialized cortex where the activity takes place. In the case of 
vision, different features of visual stimuli are processed by different areas of visual cortex 
(e.g., V1/orientation, V4/color, MT-V5/motion). The brain binds together all these features in 
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a single, coherent, and conscious percept by synchronizing the neural activity in these areas. 
Moreover, this activity is coordinated by zones in sensory cortices that are rich in feedback 
neurons (i.e., neurons that project from a higher area to a lower area). These feedback 
projecting zones also exist in other regions, such as the thalamus or the claustrum, which 
may play a major coordination role (Crick and Koch 2005). Thus, synchronized firing at about 
40-70Hz is proposed as a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness (provided 
enabling conditions such as attention and activation of working memory are met). 
Importantly, even though the NCC in Crick and Koch’s proposal are highly distributed across 
brain areas, PFC is not predicted to play any significant role in sustaining conscious activity. 
At most, PFC may be relevant for attention, sustaining contents in working memory, and 
reporting conscious contents.  
 
b. Two-visual-systems hypothesis 
 
According to an influential theory advanced by Milner and Goodale (Milner and Goodale 
2006), the neural correlates of visual awareness are restricted to activity in the ventral 
stream of the visual processing pathway. There are corticocortical projections from early 
visual cortex (V1) that later split into two processing streams (Ungerleider, Mishkin, and 
Mansfield 1982). One stream is located dorsally and ends in parietal cortex, the other stream 
runs on a ventral pathway that ends in inferior temporal cortex. The Two-Visual-Systems 
Hypothesis relies on neurophysiological and anatomical evidence in monkeys, as well as 
neuropsychological evidence in humans, to suggest activity in the dorsal stream is associated 
with visually-based action (for example, saccades or visually guided hand movements) and 
egocentric representations (i.e., representations of objects from the subject’s point of view). 
 121 
Despite involving complex computations, activity in this stream is not normally available to 
awareness according to this view. In contrast, activity in the ventral stream is typically 
associated with allocentric representations (i.e., objective representations independent of the 
subject’s perspective) and visual object recognition. Objective visual representations have 
shape, size, color, lightness, and location constancies that allow subjects to re-identify objects 
independently of viewpoint (Burge 2010). Milner and Goodale argue that “visual 
phenomenology [...] can arise only from processing in the ventral stream.” (Milner and 
Goodale 2006, 202) In other words, activity in the ventral stream is necessary for awareness. 
Additionally, attentional modulation that selects a represented object is required. Object 
representations in the ventral stream and attention are jointly sufficient for conscious 
awareness. Importantly, they think prefrontal cortex exert “some sort of top-down executive 
control [...] that can initiate the operation of attentional search” (Milner and Goodale 2006, 
232), guide eye movements and motor control. However, activity in prefrontal cortex would 
probably be in and of itself irrelevant for conscious awareness.  
 
c. Local recurrency theory 
 
Local Recurrency Theory (LRT) proposes three stages involved in visual information 
processing. First, after stimulus presentation there is a rapid, unconscious feedforward 
sweep (~100-200ms) of activity from visual cortex (V1) to motor and prefrontal cortex. 
Immediately after, in a second processing stage, an exchange of information within and 
across high- and low-level visual areas starts taking place. This fast and widespread 
information exchange is achieved by means of so-called recurrent processing, namely, neural 
activity in horizontal connections within a visual area, and activity in feedback connections 
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from higher level areas back to lower levels (all the way back to V1). Local recurrent 
processing enables the exchange of information of different visual properties (e.g., 
orientation, shape, color, motion, etc.) that are processed independently in different visual 
areas. This facilitates the required “perceptual grouping” (Lamme 2006, 497) for forming 
coherent conscious representations of objects. According to LRT, this second stage of 
recurrent processing is the NCC as it is both necessary and sufficient for phenomenal 
consciousness (Lamme and Roelfsema 2000; Lamme, Zipser, and Spekreijse 2002).54 Finally, 
in a late third stage, this reverberating activity becomes a widespread co-activated network 
involving visual and frontoparietal areas through attentional amplification. Motor and 
prefrontal cortex activity enables response preparation, keeping information in working 
memory and other types of cognitive control like attending, changing response strategies or 
inhibiting response. For LRT, this later frontoparietal activity is required exclusively for 
report and cognitive control (what Block (2007) calls ‘access consciousness’), not for 
supporting conscious experiences themselves (what Block calls ‘phenomenal consciousness’). 
One surprising consequence of the view is that conscious experiences take place even if they 
are not reportable or accessible to the subject (Block 2007; Landman, Spekreijse, and Lamme 
2003; Sligte, Scholte, and Lamme 2008; Vandenbroucke et al. 2015). In other words, it would 
be possible to be conscious without knowing it and without any possible behavioral and 
cognitive manifestation of such phenomenal experiences.55 In many cases, according to LRT, 
                                                 
54 “That recurrent processing is necessary for visual awareness is now fairly well established, and 
supported by numerous experiments.” (Lamme 2010, 216) “According to such empirical and theoretical 
arguments, [local recurrent processing] is the key neural ingredient of consciousness. We could even 
define consciousness as recurrent processing.” (Lamme 2006, 499) 
55 See (Kouider, Sackur, and de Gardelle 2012; M. A. Cohen and Dennett 2011) for criticisms of the 
scientific viability of this position. 
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when subjects report unawareness, they may just be reporting their lack of access to 
otherwise conscious experiences.  
 
d. Global workspace theory  
 
According to Global Workspace Theory (GWT), after stimulus presentation, activity in visual 
areas starts accumulating in two independent processing streams, one that can lead to 
consciousness and another that supports unconscious processing (Del Cul et al. 2009; Charles 
et al. 2013; Charles, King, and Dehaene 2014).56 Evidence accumulation through visual 
information processing in each stream races to a threshold in a “winner-takes-all” fashion 
(Shadlen and Kiani 2013; Pleskac and Busemeyer 2010; Wald 1947). If activity in the 
conscious stream reaches its threshold first, a sudden ignition “mobilizes” perceptual 
representations to a widespread global workspace implemented in frontoparietal 
interconnected neurons. This global broadcasting makes visual representations available for 
report and cognitive control, which results in a visual conscious experience (Dehaene and 
Changeux 2011; Dehaene and Naccache 2001). It is this globally broadcasted activity that 
GWT identifies as the NCC (Dehaene et al. 2006). Simultaneously, an unconscious stream 
processes the same visual stimulus. In case global ignition fails, the perceptual 
representation in the unconscious stream can be used if the subject is forced to provide a 
response, accounting for the commonly-observed capacity of subjects to perform above chance 
even when they are unaware of stimuli. Global workspace theorists appeal to a wealth of 
                                                 
56 Not to be confused with the dorsal and ventral streams discussed by the Two-Visual-Systems 
Hypothesis. According to GWT, the conscious and unconscious streams may be implemented in largely 
overlapping anatomical regions in visual areas.  
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studies showing that all sorts of cognitive processing can be performed unconsciously to a 
certain extent: visual judgments, word meaning extraction, performing simple arithmetic 
operations, cognitive control, etc. (Dehaene et al. 2014). Note that this dual-stream approach 
makes the surprising assumption that every stimulus is processed twice simultaneously, 
which imposes stringent and possibly unnecessary computational requirements on the brain. 
 Global workspace theorists note that unconscious performance and neural activity 
associated to it are rarely at the same level as during conscious conditions. Thus, global 
ignition provides a necessary and minimally sufficient signature of consciousness, which 
according to the view, increases and maintains performance and cognitive flexibility. This 
signature is identified by GWT with frontoparietal activity in fMRI studies and with sudden, 
widespread activity in a late (~270-650ms) positive voltage in frontoparietal areas in EEG 
studies (also known as the P300 component) (Del Cul, Baillet, and Dehaene 2007; Sergent, 
Baillet, and Dehaene 2005; Lamy, Salti, and Bar-Haim 2009).  
 
e. Higher order theory 
 
The Higher Order Theory (HOT) of consciousness holds that a mental state is conscious by 
virtue of its relation to some higher-order state. A perceptual representation alone is never 
in and of itself conscious. Rather, it becomes conscious when it is somehow “tagged” or meta-
represented by another, higher-order state. According to some versions of HOT, this relation 
is achieved by means of the higher-order state’s representing the first-order state in ways 
similar to thought or perception (Rosenthal 2005). What different versions of higher order 
theories have in common is that “a mere change in the higher order representation or process 
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is sufficient to lead to a change in subjective awareness, even if all first-order representations 
remain the same” (Lau and Rosenthal 2011, 365). 
 HOT holds that first-order representations depend on neural activity in early visual 
areas, whereas higher-order processes are implemented mainly in prefrontal (and parietal) 
cortex in both human and other primates (Lau and Rosenthal 2011). More specifically, 
consciousness emerges from a hierarchical processing architecture in which unconscious 
visual information processed in early areas gets selected by downstream mechanisms in PFC. 
One of HOT’s main predictions, then, is that disrupting the activity responsible for sustaining 
higher-order processes in prefrontal cortex should affect or eliminate visual experiences 
without affecting performance (because performance is driven mainly by unconscious first-
order representations in early sensory cortex). Importantly, disruptions to PFC should affect 
conscious experiences themselves, not just report or access to visual experiences, as expected 
by LRT. In contrast to GWT, HOT does not expect global activity to be predictive of conscious 
awareness. PFC activity related to consciousness may be very subtle as it just needs to select 
relevant visual processes in early areas. Thus, HOT predicts that massive alterations to PFC 
may not be sufficient to disrupt consciousness as long as specific PFC activity is preserved. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, some versions of HOT predict that specific activity in PFC is 
necessary and minimally sufficient for consciousness. In other words, if the ‘tagging’ activity 
normally responsible for consciousness takes place in the absence of a ‘tagged’ state, conscious 
experiences may still occur.  
 
In summary, these theories make very different general predictions about the nature and 
location of the NCC. They also make very different specific predictions regarding the role of 
PFC in consciousness, behavior, and the computational architecture underlying conscious 
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processing. Neural Synchrony Theory, Two Visual Systems Hypothesis, and Local 
Recurrency Theory focus on activity in sensory areas in fact denying any role in consciousness 
for PFC.57 GWT accepts PFC plays an important role, emphasizing the heightened level of 
activity and its distribution through frontoparietal areas. In contrast, HOT confers PFC a 
dominant role in consciousness because of the specific and subtle function it plays within a 
hierarchical processing architecture.  
 A clear sign of progress in the scientific quest for the neural correlates of consciousness 
is that despite their initial popularity, some theories are completely abandoned in light of 
subsequent evidence. The Neural Synchrony Theory, for example, has lost credibility thanks 
to multiple studies finding oscillations at 40Hz in the absence of awareness and failing to 
detect these same oscillations during reports of conscious experiences (for a review, see Koch 
et al. 2016). The Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (at least with respect to its commitment to 
the ventral stream being the NCC) has also been subject of strong skepticism after 
considering the mounting evidence against the independence of the dorsal and ventral 
streams and their proposed clear-cut roles (Wu 2014a; Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015).  
In the next two sections, I discuss neuroscientific and computational evidence relevant for 
arbitrating between the theoretical frameworks of the other three theories discussed in this 
section—LRT, GWT and HOT—and their predictions regarding the NCC and PFC’s 
involvement. 
  
                                                 
57 Neural Synchrony Theory and Local Recurrency Theory further specify that consciousness is 
associated with a specific type of feedback activity. 
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3.  The NCC: Evidence of PFC ’s Involvement 
 
Activity in PFC is crucial for supporting conscious perceptual experiences.58 Multiple 
neuroimaging studies have systematically found increased activity in prefrontal and parietal 
cortex when comparing conscious versus unconscious conditions, often even when 
performance capacity is controlled for (Lau and Passingham 2006; Sergent, Baillet, and 
Dehaene 2005; Dehaene et al. 2001; for recent reviews, see Dehaene and Changeux 2011; 
Lau and Rosenthal 2011; Odegaard, Knight, and Lau 2017; Boly et al. 2017). Some 
researchers minimize PFC’s importance in the NCC arguing that it plays an important 
function in attention, report, and cognitive control, but that it has a negligible role in 
consciousness (Koch et al. 2016; Tsuchiya et al. 2015). While these ideas are not new (Lumer 
and Rees 1999; Tse et al. 2005), they have sparked a renewed interest in the topic. 
 Admittedly, interpreting imaging results can be challenging. During an imaging 
experiment, reasons other than a causal role in supporting conscious experiences might lead 
to statistically significant results (e.g., noise or different functions performed by the same 
areas). As discussed in section 1, a more robust way of determining if an area of the brain is 
necessary for supporting a function is to permanently or temporarily impair it. If the function 
is lost, a constrained necessity claim may be warranted. Relatedly, if the function is not lost, 
not only constrained necessity claims are harder to maintain, the non-affected areas become 
candidates for being sufficient for supporting that function.59 With this logic in mind, recent 
                                                 
58 For simplicity we refer collectively to PFC, but activity relevant for consciousness is likely to be 
found in more specific areas, such as dorsolateral PFC, insula, and other orbitofrontal and rostrolateral 
regions. 
59 Necessity claims or denials in this context have to be constrained for the reasons discussed in the 
first section. Other species may implement consciousness differently, preventing any unconstrained 
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studies with carefully controlled psychophysical methods have investigated how PFC lesions 
(Del Cul et al. 2009; Fleming et al. 2014) and temporarily induced impairments by 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Rounis et al. 2010) impact visual experiences. The results 
of these studies have been univocal: permanent and temporary impairments to PFC do not 
abolish objective visual task performance capacity, while they affect subjective judgments. 
Either the percentage of visible stimuli decreased despite constant performance (Rounis et 
al. 2010; Del Cul et al. 2009) or these subjective judgments became less diagnostic of task 
performance (Fleming et al. 2014). In the case of lesion patients, the capacity to use subjective 
ratings to diagnose task performance (i.e., metacognitive capacity) was impaired by 50% 
(Fleming et al. 2014).  
 Nevertheless, several objections are often raised against this evidence. First, it is argued 
that these impairments only affect subjective judgments mildly, while damage to early visual 
areas like V1 abolish visual consciousness completely; second, that PFC does not represent 
conscious content specifically, which confers it a limited role (if any); and, third, that the 
activity detected in PFC during imaging studies pertain to attention and report, not 
consciousness per se. These objections are addressed in order. 
  
                                                 
necessity claim. But, perhaps more importantly for the neuroscientific study of consciousness, failures 
to eliminate a function--consciousness in this case--need not imply that the area was not necessary (in 
a constrained way) for supporting the function. The impairment might not have been specific enough 
or the brain might have repurposed other circuits to implement that function which, otherwise, would 
have been implemented in the impaired area under normal conditions.  
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a. PFC activity related to consciousness is highly specific  
 
Lesions to V1, in fact, can often completely abolish visual experiences (Melnick, Tadin, and 
Huxlin 2016; Weiskrantz 1986). When V1 is affected, like in blindsight, the sensory signal is 
degraded to the point of preventing subjective judgments of consciousness. In blindsight 
patients, the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) is spared. This relay center of visual 
information from the retina to early visual areas in the occipital lobe is located in the 
thalamus, and is likely responsible for driving objective performance of blindsight patients 
(Schmid et al. 2010). This does not rule out that in normal cases proper functioning of early 
visual areas is necessary, even if not sufficient, for consciousness.  
 A second point to highlight is that PFC functions very differently from sensory cortices. 
For instance, neuronal coding in PFC is relatively distributed, is rarely linear and shows a 
high degree of mixed selectivity (Mante et al. 2013; Rigotti et al. 2013). This means that, 
unlike visual cortex whose function is highly specialized for processing visual information, 
PFC’s role in consciousness is performed by highly specific patterns of activity as it is 
responsible for carrying out many other functions as well. Therefore, to exclusively produce 
a large disruption of perceptual experience, neural patterns of activity in PFC would need to 
be affected in highly specific ways.  
 Relatedly, frontal and parietal cortices are densely connected and frontal regions display 
high neuroplasticity (Miller and Cohen 2001; R. A. Andersen, Asanuma, and Cowan 1985; 
Barbas and Mesulam 1981; Cavada and Goldman-Rakic 1989; Petrides and Pandya 1984; 
Croxson et al. 2005). This implies that the brains of patients with frontal impairments can 
rewire rapidly by the time they can be tested, often several months after the lesion. Lesions 
produced by trauma, stroke or ablation are often too unspecific, but sometimes they are 
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extended enough to likely include all regions responsible for consciousness. However, because 
these same regions support many central cognitive functions (Badre and D’Esposito 2009; 
Miller 2000; J. Duncan and Owen 2000; Passingham and Wise 2012), patients may be so 
generally impaired that testing them immediately following the brain damage may not be 
straightforward (Knight and Grabowecky 1995; Mettler 1949). As further support for this 
point, chemical inactivation in rodent and monkey PFC and regions strongly connected to 
PFC (e.g., pulvinar) lead to strong effects in subjective confidence judgments without 
affecting performance in perceptual and even memory tasks. In these cases, the animals are 
tested immediately after PFC or pulvinar are inactivated, preventing compensatory rewiring 
(Lak et al. 2014; Romanski et al. 1997; Shipp 2003; Komura et al. 2013; Pessoa and Adolphs 
2010; Miyamoto et al. 2017). This background makes the specific effects of lesions or 
temporary impairments of PFC on subjective judgments indeed quite robust. 
 
b. PFC encodes specific content 
 
Another recent objection is that PFC activity does not encode specific content (Koch et al. 
2016), making its role as the NCC likely to be limited. First, specific content representation 
of visual experiences in PFC is not explicitly predicted by all theories. For instance, PFC may 
enable conscious perception through connections to early visual areas where the specific 
content is supported (Lau and Rosenthal 2011). Second, and perhaps more importantly in 
terms of interpreting the available neuroscientific evidence correctly, denying that PFC 
represents explicit contents of conscious experiences is empirically unsupported.  
 Researchers often perform simple contrastive univariate analysis with fMRI data. In this 
kind of analysis, the overall levels of activity belonging to one experimental condition is 
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simply compared to (subtracted from) the overall levels of activity in another condition (e.g., 
conscious versus unconscious trials). But it is known that univariate fMRI analysis provides 
limited sensitivity. As mentioned above, activity in PFC is hardly linear and neurons exhibit 
mixed selectivity, which varies widely upon contextual changes. Measuring the overall levels 
of activity is at best a coarse approximation to total neural activity. Hence, visual content 
supported by specific patterns of activity may only be decoded effectively with careful analysis 
and sophisticated modelling strategies (Ester, Sprague, and Serences 2015; Stokes 2015). 
This includes multivariate analyses that go beyond a simple subtraction of overall activity. 
One example of this is multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), where a decoder is trained to 
classify the patterns of activity in two conditions of interest. For example, if subjects are 
presented with two types of stimuli in different trials, say, houses and faces, the decoder can 
be trained to distinguish between patterns of activity pertaining to houses and patterns 
pertaining to faces. A successful decoder classifies above chance a novel set of data (usually 
data from the same subject that was not used during training) as belonging to house- or face-
trials. MVPA reveals that perceptual content can be decoded from PFC in a simple perceptual 
decision task (Cortese et al. 2016), and that the pattern of activity in PFC reflects specific 
perceptual content even under several straining conditions (Wang, Arteaga, and He 2013). 
In another recent study, patterns of activity specific to subjective confidence judgments in 
perceptual and memory trials were successfully decoded from PFC (Morales, Lau, and 
Fleming 2018). 
 Finally, it could be objected that the spatiotemporal resolution of fMRI offers only a 
limited insight into neural activity, even when these sophisticated multivariate analyses are 
used. After all, it only gives us access to ~2 second snapshots of indirect blood-oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) activity driven by the hundreds of thousands of neurons found in each 
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voxel (i.e., the minimum resolution in fMRI, equivalent to a 3D pixel of approximately 3 x 3 
x 3mm). However, direct single- and multi-unit neural activity recording in monkeys offer a 
significantly higher spatiotemporal resolution (i.e., in the order of milliseconds and down to 
a single neuron) and multiple studies have unambiguously confirmed that specific perceptual 
decisions can be decoded from PFC (Kim and Shadlen 1999; Rigotti et al. 2013; Mante et al. 
2013). 
 
c. PFC is crucial for consciousness, not just attention or report 
 
Together, the aforementioned evidence indicates that activity in PFC is necessary for visual 
consciousness. However, most of the fMRI studies mentioned above involved subjects 
explicitly reporting their conscious experience. A legitimate worry is that this activity does 
not reflect conscious perception per se and that, rather, it is confounded by the task demand 
to report or attend the stimulus (Koch et al. 2016; Tsuchiya et al. 2015). Some of these 
concerns have been recent rekindled by neuroimaging studies where subjects were not 
required to make explicit subjective judgments about visual stimuli and activity in prefrontal 
cortex previously related to consciousness was significantly diminished or undetected 
(Tsuchiya et al. 2015; Frassle et al. 2014). 
 The issues concerning limited sensitivity of methods commonly used in fMRI studies, 
specifically univariate analysis concerning PFC, are relevant here. Using more sensitive 
methods in humans, such as direct intracranial electrophysiological recording 
(electrocorticography, or ECoG), reveals activity related to visual consciousness in PFC even 
when subjects were not required to respond to the stimulus (Noy et al. 2015). Perhaps more 
importantly, in direct neuronal recordings in nonhuman primates who viewed stimuli 
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passively, activity specifically related to the stimulus was detected in PFC 
(Panagiotaropoulos et al. 2012). It could be argued, however, that even under passive viewing 
an over-trained animal may still attend the stimuli or implicitly prepare a report (which could 
increase prefrontal activity for reasons unrelated to consciousness). But even unreported 
features of a visual stimuli can be decoded from PFC activity. That is, even when the animal 
had to report on a different, orthogonal stimulus feature, the unattended and unreported 
feature was encoded in PFC (Mante et al. 2013). It is very unlikely that the monkeys prepared 
to attend or report on both features, especially considering that the task was challenging and 
involved near-threshold stimuli.  
 It is important to note that this does not mean that in studies of conscious perception 
making explicit reports does not further drive activity in PFC. PFC activity is involved in all 
sorts of higher cognition, not just conscious awareness. But this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that most univariate imaging techniques will only reveal the most heightened 
activity. It is also consistent with the observation by Noy and colleagues (2015) that their 
positive ECoG findings in PFC were subtle when no report was required. Still, in more direct 
recordings unreported stimulus features were robustly decoded, almost at the same level as 
attended and reported features (Mante et al. 2013). Thus, the objections from the so-called 
‘no-report’ paradigms may have been exaggerated.  
 
In summary, the important role of PFC in visual conscious experiences resists common 
objections. As anticipated in the first section, when looking for the NCC, methodological 
hurdles have to be considered with utmost care. When studying consciousness, non-invasive 
tools like fMRI may seem ideal for making inferences about neural function in humans. 
However, its spatiotemporal limitations as well as the prevalence of simple statistical 
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approaches should give us pause, especially when confronted with null findings. When ECoG 
and single- and multi-unit cell recordings along with multi-voxel pattern decoding analysis 
are incorporated, the picture that emerges is that activity in PFC is a serious candidate for 
being the NCC. This is incompatible with the main predictions made by LRT. Also, despite 
predicting an involvement of PFC during global ignition, GWT’s requirement of global, 
heightened activity does not fit well with the evidence presented in this section. This evidence 
points towards a more subtle and specific role of frontal activity during conscious awareness. 
HOT also predicts an important role of PFC as the NCC but, in contrast to GWT, it does not 
require the relevant activity to be particularly heightened or distributed.  
 
4.  The Architecture of the NCC: Computational 
Considerations  
 
Neuroimaging as well as direct cortical recordings offer evidence for determining where 
activity supporting conscious experiences is located in the brain. Multivariate analyses can 
even distinguish specific patterns of conscious and unconscious activity, rather than merely 
detecting a difference in levels of activity. Nevertheless, finding the NCC is not only a 
‘localization’ problem. At the level of analysis that we are focusing on, it also involves finding 
the computational architecture most likely to account for the available neurophysiological 
and behavioral evidence. Computational modelling offers a non-invasive, formal way of 
comparing different models’ capacities to account for behavioral data obtained in normal 
experimental conditions. Unlike neuroimaging and neurophysiology, where different 
conditions prevail across different experiments, in computational modelling the same data 
from a single experiment can be fed to a range of models. This is especially important for 
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comparing the likelihood of rival possible computational architectures of the NCC, giving 
them an equal chance to fit the data.  
 Some possible models of how perceptual processing and conscious processes interact in 
the brain are directly ruled out by the neurophysiological evidence. For example, a model 
that does not predict unconscious and conscious perceptual processing to take place in two 
distinct regions, like the one implied by LRT, is not particularly promising when evidence of 
the importance of frontal regions for visual consciousness is considered. Nevertheless, 
multiple computational architectures may be compatible with the extant neurophysiological 
evidence that privileges PFC. Unconscious and conscious processes could be instantiated in 
different fashions. For example, on one model these distinct processes could operate in 
parallel. On another model, perceptual conscious processing could operate hierarchically such 
that later activity associated with consciousness operates as if evaluating the quality of 
unconscious visual processes.  
 Let us explore this issue with the illustrative case of experiments in which performance 
is matched while subjective judgments differ. Humans and some nonhuman animals make 
perceptual decisions about the external world all the time, and they are also capable of 
making subjective judgments regarding the quantity, quality or reliability of their evidence 
regarding such perceptual decisions (e.g., by making one decision over another, by extending 
or suspending a search for resources, by providing visibility or confidence ratings, by placing 
bets regarding their likelihood of being correct, etc.) (Smith 2009; Beran et al. 2012; Fleming 
and Frith 2014).  
 Notoriously, objective perceptual decisions and subjective judgments about the stimuli 
can come apart in the laboratory and in clinical contexts. For instance, blindsight patients 
can objectively discriminate visual stimuli while denying having any subjective experience of 
 136 
them (Weiskrantz 1986). In experimental conditions, humans (Maniscalco and Lau 2016; 
Rounis et al. 2010; Lau and Passingham 2006; Vlassova, Donkin, and Pearson 2014; Rahnev 
et al. 2011) and some other animals (Lak et al. 2014; Komura et al. 2013; Fetsch et al. 2014) 
can exhibit similar dissociations: subjects achieve comparable performance levels in a 
perceptual task while providing different subjective reports in different conditions. For 
example, in masking experiments (Maniscalco and Lau 2016; Del Cul et al. 2009; Lau and 
Passingham 2006), long and short gaps between stimulus presentation and the presentation 
of a mask allow subjects to identify the stimulus correctly at similar rates, while their 
subjective ratings of how visible the stimulus was differ significantly. These dissociations 
offer a unique opportunity to assess the specific processes involved in consciousness while 
distinguishing them from mere perceptual processing. 
 Let us consider three models recently used to fit data from a masking experiment 
(Maniscalco and Lau 2016): a single-channel, a dual-channel, and a hierarchical model 
(Figure 12). The single-channel model holds that subjective and objective judgments are 
different ways of evaluating the same underlying evidence generated by a single perceptual 
process. This sensory evidence consists on the sensory signal that arises in the brain after 
stimulus presentation plus the internal noise always present in neural processing. This 
sensory evidence is processed by the perceptual system and both objective and subjective 




Figure 12. Diagrams of three computational models of objective and 
subjective judgments 
Single-channel model. The same evidence (sensory signal + internal noise) gives rise to objective and 
subjective judgments. Dual-channel model. Two parallel streams of conscious and unconscious 
perceptual processing run simultaneously, each influenced by independent sources of noise. If the 
subjective judgment is given the lowest rating (e.g., “not seen”, “not confident”, “guess”) the 
unconscious stream is used for objective classification, otherwise the conscious stream is used. 
Hierarchical model. Objective and subjective judgments are driven by different processes organized in 
a serial hierarchy. An early stage produces objective judgments and a later stage of processing 
produces subjective judgments, as if evaluating the quality of the former. The second stage inherits 
the noise of the first, influenced by the early stage, but not vice versa. 
 
 According to the dual-channel model, objective perceptual judgments are based on the 
same sensory evidence as subjective judgments when the subject is conscious of the stimulus, 




























evidence. ‘Conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ streams receive the same sensory signal but this gets 
affected independently by different sources of noise. If the conscious processing stream 
reaches a threshold first, the stimulus is classified by the brain as ‘seen’ and the sensory 
evidence is amplified and made available in working memory for further cognitive control 
(e.g., making a perceptual judgment about the stimulus and report that it was consciously 
seen). If the consciousness threshold is not crossed, the stimulus is classified by the brain as 
‘not seen’ and the evidence accumulated in the conscious channel is discarded. If the subject 
still has to provide an answer—for instance, if prompted by the experimenter—the sensory 
evidence accumulated in the unconscious channel is used to provide a forced response. 
 Finally, according to the hierarchical model, the sensory evidence available for objective 
and subjective judgments differ, but it is not independent. The sensory signal (plus noise) is 
used to make objective perceptual judgments. Then, subsequent processing of this same 
evidence, in addition to a new source of noise, is used to make subjective judgments 
(Cleeremans, Timmermans, and Pasquali 2007; Fleming and Daw 2017). Thus, the 
accumulated evidence at the late stage might become degraded by the time it is tapped by 
subjective mechanisms due to signal decay or accrual of noise, or it may be enhanced due to 
further processing. 
 These models have been proposed based on conceptually reasonable grounds. In other 
words, finding which fits the empirical data better provides us with substantial insight 
regarding the computational architecture behind conscious perception. After performing 
formal model comparison, Maniscalco & Lau (2016) found that the hierarchical model 
provided the best and more parsimonious fit to the data of the metacontrast masking 
experiment, and it was also superior in reproducing the empirical data pattern in a series of 
simulations. The hierarchical model was able to account for the dissociation between 
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performance and subjective visibility ratings by supposing that early-stage perceptual 
processing is better transmitted to late-stage processing when the gap between stimulus and 
mask is longer. Since the early stage influences task performance and the late stage governs 
subjective judgments, longer gaps allow more evidence accumulation. This results in higher 
subjective visibility judgments in trials with longer gaps between the stimulus and the mask 
than in trials with short gaps, in spite of having similar task performance.  
 The last point is of importance for arbitrating between the theories of consciousness 
discussed in the previous sections. LRT does not make the prediction that the manipulation 
of the second processing stage changes subjective judgments without affecting task 
performance, bearing more functional resemblance to a single-channel model. Although GWT 
allows for unconscious above-chance performance, it does not predict unconscious 
performance will be at the same level if global workspace activity, likely implemented in 
frontoparietal regions, is disrupted. Some global workspace theorists explicitly endorse this 
dual-channel model which, at least for the masking dataset reported above, does not account 
well for the dissociation of objective and subjective judgments (Del Cul et al. 2009; Charles 
et al. 2013; Charles, King, and Dehaene 2014). The dual-channel model espoused by GWT, 
then, does not aptly account for the data presented in the previous section, where altering 
PFC normal functioning affects subjective judgments but preserves performance at normal 
levels (Rounis et al. 2010; Fleming et al. 2014). In any case, the idea of perfectly parallel 
processing routes for conscious and unconscious visual stimuli is unlikely to reflect the real 
neural circuitry involved in visual processing. As discussed above, for a long time the dorsal 
and ventral streams of visual processing were taken to be exclusively involved in unconscious 
and conscious visual representation, respectively (Milner and Goodale 2006). However, 
information within both streams is likely to be integrated (Wu 2014a), and unlikely to be 
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sufficient for consciousness. In sharp contrast to LRT and GWT, HOT predicts that late stage 
activity can be disrupted without affecting task performance. HOT explicitly proposes that 
downstream brain areas like PFC render sensory activity conscious by evaluating it. This 
puts HOT in close functional proximity to the hierarchical model, whose performance was far 
superior to the other two.  
 It is important to note that these results are limited to the analyzed dataset in 
Maniscalco & Lau (2016) and only further testing may confirm whether they generalize to 
other datasets, other experimental paradigms, or the hierarchical model outperforms other 
models. Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight that these results fit well with the data 
presented in the previous section according to which activity in PFC is crucial for conscious 
experiences. The second stage in the hierarchical model may be played by specific patterns 
of activity in PFC, while the earlier processing stage takes place in early visual areas.  
 
5.  Further Implications 
 
The neuroscientific and computational evidence presented in the previous sections suggests 
that the NCC may be found in a hierarchical processing architecture of perceptual signals in 




a. Conscious and unconscious neural circuitry is largely shared 
 
The Hierarchical model favored by the formal model comparison results holds that 
unconscious and conscious objective performance is based on the same perceptual evidence. 
Combined with available neuroscientific evidence, this suggests early visual and association 
areas support objective judgments while PFC taps onto this evidence later in the processing 
hierarchy, as if evaluating it, to give rise to consciousness. One consequence of this 
architecture is that, as far as visual information processing is concerned, unconscious and 
conscious mechanisms are mostly shared. PFC conscious-related engagement with visual 
representations constitutes only a late portion of the conscious processing stream, otherwise 
shared with unconscious representations. This important realization should impact how we 
study consciousness as well as how we think about the function of consciousness. 
 
b. Distinguishing conscious and unconscious activity requires subtle methods 
 
The fact that these mechanisms are largely shared points towards a subtle difference between 
conscious and unconscious processing. When controlling for stimulus strength and 
performance in an experimental setting, which is crucial for discovering the NCC, neural 
activity levels are not likely to differ greatly between conscious and unconscious trials. 
Activity in PFC is often not linearly correlated with behavior or stimulus properties and 
frontal neurons often have mixed selectivity properties that code distinct properties on a 
highly contextual manner (Rigotti et al. 2013; Mante et al. 2013). This suggests that we need 
to be very careful when interpreting results of purported elevated and distributed activity in 
conscious conditions (Lamy, Salti, and Bar-Haim 2009; Koivisto and Grassini 2016; Michel 
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2017; Railo, Koivisto, and Revonsuo 2011; Pitts et al. 2014; Dehaene 2014). In some of these 
experiments, it is often the case that stimulus strength and performance is inadequately 
controlled for and, sometimes, dated conceptions of the nature of perception hinder the 
interpretation of these results (see Chapter 3). For instance, it is easy to mistakenly include 
activity related to objective stimulus processing as part of activity responsible for 
consciousness. 
 The interpretation of null findings also demands caution. Detecting subtle neural 
activity specifically involved in consciousness requires highly sensitive methods. Current, 
non-invasive imaging technologies like univariate fMRI, MEG, or EEG are not ideal for such 
task as they are only able to detect the strongest signals from the brain. Because of their 
particular limitations and their indirect nature, subtle yet critical activity in prefrontal 
cortex is easily missed when comparing activity from conscious and unconscious conditions. 
In other words, while there may be nothing wrong with positive results when these methods 
detect strong activity in prefrontal cortex, we should be conservative about the meaning of 
null findings. The computational and empirical evidence gathered from more powerful 
methods suggest that, for the most part, only subtle and highly specific patterns of activity 
are relevant for consciousness. It should not be surprising then, that crude methods—
advanced as they are—turn out to be often unsuited for detecting critical activity for 
consciousness in PFC.  
 
c. The function of consciousness may be limited 
 
If the mechanisms for unconscious and conscious processing are mostly shared and their 
difference is expected to be subtle and specific, it is possible that consciousness per se does 
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not contribute significantly to visual information processing, task performance or behavior 
in general (Rosenthal 2008; Robinson, Maley, and Piccinini 2015). It is hardly contested that 
the brain can perform lots of perceptual and cognitive tasks unconsciously (but see Phillips 
2016; Peters and Lau 2015): anything from stimulus detection (Tsuchiya and Koch 2005) and 
word identification (Dehaene et al. 2001), to processing word meanings (Luck, Vogel, and 
Shapiro 1996; Gaillard et al. 2006) or performing basic arithmetic (Van Opstal, de Lange, 
and Dehaene 2011). Even high-level cognitive functions, like cognitive control (Koizumi, 
Maniscalco, and Lau 2015) or working memory (Samaha et al. 2016) show no apparent 
benefit from conscious awareness in controlled experimental conditions. 
 Denying the role of consciousness in behavior might strike as rather counterintuitive. 
Conscious experiences, it would seem, allow us to make fine-grained discriminations and to 
increase performance, and even to form beliefs, reason, and act (Tye 1996). In fact, in 
experiments showing above-chance performance in unconscious trials, the effects tend to be 
small and elicited only in forced-choice contexts. However, unconscious stimuli often differ 
from conscious ones in other ways besides consciousness. For instance, stimuli are often 
rendered unconscious by weakening perceptual stimulation (e.g., lower contrast, shorter 
presentation, higher noise, inattention, etc.), which has the effect of reducing the signal-to-
noise ratio of the perceptual evidence. A lower signal-to-noise ratio alters first-order 
representations, expectedly decreasing performance capacity and the effect of attentional 
magnification. In these cases, it is the decreased signal-to-noise ratio elicited by the 
stimulation conditions rather than the stimulus being unconscious what accounts for the 
difference in performance capacity. This is why it is crucial to insist that performance 
capacity is a confound that needs to be controlled for when searching for the NCC (see 
Chapter 3).  
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 This, of course, is not to deny consciousness has some function; although it does invite to 
rethink what the functions of consciousness might be. However, it does not seem to be a 
necessary trait of conscious experiences that they enable better performance than during 
unconscious processing. Still, some considerations are in place. First of all, it is worth 
emphasizing that in many experiments where unconscious performance is above chance it 
does not mean that it is as good as during conscious performance. Blindsighters, for instance, 
guess correctly very close to 100% of the time. But people with normal vision would respond 
correctly 100% of the time. This is consistent with the idea that when visual stimulation is 
matched, conscious vision might not yield any advantage over unconscious vision, but it 
might yield some advantage. This idea still goes against the often-assumed idea that 
consciousness offers a large advantage over unconscious processing. 
 As I argued in Chapter 1, it is quite possible that consciousness in general, and mental 
strength in particular, have a motivational function. It is hard to imagine how the initiation 
of directed actions would take place without consciousness. Blindsight patients, for instance, 
can detect and discriminate stimuli they are unaware of (Weiskrantz 1986). In some cases, 
they can even avoid obstacles while walking down a hallway (de Gelder et al. 2008). However, 
patients in these contexts are always prompted by the experimenters. In fact, they tend to be 
reluctant to comply with their instructions at first. The lack of awareness of the stimuli they 
are supposed to react to makes very unnatural for them to initiate behavior. Ned Block 
describes the imaginary case of superblindsighters (Block 1995). These are blindisighters 
who learn to prompt themselves to adventure guesses about objects in their blind fields. 
Eventually, their behavior would become indistinguishable from normal behavior despite the 
lack of consciousness. As far as I know, blindsighters cannot be thus trained. Finally, mental 
strength plays an important motivational role too. For example, there is less motivation to 
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take weak visual experiences at face value, and therefore act upon them, than when 
experiences are strong. Naturally, this important motivational role of mental strength is 
consistent with consciousness providing little to no advantage in visual processing. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
The current science of consciousness is gradually achieving maturity. Fair assessments of 
empirical evidence related to the NCC, however, require subtle and thorough theoretical 
work. Determining necessary and sufficient neural conditions for consciousness goes beyond 
merely ‘mapping’ conscious-related activity (or lack thereof) onto certain brain areas. First, 
detecting or failing to detect activity in a brain area is not immediately uncontroversial 
evidence in favor or against that area being the NCC. For instance, activity in certain areas 
during conscious conditions may be confounded with activity of some other cognitive 
capacities related to performance, attention or cognitive control. Also, activity supporting 
consciousness in normal situations may be subtle and, hence, hard to detect with traditional 
methods. In consequence, scientists and philosophers need to be cautious as a few null results 
may not be sufficient for ruling out certain area as an important NCC. Second, a simple 
mapping of relevant brain areas is insufficient for explaining the overall computational 
architecture supporting consciousness. Even if certain brain area is found to be related to 
consciousness, activity in that area could be consistent with different processing 
architectures. So, the NCC is probably better understood as brain-wide interconnected 
processing rather than isolated activity in a single brain area.  
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 Importantly, the empirical efforts behind the search for the NCC go beyond functional 
localization as they can also shed light on theoretical issues. As different theories make 
distinct predictions regarding the neurofunctional and computational architecture involved 
in consciousness, we can use empirical findings to arbitrate between these theories. The main 
predictions made by the Local Recurrency Theory regarding the NCC are not supported by 
current available evidence. A vast body of evidence using different methodologies privileges 
PFC as a crucial area for consciousness, which is incompatible with its central predictions. 
In contrast, both Global Workspace and Higher Order Theories predict PFC must have a 
major function in conscious awareness. From a study involving a formal model comparison, 
we concluded that a hierarchical computational model akin to HOT’s prediction of a serial 
processing stream is better supported than a dual-channel model akin to some versions of 
GWT’s prediction that objective and subjective processes are implemented in parallel. While 
this result is limited to the analyzed dataset, when considered along the systematic findings 
of PFC relevant role for consciousness, confidence in a hierarchical implementation of the 
NCC may be bolstered. 
 Finally, the data here presented point towards some important, although perhaps 
unexpected, features of the study of the NCC and consciousness itself. Firstly, the neural 
activity involved in conscious and unconscious perception may be largely shared. This 
suggests that the NCC involve subtle activity differences from unconscious processing which 
are detectable only by highly sensitive methods. Secondly, the function of consciousness may 
be limited. While a subtle difference in neural activity does not necessarily imply a subtle 
difference at the psychological, behavioral, or phenomenal level, it does make it a possibility. 
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Here I describe the technical details of the 2-choice discrimination simulation reported in 
Figures 8-11. All simulations were made in Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, MA). Equal 
Gaussian distributions were assumed for the internal response. The discrimination criterion 
(vertical solid line, Fig. 6) was simply the intersection of the two curves, which were 
arbitrarily placed at zero. The distributions for stimuli A and B were centered at μ=±d’/2, 
respectively, where sensitivity measure d’ equals 1 in Figures 8-10, it equals 2 in Figure 11a-
b and it equals 0.5 in Figure 11c-d. The awareness criteria were arbitrarily set at ±2 (vertical 
dashed lines, Fig. 6) for Figures 8-10 and to ±3 in Figure 11a-b and ±0.5 in Figure 11c-d. The 
activation waveform was stipulated to be a simple sine wave from 0 to 2π (Fig. 8a-c). For 
simplicity, the domain was extended to 3π, in which an additional wave was added to 
represent the extra activity in the aware condition (Fig. 8a). The domain was scaled to 500ms 
to maintain consistency with ERPs. The sine wave amplitude was directly proportional to the 
internal response. Specifically, the goal of the analysis was to recover the response that only 
appears from 2π to 3π (i.e., 333 ms to 500 ms), which was stipulated to be specific to 
awareness. Below, in Equation 1, A(unaware) and A(aware) are the amplitudes of the waveforms 
associated with unaware and aware trials at every time point, respectively. Finally, x 
represents the internal perceptual response, and t represents time in milliseconds. 
 
𝐴(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = {
𝑥 sin 𝑡 , 0 < 𝑡 < 333
0, 𝑡 > 333
    𝐴(𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 𝑥 sin 𝑡          Eq. (1) 
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 10,000 trials were used per simulation (Fig. 8) and performed LSB’s correction method 
as presented in their endnote 2. The results of this correction are presented in Figures 9 and 
11, whereas the results of the SDT-based correction method appear in Figures 10 and 11. 






          Eq. (2) 
 
where A is the amplitude of the waveform at each time point, UCobserved are the unconscious-
correct trials, UIobserved are the unconscious incorrect trials, and %UCchance is the expected 




% 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
∗ % 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒        Eq. (3) 
 
 Since we simulated, for computational simplicity, a 2-choice discrimination task rather 
than a 4-AFC task as was done in LSB, chance performance was 50% in all our simulations 
rather than 25%.  
 In the proposed correction method the awareness criteria can be inferred using standard 
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) (Maniscalco and Lau 2012). Note that the awareness criteria 
are slightly different from the standard discrimination criterion, but they are criteria all the 
same. So, in Equation 2 below the awareness criterion ac is determined by means of C and I, 
which represent the proportion of aware correct responses (analogous to hit rate) and the 
proportion of aware incorrect responses (analogous to false alarm rate), respectively. By using 
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these rates instead of the standard hit rate versus false alarm rate calculation, awareness 






                 Eq. (4) 
 
where z(C) and z(I) are the z-scores of C and I. 
 Because we worked in standardized space (i.e., the standard deviation of the Gaussians 
is 1), knowing ac allows us to estimate the mean internal perceptual response for each 
partition (Fig. 6) using expected value:  
 
𝐸(𝑋) =  ∫ 𝑥 ∗ 𝑝(𝑥) =
∫ 𝑥∗𝑓(𝑥)
∫ 𝑓(𝑥)
 𝑑𝑥                   Eq. (5) 
 
 This leaves us with the mean internal response for Stimulus A aware, Stimulus A 
unaware, Stimulus B aware, and Stimulus B unaware. Below, in Equation 6, 0 is the 
discrimination criterion, ac, as defined above, represents the awareness criterion, and x 
represents the internal perceptual response. Because the area under the curve of each 
partition is not 1, the means must be normalized. The equations are illustrated with Stimulus 
A as in Figure 2 (but it can trivially be altered for Stimulus B), and assumed f(x) to be a 
standard Gaussian distribution.  
 
𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 =














        Eq. (6) 
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 The ratio of the means is used as a way to scale the waveform associated with the 






∗ 𝐴(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒)           Eq. (7) 
 
 Finally, the A(unaware SDT-adjusted) waveform was subtracted from the A(aware) waveform to 
obtain the distinctive awareness waveform thus eliminating the potential performance 
confound. 
